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In 1981, the Chilean Social Security System was reformulated from a Defined-
Benefit program to a Defined-Contribution one.  The new law requires that only private 
pension fund managing companies called Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) handle 
individual saving accounts and return a minimum yield on funds to their affiliates.  An 
examination of the investment behavior of the PFAs reveals a great likeness in portfolio 
returns.  The mechanism used by PFAs to achieve similar performance is to mimic their 
asset allocations and domestic stocks trading.  The benchmark explains more than 95 
percent of portfolio performance variability across pension funds.  The asset allocation 
weights are equal across PFAs and there exists a high positive correlation among 
domestic stock weights.  PFAs copy the asset selection in large market capitalization 
stocks.  The legal framework of the reformed system encourages fund managers not to 
deviate from the average system return by herding in their investment decisions. 
Regarding the relationship between fund flows and performance and the 
determinants of investors’ (pensioners’) choice of PFA, evidence is found that (1) a 
positive and non-linear relationship exists between fund flows and performance, (2) past-
 vii
12-months performance and rankings are relevant to consumers, although larger accounts 
are more sensitive to these variables, (3) the number of customers in a PFA is stable even 
if it performs poorly, and (4) the marketing strategy commonly carried out by the best 
performer is advertising, while PFAs in the bottom positions tend to expend less on 
advertising.  These findings suggest that the best performing PFA according to rankings 
is slightly rewarded with larger flows from elderly or wealthier accounts.  However, the 
instability in the ranking position indicates that customers do not flock toward the top 
performer.  The market share across PFAs has tended to stay constant over time, 
indicating the short-lived effects of advertising. 
 viii
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the Chilean capital market, pension funds are the largest institutional investors 
with an asset value of US$35 billion, equivalent to 50 percent of the country’s GDP.  In 
contrast, life insurance companies and mutual funds represent 13 percent and 5 percent of 
Chile’s GDP, respectively.  Chilean pension funds started their activities as of May 1981 
after the government reformed the social security system from a defined-benefit program 
to a defined-contribution one.  Edwards (1998) characterizes the Chilean reform as 
pioneering in Latin America and stresses that it has contributed to the enlargement the 
Chilean saving rate from less than 10 percent to 29 percent.  In fact, this reform has been 
implemented in nine other Latin American countries: Peru (1992), Argentina and 
Colombia (1993), Uruguay (1995), Mexico, Bolivia, and El Salvador (1996) and 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (2001).1  Diamond (1993), Edwards (1998), and 
Iglesias and Acuña (2001) give a deeper and detailed description of the excellent 
performance of Chilean economic reforms during the 1980s.   
In spite of its economic benefits, the Pension Funds Act has been criticized for 
implicitly encouraging a lack of diversification due to constraints on the portfolio 
investment administered by the pension fund managing companies, called 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs).  
According to the Pension Funds Act, the government supervises both PFA operations and 
investments.  More importantly, it is obligated by law to assure both a minimum 
guaranteed return (MGR) on the clients’ funds and a minimum pension stream to 
 
1 Diamond (1993), Edwards (1998), and Iglesias and Acuña (2001) give a deeper and detailed description 
of the excellent performance of Chilean economic reforms during the 1980s.   
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pensioners.2  The commitment to attain this minimum yield is transferred directly from 
the government to the PFAs.  The MGR corresponds to the lower value between: either 
the weighted average real return minus 2 percent, or the weighted average real return 
minus 50 percent of its absolute value.  The law requires each PFA to hold a Margin 
Account equivalent to 1 percent of the fund value to warrant this commitment, which is 
directly funded by PFA’s shareholders.  If a PFA does not achieve the MGR, it must 
cover the difference between the current yield and the MGR with funds from the Margin 
Account.  In addition, its equityholders must restitute the initial value of this account 
within 15 days.  If a PFA fails in doing so, it is immediately liquidated.  In contrast, if a 
PFA gets a return superior to the yield between the weighted average real return plus 2 
percent and the weighted average real return plus 50 percent of the absolute value of the 
average return, whichever is higher, this excess would be accumulated in the Yield 
Fluctuation account.  This account is utilized to cover the event that the PFA does not 
realize the minimum return in the future. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the investment behavior of pension 
funds with regard to this legislation and how their clients make decisions with respect to 
which PFA to select.   
In Chapter 1, I review the literature on theoretical models of moral hazard and 
relative performance evaluation that are related to the type of compensation contract 
offered by the Chilean government to PFA managers.  Also, I review the herding 
literature, presenting theoretical models and empirical findings to explain similarities in 
returns perceived by PFAs.  Finally, I examine the literature on the relationship between 
past performance and fund flows to explain how clients make their decisions.  
 
2 The Pension Fund Act refers to clients as “afiliados” (i.e., affiliates). 
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In Chapter 2, I provide the background of the Chilean pension fund system, 
describing its evolution and the main points of the regulatory law related to investment 
constraints and the minimum guaranteed return. 
In Chapter 3, I study how the new system under the Pension Funds Act has 
influenced the investment style of money managers.  Specifically, the questions I address 
are: (i) how much of the return of each PFA is explained by the asset allocation, (ii) how 
pension funds are allocated among asset classes, and (iii) what mechanism the funds 
implement to reach similar returns.  I do not argue whether the new system is optimal in 
terms of resource allocation or whether a PFA’s behavior is correct.  Rather, I claim that 
the current legislation—which is based on the principle of relative performance 
evaluation—forces fund managers to stay as close as possible to the weighted average 
primarily due to the threat of punishment.  I find that in general PFAs tend to hold the 
same asset allocation.  The benchmark, defined as weighted average return of industry, 
explains more than 99 percent of return volatility.  When testing the differences in asset 
allocation, the null hypothesis that the weight coefficients are equal among funds is not 
rejected.  When pension funds change their asset allocation, fixed-income securities 
become perfect substitutes within themselves in yield, exhibiting great diversity of 
correlations.  However, the correlation of the stock weights across funds is perfectly 
positive.  Granger-causality tests suggest that the three largest funds are the leaders, and 
they move the market.  Medium funds have influence on the weighted average return; 
however, they tend to follow the three leaders, who account for more than 60 percent of 
assets value.  Finally, I examine stock trading using the methodology of Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Sias (2004) to appraise the possibility of herding.  The 
herding level tends to increase quickly (i) with the number of funds trading, (ii) within 
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the quintile Q1 of the largest market capitalization stocks, and (iii) during the Asian 
crisis.  
In Chapter 4, I examine how the clients choose among funds and how the pension 
funds compete to attract customers.  In particular, I consider whether past performance or 
ranking on performance influences investors’ decisions.  I also examine if advertising is 
commonly used to divulge information about significant events such as past performance 
and reductions in fees.  I find evidence of a positive and non-linear relationship between 
flows and past-12-months performance.  I also find that the number of clients in each 
fund remains relatively steady despite some funds being classified as losers in the 
ranking—that is, clients are less performance-sensitive to poor performers.  I also 
document a negative relationship between net flows and both fixed and variable fees.  
The biggest marketing efforts are mainly carried out by the winner fund in order to 
promote its past performance.  Funds that rank lower tend to spend less on their 
marketing strategy.  Finally, I find that the best performer increases its share of 
advertising expenses in a period between 1-month and 3-months.   
1.2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1.  Moral Hazard and Relative Performance Evaluation 
Conceptually speaking, the Pension Fund Act may be visualized as the contract 
offered to PFAs (Agents) by the government (Principal).  Managers must attain at least 
the minimum guaranteed return (MGR), which is calculated from the average return of all 
pension funds (benchmark).  Managers who do not obtain this MGR are punished.  The 
Chilean government evaluates pension fund managers based on the weighted average 
return across funds, that is, under relative performance evaluation. 
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The form in which fund managers are rewarded influences their behavior, and 
simultaneously, their actions (unobserved) affect the government’s wealth.  In general, 
the principal’s main problem is how to design a contract or compensation to induce the 
appropriate efforts of agents when the principal is unable to control non-observable 
efforts (moral hazard).  When writing a contract, the principal must include (i) individual 
rationality and (ii) incentive compatibility.  The first concept represents the manager’s 
willingness to participate in this market, taking into account the opportunity cost.  The 
second one means if the principal wants a manager to implement a specific action, that 
action should be congruent with the manager’s benefit maximization.  
The PFA performance (r) depends on the manager’s efforts (e) and a random 
component (P), which is beyond his control.  If a PFA manager is risk-averse, then the 
government should compensate him for bearing risk due to changes in his salary 
triggered by the exogenous term.  In this case, there exists a trade-off for the manager 
between making a reasonable effort and reducing the amount of risk.  Sharpe (1981) 
postulates that specialization and diversification are two reasons to prefer a manager team 
to a single agent.  However, Barry and Starks (1984), continuing with Sharpe’s notion, 
argue that risk-sharing is a sufficient argument to select multiple agents.  This principle 
means that sharing independent risks reduces the total cost of risk-bearing.   
Holsmtrom (1979), in one of the leading papers in the moral hazard literature, 
shows that the wage contract is increasing in relation to single agent’s output and that any 
information on actions may be used to design the contract.  Holmstrom (1982) widens his 
analysis to agent teams and claims the actions of one agent are informative for the 
principal of other agents, especially if their outputs are correlated.  In this case, 
competition among workers is fruitful for the principal.  Lazear and Rosen (1981) show 
that when agents do not collude, wages based on rank-order contest provides incentive to 
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agents to acquire skills and increase their efforts.  Mookherjee (1984) extends the moral 
hazard problem to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance 
evaluation (RPE) in optimal incentive contracting.  However, the principal cannot 
identify with precision whether a high performance is the result of high effort (eh) 
realized by the manager or high shock (Ph). 
One way to solve the problem for defining a reward scheme is to consider 
observable factors that allow identifying the type of effort implemented by each PFA 
manager through relative performance.  Holmstrom (1982), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), 
and Prendergast (1999) say that the optimal compensation should be based on relative 
performance since it is more informative about the fund managers’ efforts 
(Informativeness Principle).  The manager’s reward would depend on his performance 
and peer-performance.  In effect, Gibbons and Murphy (1990), in their empirical study of 
CEO compensation, state that RPE insulates agents from random shocks, which influence 
performance.  Despite RPE reducing risk exposure of a risk-averse agent, a manager may 
realize efforts that affect the average return of the group (collusion) when compensation 
is based exclusively on RPE.  They provide evidence that CEOs are evaluated relative to 
market movements rather than industry movements.  Mookherjee (1984) argues that the 
principal may extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses.  This 
implies that under perfect correlation in agents’ performance, the principal may get the 
first best by setting heavy penalties on agents.  Naik and Maug (1995) derive an optimal 
contract for delegated portfolio management that contains RPE; they show that managers 
ignore their own superior information and “go with the flow.”  If a contract is contingent 
on performance relative to a fund manager’s peers, then asset allocation realized by that 
manager depends not only on expected returns but also correlation of the returns with 
those they are compared with. 
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The literature on multiple agents indicates that there are often multiple Nash 
equilibria ranked differently by agents and investors—that is, agents could cooperate to 
reach an outcome other than that desired by the principal.  In their model, Naik and Maug 
(1995) conclude that an RPE contract induces smart managers to herd with dumb ones in 
spite of their superior information.  This is the opposite of what Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) observed.  Herding arises due to the RPE nature of the compensation contract.  
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) explore benefits to the principal of inducing 
cooperation among agents (sharing tasks), as managers may work either individually or 
in cooperation.  They show that if two tasks are uncorrelated, the principal prefers a 
cooperative game to a competitive one, but if tasks are correlated and the compensation 
scheme of each agent depends on what the other does, then managers tend to collude.  If 
tasks are correlated and the principal organizes them in a competitive system, the 
expected contracting costs decrease monotonically as the correlation coefficient 
increases.   
Unlike Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991), Pichler (2002) considers not only that 
the principal is risk-averse but that managers may either herd or ignore others’ efforts.  
He examines portfolio management in teams under moral hazard, analyzing 
noncooperative and cooperative forms.  In the first form, managers are not able to 
monitor each other.  In contrast, in the second form, they can engage in side contracts.  
His conclusion is that the optimal contract depends on the risk attitudes of both principal 
and managers.  If managers are risk tolerant, the efficient contract is not to herd, which is 
a strictly competitive contract (noncooperation form).  If a manager is risk-averse, a 
competitive contract imposes risk on individual managers because some managers are 
winners and some are losers.  The intention of managers to herd will depend on (i) 
relative strength of incentives and (ii) the risk attitude of the manager.  In cooperative 
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form, if a manager is risk-averse, the first best (optimal solution) requires that the wage 
be based on team performance and not on an individual manager’s performance.  If a 
manager is risk-tolerant, then first best without herding can never be achieved if 
cooperation is infeasible.  If cooperation is feasible among managers, the cost of 
discouraging herding decreases for some parameters.  Kapur and Timmermann (2002) 
examine how portfolio choice changes with the compensation schemes by examining 
contracts that reward a manager when he out-performs his peers’ performance and 
penalizes him when he under-performs.  They conclude that those contracts tend to 
exacerbate herding in managers by holding the benchmark portfolios and lowering risk 
premium in stocks.  
In sum, RPE-based contracts induce managers to collude with each other, creating 
the tendency to herd investment decisions. 
1.2.2.  Herding as Investment Behavior 
In the financial literature, herding is defined as a decisive intention of managers to 
copy investment decisions made by others regardless of their own information 
(intentional herding)3.  Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) distinguish 3 possible reasons to 
herd: (i) manager thinks others know something that he doesn’t and their actions are 
informative for him, (ii) compensation contract implicitly rewards imitation, and (iii) 
preferences for conformity driven by specific payoffs that affect compensation of others. 
The term herding is referred to as informational cascade by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer 
and Welch (1992).  Banerjee (1992) argues that herd externality is inefficient from social 
viewpoint. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) describe a herding model of reputation, where 
there are two types of agents, smart and dumb, and the investor infers their abilities even 
 
3See, for example, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998), 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2001), and Devenon and Welch (1996). 
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if their investment decisions are identical.  Herding arises when the smart manager makes 
her choice and then the next manager follows this choice, regardless of his own signals, 
because low performance occurs by chance and high performance is due to managers’ 
capabilities.  
Several empirical papers have documented different herding levels.  Lakonishok, 
Sleifer, and Vishny (referred to as LSV) (1992) wrote the determining document in the 
literature on herding measure.  LSV (1992) define herding as the tendency of funds to 
trade a given stock together and in the same direction.  A group of funds exhibits herding 
when there is unbalance between funds that buy and funds that sell a given stock.  There 
is herding behavior when a proportion of funds that trade in a stock in the same direction 
(buy–sell) is above the expected proportion of funds trading in that direction under the 
null hypothesis of independent trading decisions by the funds.  This kind of herding 
appraisal allows the differentiation of spurious herding from intentional herding as 
defined by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001). 
LSV (1992) look at 769 pension funds, managed by 341 different portfolio 
managers between 1985 and 1989, and find the herding level was not significant (2.7 
percent).  Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), who use the LSV (1992) measure, 
examine the extent to which herding and momentum investing affect the performance of 
155 mutual funds over the period 1975-1984 and find weak evidence of herding 
strategies (2.5 percent).  Wermers (1999) analyzes the trading of the mutual fund industry 
from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds herd when they trade stocks and to 
investigate the impact of herding on stock prices.  Using the LSV (1992) approach, he 
finds a low level of herding among mutual funds (3.4 percent); however, there is a 
stronger herding effect among growth-oriented mutual funds and in small and winner 
stocks.  Nofsinger and Sias (1999) study two types of shareholders (institutional and 
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individual) and focus on annual changes in ownership, exploring how changes in 
institutional ownership are related to lag returns (feedback trading) and momentum.  
Their results reveal positive annual changes in institutional ownership and returns.  The 
decile of stocks experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership outperforms 
by more than 31 percent the decile experiencing the largest decrease.  Choe, Kho, and 
Stulz (1999) find that foreign investors herded in the Korean market before the Asian 
crisis in the smallest quintile of market capitalization stocks (6.9 percent) but not during 
the crisis.  Lobao and Serra (2002) test herding in Portuguese mutual funds over the 
period of 1998-2000 and evidence a strong herding level (11 percent).  
A different approach to measure herding is that described by Sias (2004).  He 
examines trading activity of five institutional investors for 60 quarters and addresses the 
question of whether institutional investors herd.  He analyzes a cross-sectional correlation 
between demand for a security last quarter and demand for the security this quarter.  
Unlike the LSV (1992) approach, Sias’s method captures the effect that traders may 
follow their own pattern or another’s over adjacent periods.  The herding value he finds is 
equally explained by a manager’s own trading activity and by others’ trades. 
1.2.3.  Past Performance and Fund Flows 
Many articles in the financial literature examine the relationship between past 
performance and money flows.  Ippolito (1992) presents evidence that funds that do 
better than the market tend to experience a more positive response than those that do 
worse.  Sirri and Tufano (1993) show that top-performing funds receive net inflows, yet 
funds that perform poorly do not lose many assets.  Gruber (1996) illustrates that the flow 
of new money into the best performing funds is much larger than flows out of the poorer 
performing funds.  Sirri and Tufano (1998) study household behavior by analyzing fund 
flows in U.S. mutual funds and find that consumers are fee-sensitive and react 
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asymmetrically to past performance, especially in those funds that realize more marketing 
activities as a mechanism to reduce costly search.   
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) examine in mutual funds and pension funds the 
relationship of flow-performance under three flow definitions and show that pension fund 
clients react more slowly to poor performers than do mutual fund investors.  Mutual fund 
investors strongly flock toward top performing funds.  Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003) 
postulate that investors recognize increase in volatility and hence fund flows are less 
sensitive when performance is more volatile.  Zheng (1999), using flow measure in 
dollars, finds top performer funds get more money, but this is a short-run effect. 
Likewise, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) find short-run persistence level of 
superior performance (hot hands).   
Goezmann and Ibbotson (1994) claim the best performing managers in the past 
are likely to be the best performing managers in the future.  Goetzmann and Peles (1994) 
suggest that people tend to buy funds that have done well in the past, but after purchasing 
a fund, if that fund performs poorly, these investors are reluctant to admit their mistake 
due to cognitive dissonance.  Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) study how incentives 
affect fund managers’ behavior by viewing the mutual fund industry as a tournament.  
Top performers relative to their peers tend to receive higher compensation since investors 
flow toward funds with higher performance.  This produces an adverse incentive on fund 
managers to change their portfolio risk when their performance is behind that of their 
peers as a way to maximize their compensation.  Similarly, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) 
argue that a positive relationship between fund flow and performance encourages fund 
managers to alter the riskiness of the portfolio.  Relative performance evaluation 
generates the undesirable incentive in managers to increase portfolio volatility because 
investors are top fund seekers.   
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In the following chapters, I use this bibliography to analyze the Chilean pension 
funds.  (All the tables referred to in the following chapters appear near the end of the 
document as appendices.) 
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Chapter 2: Overview of Chilean Pension Funds 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I provide general information on Chilean pension funds from 1981 
to 2001, specifically: 
• the causes that drove the reform of the Chilean Social Security system 
from a defined-benefits program to a defined-contribution one 
• the evolution of asset values 
• the main features of the pension fund law relative to investments and 
minimum guaranteed return 
• general statistics of market share, average returns, revenues, expenses and 
assets.  
2.2.  BACKGROUND 
2.2.1.  Overview of the Chilean Social Security System Reform  
The Social Security system began functioning in 1924 under the form of pay-as-
you-go (PAYG), a defined-benefit program.  PAYG was a collective contribution 
program with several pension schemes for different types of workers.  In fact, each 
program, administered by institutions with distinct objectives, granted a variety of 
pensions depending upon industry category, worker’s age, and the number of working 
years.  In the 1960s, as a consequence of a demographic trend, the PAYG system started 
progressively exhibiting severe problems of financing.  In the period 1960-1970, the 
number of contributors per retiree decreased from 10.8 to 4.4.  Additionally, the disparity 
in the benefits conferred to workers of the same working situation (due to political 
privileges), the mismanagement of pension funds invested (non-indexed to inflation rate 
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and loans to workers), and the increasing government funding obligated the government 
to reform the pension system.4 
The Pension Funds Act replaced the PAYG system in May of 1981.  The 
fundamental tenet of this reform lies in the creation of mandatory individual savings 
accounts administered exclusively by private fund managing companies called 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs).  The 
government office called the Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones or Superintendence of Pension Fund Administrators (SPFA) strictly regulates 
PFAs’ operations and investments carried out on behalf of Pension Funds.5  In addition, 
by regulation, the government is responsible to guarantee a minimum cash flow stream to 
pensioners and a minimum guaranteed return (MGR) on funds managed by PFAs.  The 
accountability for achieving this MGR is delegated to PFAs.  
Regarding compulsory savings, dependent workers must contribute 10 percent of 
their taxable salary to their individual saving accounts monthly.  A supplementary 
percentage (around 3 percent) is charged to finance management fees and disability–life 
insurance.  Savings accounts cannot be used as collateral by workers to warrant any 
financial transaction.  The employers are the responsible agents to deposit these monthly 
contributions directly to each PFA.  Each worker has the freedom to choose any PFA; 
however, she cannot divide her individual savings among different pension funds.  The 
law prohibits PFAs from charging any fees on cumulated funds in the savings accounts 
 
4 SPFA (1999), Edwards (1998) and Godoy and Valdes-Prieto (1997) provide good overviews on the 
historical evolution of the Chilean pension system.  
5 The Pension Fund is the sum of individual saving accounts. A PFA is a privately-owned or publicly-
owned entity with a board and shareholders.  Both institutions possess independent financial statements and 
portfolio holdings.  The current legislation also regulates the “conflict of interests” between the PFA and 
the Pension Funds with respect to the participation of PFAs on behalf of Pension Funds in shareholder 
meetings of security issuers.  
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(asset value) but exclusively on monthly taxable salaries.  Even though PFAs are allowed 
to charge fees on transfer of the client’s funds, no institution does.   
Every month, workers must pay both variable and fixed fees for PFA services.  
The variable fee is a percentage of a worker’s taxable income.  This percentage ranges 
from 2.3 to 2.8 percent of a worker’s income; the average charged by PFAs in 2001 was 
2.5 percent.  The fixed fee is just a flat rate that is not based on income; the average fixed 
fee is $581 (US $0.90).6  The variable fee for managing the funds accounts for 85 percent 
of PFAs’ total revenue (the other 15 percent is capital gains from investing in the 
market).  The worker’s taxable income is defined as the monthly salary before withheld 
taxes and health care deductions.  Those with higher salaries definitely pay higher fees 
because their monthly deposits are larger; however, the law sets a maximum of $1.0 
million (US $1,500) of a worker’s salary from which to make mandatory contributions to 
a savings account and from which to calculate the variable fee.  For instance, if a 
worker’s salary is $2.0 million, her monthly contribution to her savings account would be 
$0.1 million, and the PFA would get a monthly variable fee payment of $25,581.  
However, if a worker is laid off or otherwise loses her job, no monthly contribution is 
deposited in her account, and no monthly fee can be charged by the PFA, even though the 
PFA must continue to manage her savings account.  If she starts working again, she has 
no legal responsibility to pay any “back” fees for having her fund managed during the 
months she was unemployed.   
Regarding the number of funds under management, each PFA was initially 
allowed to manage just one fund.  Legislative changes in 2000 gave PFAs the authority to 
administer two funds (Type I and II).  The main differences between them are their 
 
6 Data is expressed in Chilean pesos.  I present some tables in U.S. dollars just to provide to readers a 
general overview of the system, but findings are computed using local currency.  The amount of $581 
converted to US dollars is US$ 0.90. 
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investment limit and the type of client they serve.  For instance, for government bonds, 
the maximum limit of investment for the funds Type I and II is 80 percent and 50 percent, 
respectively.  Fund Type I is designed to draw clients who are near their retirement date; 
however, a contributor cannot divide his PFA-managed savings between both types of 
funds.  In August 2002, lawmakers authorized the running of five funds as a way to 
spread out the investment alternatives for clients (Funds A, B, C, D, and E).7  Currently, 
each worker may select to split his savings between two funds but in only one institution. 
2.2.2.  Evolution of Pension Funds System 
The new system began to operate with twelve PFAs and US$296 million in asset 
value.  As of 2001, only 7 PFAs remain in the market with the total value in funds of 
US$35 billion, equivalent to nearly 50 percent of the Chilean GDP.  Although the system 
reached a maximum of 21 managing companies in 1994, this number diminished to seven 
by 2001 as a result of eleven acquisitions and three license cancellations.  Iglesias and 
Acuña (2001) blame the excessive and growing concentration in this industry by 
economies of scale on the number of clients and the legal barriers required of a 
mandatory margin account (equivalent to 1 percent of pension funds assets).  However, 
the pension system was, from the beginning, dominated strongly by three large pension 
funds.  The three largest institutions, Provida, Habitat, and Cuprum, have concentrated a 
great proportion of market share.  In fact, from the first year of operation of the pension 
fund system, this group has concentrated approximately 71 percent of the funds’ value.8   
Table 2.1 depicts the evolution of number of institutions, pension funds value (as 
percentage of GDP and in U.S. dollars), yearly real return, and market concentration 
 
7 Fund A is a long-term investment plan that invests in securities with a greater weight in stocks.  In 
contrast, Fund E is highly concentrated in fixed income securities and designed for those who are near their 
retirement date. 
8 This point attains an important relevance when we talk about the Minimum Guaranteed Return 
determined on the base of the weighted average return of the asset values.   
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given by Herfindahl index.  The Herfindahl index (HI) is a measure of market 
concentration and is calculated by squaring the market share of each PFA and then 
summing those squares.  As of 2001, when there were seven PFAs, the HI value was 
0.21, which is similar to the HI value in 1981, when there were twelve funds.  Some 
PFAs were neither able to achieve the break-even point nor capture significant market 
share, so their inevitable destiny was the merger.  Merged PFAs reported consecutively 
negative net operating incomes because of the low client level, despite generating similar 
returns to other institutions.   
In the sample period 1997:06–2001:12, the number of PFAs went from thirteen 
(in 1997) to seven (in 2001) as a result of a series of mergers.  Mergers have been the 
most effective mechanism used by funds to increase market share.  The absorbed 
institutions were not capable of achieving the break-even point in the number of clients.  
Table 2.1 illustrates the evolution of the market share of survivor and defunct funds 
through time measured by the number of clients (Panel A) and by asset values (Panel B).  
By 2001, the largest fund (PFA Provida) has 40 percent of all clients and 31 percent of 
assets.  With 6.9 percent of the clients but 17.5 percent of the assets, PFA Cuprum has the 
greatest account value per client. Another crucial feature in the sample period was the 
drop in mean value of monthly variable fees across funds from 3.0 percent to 2.5 percent. 
To exemplify the likeness in performance, Table 2.2 presents the returns distribution of 
pension funds for selective months.9.  The worst performance exhibited by PFAs is during 
the Russian crisis (Sept-98) with an average return of -3.8 percent and a standard 
deviation of 0.36 percent.  The average difference between the maximum and minimum 
monthly returns is 0.47 percent with a standard deviation of 0.24 percent.  However, the 
average monthly difference between the largest fund return (PFA 9) and the industry 
 
9 The averages and standard deviations are computed with all returns. 
 18
                                                
average is 0.01 percent—the same number that results when computing this difference 
with a medium fund (PFA 11).  The average monthly difference (not listed) between the 
highest performer (1.02 percent) and the next highest one (0.89 percent) is 0.13 percent, 
but the standard deviations of their monthly returns are identical, 1.84 percent.  In 
addition, Graphs 1 and 2 plot the returns and differences in returns between the highest 
performance and next highest one and between the highest return and lowest one.  It is 
striking that performance lines overlap each other.   
In contrast, Chilean mutual funds, classified into categories such as fixed income 
and variable funds, epitomize a steady growth in the number of funds and dissimilarity in 
performance.  As of December 1999, there existed 14 mutual funds with 115 funds, and 
in 2001, this industry was composed of 17 mutual funds and 177 funds.  Their asset 
values, equivalent to 10 percent of PFAs’ asset values, grew between those years from 
$2,151 million to $3,313 million.  Also, regulation of mutual funds is less restrictive than 
that of pension funds.  Investment constraints are fundamentally focused on avoiding 
concentration by security issuers.10.  Neither the government nor mutual funds are 
obligated to guarantee any minimum return on funds.  Each mutual fund may charge any 
fee by management on the basis of asset values.  PFAs, on the other hand, cannot charge 
fees on asset values.  Within each category, mutual funds have exhibited a wide range of 
management fees and returns.  In fact, Maturana and Walker (1999) find that stock funds 
present similar returns to passive strategies, but the differences in annual returns among 
funds are as large as 10 percent.  
 
10 Unlike mutual fund regulation, PFA legislation considers liquidity and concentration factors to estimate 
the investment constraints. Olivares (2003) describes that the PFA constraints. 
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2.3.  REGULATION ON INVESTMENTS AND RETURN 
2.3.1.  On Investments 
The most striking features of the Pension Funds Act are those related to regulation 
on investment and the PFAs’ accountability in yielding a minimum return.  PFAs may 
invest in securities specifically authorized by law.  The extensive list of choices 
comprises domestic securities and foreign assets such as government bonds, banking 
deposits, corporate bonds, stocks, mortgage-backed securities, and REIT shares.  The 
Risk Rating Commission is the organization in charge of assessing the eligible securities 
for pension fund holdings.  No PFA can allocate funds in assets rated in a category 
inferior to BBB.11  The regulation also restrains the maximum limits of investment, 
expressed as percentage of funds according to (i) security, (ii) issuer, (iii) family of 
securities, (iv) issuers related to the PFA by ownership or management, and (v) exposure 
to specific risk.  In light of this, the SPFA controls investments by means of factors.  
These factors are applied to an issuer’s net asset value as funds value.12  For instance, the 
limit of investment by security is equivalent to 37 percent of the pension fund value.  The 
limit by issuer is a defined percentage relative to fund value, new stock issuance, and 
issued total stocks.  Table 2.3 summarizes the main limits on investment of pension funds 
in the period relevant to our research and illustrates some examples of the application of 
these limits. 
As of 1981, pension funds held basically four assets in their portfolios: 
government bonds, deposits in banks, mortgage-backed securities, and corporate bonds.  
 
11 Government bonds are rated AAA.  One of many ways of supervising the investment is to use “factors” 
that run from 1.0 to 0.0.  Securities rated below BBB receive a multiplicative factor of 0.0.  Those AAA 
assets get 1.0.  In the following paragraphs, we explain this in detail. 
12 These factors are (i) liquidity, (ii) liquid assets, (iii) concentration of major shareholders, (iv) risk rating, 
(v) diversification and (vi) single multiple. 
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Under the new Pension Funds Act, step-by-step, the government started increasing the 
eligibility of new assets.  Stocks became part of portfolio holdings in 1985 as a product of 
not only the privatization process of government-owned companies but also the profound 
reform of capital markets.  Real estate shares were incorporated in 1989 and foreign 
securities in 1992.  Table 2.4 shows the yearly composition of portfolio holdings of the 
pension funds system from the beginning in 1981 to 2001.  This evolution of asset 
holdings was highly forced by the SPFA by forbidding fund managers from investing in 
risky assets. 
2.3.2.  On the Minimum Guaranteed Return (MGR) 
Article No. 37 of the Pension Funds Act establishes that in each month, each PFA 
will be responsible for the past-36-months annualized real rate of return of each of its 
funds not being inferior to whichever is lower,13 either: 
• the past-36-months annualized average return across funds of the same type minus 2 
percent, or  
• the past-36-months annualized average return across funds of the same type minus 50 
percent of absolute value of this average return. 
For example, if the weighted real average return were 4 percent, both alternatives 
converge at 2 percent.  If the average real return of the system were either higher than 4 
percent or lower than minus 4 percent, then the lower boundary would be the average 
minus 50 percent of this return.  However, if the average real return lies between 4 
percent and minus 4 percent, then the warranted return would be realized by the average 
 
13  Some authors have wrongly translated this article saying, “not be inferior to whichever becomes the 
higher.” 
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minus 2 percent. In October 1999, the legislation extended the measure horizon from the 
past-12-months return to the past-36-months return.14
In order to guarantee this condition, the legal framework requires that PFAs keep 
two margin accounts.  Each PFA must hold, at any moment, the equivalent of 1 percent 
of the value of each fund that it manages in an account called Mandatory Reserve, which 
is financed directly by its shareholders.15  This reserve must be deposited in the Central 
Bank of Chile and invested in a portfolio similar to that of the fund.  The second account, 
called Yield Fluctuation Reserve, is constituted by the excess of return over the minimum 
return.  If the past-36-months current real return is the higher between the average return 
plus 2 percent and the average real return plus 50 percent of its absolute value, the excess 
is accumulated in this account.  If a PFA does not achieve the MGR, it must first use the 
Yield Fluctuation Reserve to meet this requisite.16  If that is not possible, the PFA must 
withdraw the needed money to make up this difference from the Mandatory Reserve 
account, and its equityholders must restore the initial value of this account within 15 
days.  If the PFA does not accomplish this requirement or its shareholders do not 
supplement the required funds, the SPFA will liquidate it ipso facto, finance the required 
resources to meet the yield obligation, and transfer the fund’s assets to another PFA.17   
The MGR requisite is calculated across funds of the same type, i.e., the MGR of 
fund Type I is absolutely obtained from the past-36-months weighted average real return 
 
14 Valck and Walker (1995) had already criticized the short evaluation period and postulated that extending 
the evaluation horizon would allow different investment strategies.  Later, I analyze how this change 
affected the behavior of pension funds. 
15 As the system has not reached yet its maturity (inflows>outflows), each PFA must permanently finance 
the requirement of the Mandatory Reserve.  
16 Each fund managed by a PFA possesses its own Mandatory Reserve and Yield Fluctuation Reserve.  
Both Margin Accounts are independent among funds of a PFA and cannot be combined among funds to 
meet the deficit of return of a fund in particular.   
17 Professional organizations, unions, and local companies owned most small and merged pension funds.  
Currently, international financial corporations manage five of the seven pension funds.  Due to Mandatory 
Reserve requisite, large companies with good access to the capital market possess a competitive advantage 
over unions and professional organizations to raise new money. 
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of all funds defined as Type I.  This means that the performance of a type of fund is 
unrelated to what other funds of other types realize. In fact, the Pension Funds Act tries to 
unlink the funds’ performance administered by each PFA by setting Margin Accounts 
and MGRs per type of fund. Edwards (1998) affirms that this specific constraint causes 
PFAs to handle similar portfolios.  Likewise, Valck and Walker (1995) and Iglesias and 
Acuña (2001) state that this return obligation and the short evaluation period tend to 
punish divergent portfolios. 
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Chapter 3: Investment Behavior of Pension Funds 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the investment behavior of the Chilean Pension Funds.  I 
start by documenting the main statistical patterns of the returns.  Then, I examine the 
main determinants of such returns..  Specifically, the issues I examine are: (i) how 
pension funds are allocated among asset classes, (ii) how much of the return of each PFA 
is explained by the asset allocation, (iii) how similar are the funds’ returns, and (iv) what 
explains the similarities across fund returns.  In addition, I use the methodologies of 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Sias (2004) to measure herding activity.   
To briefly preview the results, I find that the mechanism used by pension funds to 
achieve similar performance is to mimic their asset allocations and domestic stocks 
trading.  I also find that the asset allocation weights are equal across pension funds and 
there exists a high positive correlation among domestic stock weights.  In relation to 
stock holdings, I find that pension funds particularly copy the asset selection in large 
market capitalization stocks. I conclude that the legal framework encourages fund 
managers not to deviate from the average system return by herding in their investment 
decisions. The contract offered by the government to managers is based on RPE, which, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, may be inducing PFA managers to collude in their 
actions to avoid being penalized. 
3.2.  METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1.  Data and Methodology 
I utilize a monthly data set collected on the fund Type I directly from the 
Superintendence of Chilean Pension Funds for the period June of 1997 and December of 
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2001 in Chilean pesos.  It contains detailed information on monthly portfolio holdings, 
quota value, and financial statements of each pension fund.  This data comprises all 
PFAs. Our sample includes the thirteen institutions that functioned in 1997 and the seven 
that still survived in 2001.  This allows us not only to keep our study free of survivorship 
bias as argued by Mankiel (1995) and Brown and Goetzmman (1995) but also to analyze 
the investment behavior that the merged PFAs followed and compare it with that of the 
survivor PFAs.  Monthly information on stock prices, stock index value, and issued total 
stocks come from a Chilean Stock Exchange database.  I exclusively consider the Type I 
fund because it has more observations compared to the Type II fund, which started its 
operation in 2000 after an amendment to the legislation.  The two fund types are 
completely unrelated since each one has its own investment limits and the minimum 
return condition is computed across the same type of fund.   
Although I display descriptive information on the pension funds system in some 
tables using both Chilean pesos and U.S. dollars; the data and findings are computed in 
Chilean pesos.  In fact, PFA share values, asset allocations, stock prices, and portfolio 
holdings are processed in Chilean pesos.  There is no benchmark portfolio in the Chilean 
market, aside from two stock indices prepared by the Santiago Stock Exchange.18  To 
compare the investment strategy of pension funds, I define the benchmark portfolio as the 
summation of total holdings of the pension funds industry.  The benchmark performance 
is calculated as defined in the law: the average return across funds weighted by asset 
values of each fund.  The asset allocation of the benchmark corresponds to total money 
allocation realized by all PFAs in different assets.  However, although the weighted 
average portfolio is biased by the largest three funds, I compute an equally weighted 
portfolio from all funds (simple average) in both return and asset allocation weights on 
 
18 The indices are IPSA formed with the 40 largest stocks and IGPA with all stocks. 
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five asset classes.  In the case of pension funds, the set of alternatives is provided by 
investment constraints and by weighted average portfolio.  As a reference, in the 
regulatory benchmark portfolio, the smallest and largest fund weights, measured by asset 
values, account for 2 percent and 33 percent, respectively, of the total, but in the simple 
average portfolio, both represent 8 percent. 
This study covers the period beginning in June of 1997 to take advantage of the 
fact that most of the data starting from this period is available electronically.  However, I 
also provide readers with an overview of the Chilean pension system using yearly 
information from May of 1981 to December of 2001 obtained from the Bulletins 
published by the Superintendence as well as a special SPFA study called “Evolución del 
Sistema Chileno de Pensiones (Evolution of the Chilean Pension System), 1981-1997.”   
These bulletins compile statistics on the clients, pension funds, fees and fund asset 
values.  Table 3.1 presents this descriptive statistics in Panels A and B.   
The period under study (June 1997 to December 2001) includes several events 
that provide very useful variation that will allow a rich understanding of the behavior of 
pension funds.  Specifically, the period includes: (i) the financial crises of Asia, which 
lasted from 1997:06 to 1998:01, and of Russia in 1998:08, (ii) a series of 
mergers/acquisitions that reduced the number of PFAs from thirteen to seven, (iii) a deep 
fall in domestic share portfolio weight from 31 percent to near 10 percent of total pension 
fund assets, and (iv) a change in legislation that widened the evaluation period to 
calculate the MGR from 12 months to 36 months.  
In relation to the portfolio holdings, the asset allocation is divided into five 
categories: shares, bonds, banking deposits, foreign securities, and mortgage-backed 
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securities together with REIT shares.19  To describe the performance of the funds, I 
calculate both simple arithmetic and weighted averages of the industry return.  I define 
the variable premium in returns as the difference between the return of fund (i) and the 
benchmark return (both simple and weighted average), and I define the variable premium 
per asset class as the difference between a fund’s asset allocation weight and the asset 
allocation weight of the whole industry (both simple and weighted).  Stocks are clustered 
by quintiles of market capitalization (size), by economic sector, and by ranking of size 
within each quintile.  For each month, I compute the quintiles, returns, and ranking based 
on the monthly stock returns and values.  
3.2.2.  Hypotheses  
I postulate that the RPE-based contract defined as MGR encourages pension fund 
managers to achieve similar returns in order to not deviate from the weighted average 
return.  (Given the regulation, this industry return emerges as natural benchmark.)  This 
hypothesis suggests that the expected behavior of a fund manager would be to replicate 
the investment decisions made by others in response to financial sanctions that would 
harm his shareholders if his performance lies below this minimum return.  I investigate 
the strategic asset allocation and stock trading activity carried out by fund managers.  The 
study of stock trading activity and its asset selection is of real importance to test the 
existence of likeness in returns, considering that stock holdings weight not only 
dramatically decreases by two-thirds through time, but is also the main variable-income 
asset.20  In fact, the other four assets belonging to the asset allocation correspond to fixed-
 
19 Originally, I considered seven asset classes: stocks, government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign assets, 
deposits, MBS, and REIT shares; and our findings were not significantly different from those with five 
asset classes. 
20 Replicating investment strategy does not necessarily imply similarity in returns.  Lakonishok et al. 
(1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Choe et al.(1999) and Wermers (1999) find that, despite fund managers tend 
to copy investment strategies, their performances are different. 
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income securities since a great proportion of foreign assets is allocated in bonds.  The 
questions addressed are: 
1. how much of the return of each PFA is explained by the “benchmark”—i.e., 
whether pension funds are pursuing an asset allocation such that they achieve 
performance analogous to the industry average, 
2. how pension funds allocate among asset classes—in other words, how diverse 
PFA’s investment policy is relative to benchmark portfolio, 
3. what mechanism the funds implement to reach similar returns.  I test the time-
series of the asset allocation weight deviations with respect to benchmark 
portfolio are different among funds and whether managers tend to mimic the stock 
trading activity. 
3.3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.3.1.  On Asset Allocation 
To address the first question—the importance of the weighted average return (the 
benchmark) to explain the pension funds’ performance—I run regressions for each PFA 
and for different fund groups against the benchmark.  I group funds to determine whether 
the results of individual funds are different from those of fund groups and whether some 
funds exhibit similar characteristics in different periods of time.  I divide the pension 
funds into six subsets to find out whether fund size, financial crises, and number of 
competitors in the market provide different results.  This division into groups is 
especially useful to detect whether leaders, survivors, acquirers, and defunct funds exhibit 
similarities or differences in asset allocation:21   
 
21 In this document, the benchmark is the weighted average return defined in the law. However, Hensel, 
Ezra, and Ilkiw (1991) propose “the average of what everybody is holding” as benchmark portfolio for U.S. 
pension funds. 
Group 1 = the three largest funds.  
Group 2 = the two medium funds. 
Group 3 = the two smallest funds. 
Group 4 = the seven funds that survived to 2001 (from the 13 existing in 1997). 
Group 5 = the three funds that acquired other institutions and survived.  
Group 6 = the six funds that were acquired and did not survive.22  
To test how much the variability of group return, expressed by R-squared, is due 
to the benchmark, I analyze Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for the whole period (55 months), 
and I analyze all six groups for the periods corresponding to the Asian and Russian crises 
and for the period during which only 7 funds remained in the market (2001:02–2001:12).  
To find out if there are individual differences across funds that I could get rid of by 
grouping funds into portfolios, I apply the prior methodology to each fund.  I regress 
Model (3.1) for those groups and for individual funds.  The dependent variable is 
RetPFA(i,t), return of both individual funds and funds group (i) during time (t).  The 
independent variable is the weighted average return, RetBenchmark(t).  
 
(3.1) , ,Re *Rei t i i t i ttPFA tBenchmarkα β ε= + +  
i = individual funds (1,2…13) and funds group (1,..6), t = period 1,..55 
Table 3.2 reports the outcomes of this model in Panels A and B.  When the 
regression is run for each individual fund for the period 1997:06–1998:06, the R2 varies 
between 0.96 and 1.0 with an average of 0.99 and standard deviation of 0.009.23  The 
average beta coefficient is 1.00 with a standard deviation of 0.044.  In regressions that 
include individual survivor funds for the period 1997:06–2001:12, the average R2 is 0.99 
                                                 
22 Most of the acquisitions took place between 1998:05 and 1999:09. 
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23 All thirteen PFAs existed then; mergers started later.  
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with a standard deviation of 0.004, and the average beta coefficient is 1.01 with a 
standard deviation of 0.042.  From these values, with both beta coefficients equal to 1.0, 
on average, and with a tiny volatility, I infer not only that an individual PFA return is 
explained by the benchmark but also that each PFA replicates the investment strategy of 
the benchmark, which is equivalent to arguing that each PFA’s plan is what other funds 
are doing.   
With respect to fund groups, in the regressions run for different periods, the 
benchmark that is statistically significant at 1 percent explains more than 99.0 percent of 
return variability of pension funds.  In particular, the R-squared of Group 1 is 99.3 
percent; Group 2, 99.8 percent; Group 3, 98.9 percent; Group 4, 99.3 percent; Group 5, 
99.0 percent; and finally, Group 6, 99.0 percent.24  Likewise, there is no difference in 
how much of the return variability is explained by the benchmark among PFAs for 
different periods.  The beta coefficients range between 0.99 and 1.06, all of them being 
statistically significant.   
I test the hypothesis that the beta coefficient is different from 1.0 by running 
cross-sectional regression and computing time series coefficients for different periods of 
1-month, 2-month and 3-month returns.  The results do not reject the null hypothesis that 
beta is equal to 1.0.  This evidence is suggestive of PFAs that may be tracking the market 
portfolio (benchmark) defined as weighted average return, with beta equal to 1.0.  When 
the model is regressed using the simple average return as the benchmark, the results are 
similar to those of Table 3.2.  Furthermore, the outcomes for Model (3.1) with the simple 
average return as independent variable are not different from those of the weighted 
average and are not shown.  These results provide evidence that although the number of 
 
24 In a seminal paper, Brinson et al. (1986) find asset allocation explains 93 percent of the variability in 
U.S. pension funds.  Brinson et al. (1991) obtain a value of 91 percent, and Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) 
provide evidence that asset allocation explains 91 percent and 87 percent of the return variability of U.S. 
pension funds and mutual funds, respectively. 
pension funds decreased and the stock market bore two external shocks, the benchmark 
still continues explaining, to a great extent, the return performance of all pension funds. 
In relation to the second question, I run Model (3.2) to determine the how 
different fund managers allocate the clients’ money.  The dependent variable is premium 
in return for each PFA (i) at time (t) defined as ReturnPFA (i,t) minus 
ReturnBenchmark(t), which corresponds to excess returns of each fund over the 
benchmark; and five independent variables, called premium in asset allocation, are 
characterized by the expression WeightPFAi,t-1,a minus WeightBenchmark,t-1,a.  It 
corresponds to the difference between the share of asset allocation of each pension fund 






, , 1, 1,
1
,[ ] [i a i t a t a
a
i t t iWeightPFA WeightBenchmarkRetPFA RetBenchmark β ε− −
=
−− = ∑ +
withi j
 
What I postulate is that the coefficients of asset allocation in Model (3.2) are 
equal among pension funds, i.e. ( ) ( )0 ( ) ( ): 0
PFA i PFA j
asset a asset aH β β− = ≠
                                                
.  The null hypothesis 
is tested under four different data categorizations: (i) individual PFA against the rest of 
the existing group, (ii) pair of PFAs involved in mergers, (iii) different periods and, (iv) 
individual PFA within its group size.  To test that, I use the Chow Test based on the sum 
of squared errors (SSE).26  The procedure that I apply rests on three steps.  First, Model 
(3.2) is regressed for a specific pension fund, PFA(i), computing SSE1; second, the 
 
25 The asset allocation defined above is stocks, bonds, banking deposits, foreign assets, and mortgage-
backed securities.  On a monthly basis, I compute the difference between the weight of each asset within 
the asset allocation used by each AFP and the weights of a benchmark obtained from the average of the 
industry asset allocation weighted by the asset values.  
26 The usefulness of this lies in testing whether there has been a change in the parameters from one group 
to another.  Greene (2000) describes it as a test of structural change if regression coefficients are different 
in the distinct subsets. 1 2
1 2 1 2
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regression is run for the remaining existing funds as a group, PFA(i≠j) getting SSE2; and 
third, SST (sum of total errors) is obtained by running the regression for all existing 
PFAs.  Due to the series of acquisitions, I evaluate the existing funds up to the date of 
each acquisition.  For the first acquisition, the evaluation period is 1997:06–1998:05 with 
thirteen existing PFAs.  For the second acquisition, the analysis time is 1997:06–1998:08 
with twelve existing PFAs.  At the end, the seven surviving funds are evaluated from 
1997:06 to 2001:12. 
In addition to Model (3.2), I also use two more regressions to evaluate the 
robustness of the results by testing the same hypothesis.  The two additional models are: 
(3.3) 
4
, , , 1,
1
(3) [ ]i t i a i t a i
a
Return AssetWeightPFAα β ε−
=
= + +∑  
AssetWeightPFA(i,t-1,a) corresponds to the asset allocation weight of PFA(i = 
1,2..13), at time (t = 1..55 months) and the assets group (a = 1,2,3 and 4). 
(3.4) 
5
, , , 1,
1
(4) [ ] [ ]i t t i a i t a t a i
a
RetPFA RetAverage WeightPFA WeightAverage 1,β ε− −
=
− = −∑ +  
The return premium is defined in Model (3.4) as the simple average across funds 
and is regressed against the weight premium defined as the difference between the weight 
of asset allocation of each PFA and the simple average asset allocation weight, for the 
PFA (i =1,2..13), at time (t = 1..55 months) and the assets group (a =1..5).  Models (3.2) 
and (3.4) are expressed in deviation form as a way to get rid of the multicollinearity 
problems and hence, no intercept is needed.  The summation of the five asset allocation 
weights for each fund is equal to 1.0.  Other mechanism used to eliminate 
multicollinearity problems is to drop one variable and I use Model (3) with intercept and 
four asset allocation weights (a=1,2,3,4).  The alternative for not dropping one weight is 
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to use a variable that is realized by subtracting the benchmark’s asset allocation weight 
from each fund in Models (3.2) and (3.4). 27   
Table 3.3 describes the both Chow test and F-Test significance values in five 
panels.  Most of F-test values are non-significant at 10 percent.  From Table 3.3–Panels 
A-1 and A-2 that use Models (3.2) and (3.3), it is appreciated that the Chow test values 
tend to fail to reject the null hypothesis in several individual funds.  The statistical results 
lean toward supporting the idea that pension funds are inclined to hold the same asset 
allocation.  In Table 3.3–Panel C, Model (3.2) is used and the data are grouped in fund 
pairs involved in acquisitions.  The sum of squared errors is computed for each pair as a 
group, i.e., acquiring-acquired funds.  The statistical analysis shows that beta coefficients 
are equal among fund pairs.  None of the F-values is significant at least at 10 percent.   
Table 3.3–Panel D builds its results on Model (3.4) by putting together only the 
seven pension funds present during the entire period.  Results show that the highest 
significant value is at 3.9 percent.  When different periods are analyzed, the asset 
allocation (one-year period) using Model (3.2), Table 3.3–Panel E shows there are no 
significant changes in asset allocation among the funds group through time.  In fact, even 
though the Chilean financial market fell in 1997:06–1998:01 and in 1998:08 (due to the 
effects of the Asian and Russian market crises, respectively), the statistical outcomes still 
support the hypothesis of no differences in asset allocation.   
Table 3.3–Panel F uses Model (3.4), premium in return and premium in weight 
relative to industry average.  The sample is classified in three groups by asset values 
size—the three largest, the two medium funds, and the two smallest funds—and the total 
sum of squared errors are computed within each group.  Similar to the above findings, the 
observed F-values demonstrate that there is no statistical significant difference among 
 
27 Suits (1984) argues in favor of transforming the variable rather than dropping one variable. 
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funds’ asset allocation within funds of equal size.  Comparing the findings of Table 3.3–
Panels A, B, and C of individual PFAs with those of Table 3.3–Panel F, I infer that funds 
clustered within the same size category and measured by asset values tend to seem more 
like each other by replicating their asset allocation.   
Both on variability in returns and on differences in allocation under several 
scenarios and within different groups, the evidence suggests that the investment decisions 
of Chilean pension funds behave as one group by copying each other’s asset allocations, 
and that the weighted average portfolio of what all funds are holding has become the 
benchmark for all PFAs. 
This evidence suggests that the regulation is having a profound impact on the 
behavior of Chilean PFAs.  Specifically, it appears that without the MGR, PFAs would 
perform differently.  A reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that fund managers’ 
returns are similar because they mimic each other’s asset allocation and asset selection in 
order to avoid being penalized by not achieving the MGR.  Consistent with this 
interpretation, one can observe that in the Chilean mutual fund industry, there is no MGR 
requirement, and mutual funds show a variety of returns.  Unlike pension funds, Chilean 
mutual funds have systematically grown in new funds and institutions (families).28  
Mutual fund managers allocate their money independently of what other fund managers 
do.  Specifically, Walker and Maturana (1999) test the hypothesis that mutual fund 
management fees are high and mutual fund returns are low.  They report that the average 
return in the period 1990–1997 of stock mutual funds is 13.1 percent and that there are 
differences of over 10 percent in performance across funds.  In their evaluation of the 
stock mutual fund performance, Walker and Maturana find that Jensen’s alpha is non-
 
28 In Overview of Chilean Mutual Funds (2001), the Superintendence of Securities and Insurance reveals 
that the number of funds grew from 115 to 177 and the number of fund families increased from 14 to 17 
between 1999 and 2001. 
signficant.  They conclude that stock mutual fund performance before fees tends to be 
similar to passive strategies despite this industry having increased in the number of funds. 
3.3.2.  Correlations and Granger Causality 
To understand more deeply the mechanism used by pension funds to exhibit 
similar asset allocation, I study whether there is any pension fund that triggers the 
reaction of others when selecting or trading assets.  In other words, who moves first?  
Granger (1969) proposes a procedure to examine a causal relation between two variables.  
The causality effect arises when the result of PFA(Y) is better explained taking into 
account PFA (Y)’s information and PFA(X)’s.  Strictly speaking, causality is referred to 
being 2 2( | ) ( | , )Y I Y I Xε εσ σ>
2
εσ the variance of errors series.  Formally, I follow 
Definition 4 in Granger (1969), namely, “causality lag.”  Causality lag is more 
appropriate to this sample because fund Y may make better decisions based on the 
previous investment decision made by fund X.  The number of lags is useful to 
understand how spontaneous funds delay in reacting to information of other funds’ 
choices. Hamilton (1994) also specifies an econometric test for Granger causality starting 
from an autoregressive model of p lags for both Y and X variables, the null hypothesis 
being that beta coefficients of the variable X are equal to zero,29  
0 1 2: ... 0pH β β β= = =  
Before dealing with regressions, I compute the correlation matrix of both weights 
and changes in weight of the asset allocation across pension funds. I list in Table 3.4 the 
correlation matrices of portfolio holding of each PFA against the benchmark’s, separated 
in three asset classes; domestic stocks, fixed income securities, domestic stocks and 
foreign assets.  There exists a high and almost perfect positive correlation in each PFA’s 
                                                 
t
29 Formally, 
1 10 ... ...1 1Y Y Y X Xt t p t p t p t pα α α β β= + + + + +− − − − ε  
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asset class with respect to the benchmark’s.  Table 3.4–Panel A shows a strong 
correlation in fixed income securities (between 1.0 and 0.93), domestic shares (between 
1.0 and 0.97) and foreign assets (between 0.63 and 0.98). Fixed income securities and 
domestic stocks account for over 90 percent of total asset values of PFAs. When fixed 
income securities are decomposed in five assets, Table 3.4–Panel B shows positive as 
well as negative correlations among this assets group.  Considering these findings, I 
interpret that pension funds behave differently among individual fixed income securities 
but keep total fixed income weights as close as possible to that of the industry.  As most 
of these assets are allocated in categories AAA and AA, each security may be seen as a 
substitute within this group, since their returns are very similar, which would allow PFAs 
not to deviate significantly from the average of the system regardless of the asset 
selection in fixed income securities. 
Table 3.4–Panels C through F present the correlation of weights and changes in 
weights for domestic stocks and domestic bonds.  In the case of stocks, the correlation of 
weights ranges between 94 percent and 99 percent for both periods, and that of changes 
in weights varies between 67 percent and 97 percent.  Bonds show no specific pattern and 
exhibit positive and negative correlations.  From these findings, I infer that pension funds 
follow the same investment model in variable-income securities but not in fixed-income 
securities.   
With regard to the cutback in the stock weight from 31 percent to 10 percent 
during the whole period, funds tend to mimic the stock weight in the asset allocation by 
investing their free resources in any fixed-income asset since domestic and foreign bonds, 
banking deposits, and mortgage-backed securities are almost perfect substitutes in return.  
One possible reason for PFAs reducing their stock weight through the period is that the 
Chilean stock market plunged during the Asian and Russian crises, generating negative 
returns of 28 percent and 30 percent, respectively.  Additionally, some criticism arose 
from political sectors on the PFAs’ ability to protect saving accounts from adverse 
financial impacts and on the excessive allocation in stocks.  What in fact happened was 
all PFAs shrank their domestic stock weight.    
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Before applying the Granger test, I group the data according to (i) fund size, (ii) 
fund pairs, and (iii) date of acquisition. The dependent variable is the change in stock 
weight in a PFA(i).30  The null hypothesis is “variable X does not Granger-cause Y” i.e., 
beta coefficients of X are equal to zero, 1 2: ... pHo β β β= = = .   
The three feasible independent variables that I consider are the change in stock 
weight of (i) the benchmark, (ii) the three leaders and, (iii) any other PFA (i≠j) that may 
explain Granger causality. The investigation selects fund by fund in order to determine 
specifically who is following whom.  The hypothesis tilts to look at evidence that the 
larger funds’ strategy is copied by smaller pension funds, keeping in mind that the 
Minimum Guaranteed Return (MGR) is computed giving greater importance to larger 
funds. Hence, I claim that fund managers pay more attention to variable income securities 
rather than other assets to avoid fluctuating away the floor return by following either 
industry average stock weight or the three largest funds.   
Panel A of Table 3.5 condenses the statistical evidence of the Granger causality 
test of those pension funds that were initially absorbed by larger funds.  What compels 
consideration of this group is that its investment strategy is Granger-caused by either the 
three leaders or the weighted average portfolio with just a 1-lag period, at less than 1 
percent of significance. Results show that these PFAs behave as followers of the leaders’ 
                                                 
30 The correlation of stock weights with the benchmark (described in Table 3.4) is higher than that of 
changes in stock weights.  However, I evaluated changes in stock weights because it better illustrates the 
causality effect when I rotate the independent and dependent variables.  This occurs because stock weights 
reflect ending position but not changes.  When regressions are run, I exchange the dependent and 
independent variables to check causality; these results are presented in Table 3.5 in the last row of each 
PFA. 
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moves.  In fact, they adjust their stock weight almost instantaneously when driven by the 
leaders’ or the benchmark’s moves.  Five out of six funds keep a close watch on the three 
leaders or weighted average stock weight when evaluating their investment decisions.  
For instance, PFA Aporta, which remained functioning longer than the others (43 
periods) apparently tends to mimic the strategy of the three leaders; however, when the 
leader group is broadened, it tracks what PFA Cuprum does with 2-lags.   
To check these results, I exchange the dependent variable for the independent one 
to discover any causality issue between the variables, i.e., I run the regression for each 
PFA “X depends on past X and Y” with the null hypothesis “variable Y does not 
Granger-cause X.”  Nonetheless, the hypothesis is not rejected in any case, proving the 
one-way direction of the variables.  On the other hand, Table 3.5–Panel B documents the 
information of the existing PFAs ranked by size from the largest to the smallest.  The 
statistical evidence strongly indicates that the three leaders move first and then the 
medium and small funds follow their strategies with a 5-lag period.  In the case of the 
largest funds, PFA Provida is Granger-caused by the weighted average, but I discard this 
alternative due to its weight is doubled count on this average.31  A better explanation is 
that the other two large funds Granger-cause PFA Provida with eight lags.  Similarly, the 
other two leaders are Granger-caused by the combination of allocations of the leaders 
with seven lags.  In the case of medium funds, the test is more accurate.  PFA Summa’s 
stock allocation is explained significantly by PFA Cuprum’s with five lags.  PFA 
SantaMaria’s result is driven by PFA Habitat’s strategy.  In the case of the two small 
funds, PFA Planvital is enlightened by the two largest funds, and PFA Magister is 
Granger-caused by PFA Cuprum with seven lags.  In light of above findings, I conclude 
 
31 In other words, I dismiss the importance of this indicator (weighted average) because I would double 
count the weight of the largest fund in the Granger causality autoregressive equation, so that the answer lies 
on the other two leaders.  
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that asset allocation among funds is heavily determined by their relative size in the 
system.   
To summarize, the large funds’ investment strategy seems to be mimicked by 
others of equal size with seven lags.  The medium and small funds are significantly 
inclined to be followers of strategies pursued by one or two large funds with five lags.  
The merged PFAs surfed on either the weighted average or leader allocations with just a 
1-lag period.   
3.3.3.  On Stock Trading Activity 
Taking into account the previous evidence that stock weights exhibit high positive 
correlation, I study in more detail how pension funds trade their stock holdings, I apply 
the methodology of herding defined in the seminal document by Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (LSV) (1992) and utilized subsequently by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermer 
(GTW) (1995), Choe, Boe, and Stulz (1999), Wermers (1999), and Lobao and Serra 
(2003). In addition, I use Sias (2004)’s approach to evaluate whether stock selection of 
fund (i) is driven mainly by past fund (i)’s decisions or by other funds’s.  
Conceptually speaking, herding arises when a fund manager’s knowledge about 
others’ decisions not only changes his investment decision but also reveals information 
that he does not have currently.  More explicitly, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) develop 
the idea of the reputation effect in which herding is a solution for managers when they 
reach unprofitable returns.  When managers make the same mistakes as each other, their 
performance is not judged badly—in other words, they share the blame.  Bikhchandani 
and Sharma (2001) explain that one of three reasons to herd is that fund managers’ 
compensation is rewarded by imitation.32  In this setting, PFA managers worry about 
 
32 In the extensive literature of herding is Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Devenon and Welch 
(1996), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Also, a new herding approach is found in Sias (2004).  
their reputation and compensation with respect to being punished for falling below the 
MGR floor since they are assessed relative to their peers’ performance and the 
benchmark.   
To explore the notion fund managers copy their stock trading, Model (3.5) 
follows the methodology of LSV (1992) to measure the herding behavior.  is the 
herding measure for the stock (i) in the month (t).  Herding refers to the tendency to buy 
(sell) a certain stock by a group of funds at certain period.  This occurs when the 
proportion of buyers, , of a stock is above the expected proportion of funds,
( , )H i t
),( tip )(tp , 
that buy stocks in the market in the month (t).  







( , ) | ( , ) [ ( , )] |AF i t E p i t E p i t= −    
The adjustment factor, , appears in Model (3.5) to take into account the 
possibility of random variation of  around 
),( tiAF
),( tip )(tp under the null hypothesis of 
independent transactions among funds, i.e., no herding.  is the number of sellers in 
the market for the stock (i) and in the month (t).  The number of buyers, , has a 
binomial distribution with parameter 
),( tiS
),( tiB
( )p p t= .  The term )(tp is the proxy 
of under the null hypothesis and constant for all stocks during a month, but 
changes over time.  The null hypothesis establishes that there is not herding if the current 
proportion of buyers equals the expected value for all stocks and is constant equivalent to 
[ ( , )]E p i t
)(tp  for a certain month.   
Intuitively, this measure has two components and works in the following sense.  
For a particular stock-month, the difference between the proportion of traders buying this 
stock and the monthly average of the proportion of buyers denotes a purchasing trend 
beyond the market’s.  In the presence of a bearish market, in general both numbers would 
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tend to be equal, meaning there is no herding.  However, if, in a bearish market, a 
particular stock exhibits a higher proportion of buyers, it means some traders are taking a 
long position and would herd among them.  The second component is the adjustment 
factor.  The model considers two types of traders (buyers-sellers) and each month, a 
binomial distribution is computed on the likelihood of observing a certain number of 
buyers given the probability of occurrence equal to p(t).  The reason for including this 
adjustment factor is to account for bias that would occur if stocks were traded by a few 
investors.  The null hypothesis states that if herding does not exist, the proportion of 
buyers has the same expected value for all stocks in a given period and is constant equal 
to ( )p t .  Any deviation from | ( , ) ( ) |p i t p t−  above the expected  is evidence of 
herding.  If this difference is equal to or inferior to zero, that means there is no herding.  
The greater the number of buyers trading a stock (i,t), the higher the herding value, 
ceteris paribus 
( , )AF i t
( )p t . 
This herding appraisal allows differentiating spurious herding from intentional 
herding as pointed out by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001).  The advantage of Model (5) 
lies in the fact that if a large group of funds decreases their holdings in stocks—for 
example, in a bearish market—and a small group comes up buying stocks, then most of 
the funds that followed the market trend are not under a herding effect, but the small 
group is. 
To complete this analysis, I use Sias’s (2004) herding measure.  Sias examines 
institutional trading activity by analyzing cross-sectional correlation between demand for 
a security (k) last quarter and demand for the security (k) this quarter. Unlike LSV (1992) 
approach, Sias (2004) method captures the effect that traders may follow their own 
pattern or other’s over adjacent periods. He determines institution’s position of each 
 40
security (k) as a fraction of the security’s share outstanding per quarter. Investors are 

































Sias (2004) runs a cross-sectional regression of the standardized fraction of institutions 
buying security k: 
(3.6) , , 1k t t k t k t,β ε−∆ = ∆ +  
He argues that this correlation has two components: (i) correlation may arise from 
individual investors following themselves and (ii) correlation may result from investors 
following each other (herding) over adjacent quarters. However, he proves (in his 
appendix) that the correlation between current quarter investors buying and lag quarter’s 
investors computed from N investors across K securities can be decomposed into: 
(3.7) , , ,( ,k t k t k t 1)β ρ −= ∆ ∆   = 
,
, , , , 1 1
1 1, , 1 , , 1
( )(1 *
( 1) ( ) ( )
k tNK
n k t t n k t t
k nk t k t k t k t
D Raw D Raw
K Raw Raw N Nσ σ
− −
= =− −
)⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ − ∆ − ∆
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− ∆ ∆⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ + 
, , 1
, , , , 1 1
1 1 1,, , 1 , , 1
( )(1 *
( 1) ( ) ( )
k t k tN NK
n k t t m k t t
k n m m nk t k t k t k t
D Raw D Raw
K Raw Raw N Nσ σ
−
− −
= = = ≠− −
)⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ − ∆ − ∆
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− ∆ ∆⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑  
I run the models (3.6) and (3.7) to determine the beta coefficient and its decomposition.  
However, to apply these models, it is necessary that PFA (i) have traded the same stock  
in at least two consecutive periods.  Due to all funds having their stock holdings decrease, 
this measure presents some limitations in its application on the sample.  In several 
months, PFAs mainly sold stock positions, and a few of them bought but not in 
consecutives periods, restricting the use of the Model (3.7). 
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3.4.  HERDING BEHAVIOR 
3.4.1.  Herding on Trading Activity  
In the Chilean Stock Exchange, there are 330 publicly owned stocks listed.  
According to the Risk Rating Commission, pension funds are allowed to invest in less 
than 50 percent of these stocks.  In the sample, pension funds hold in their portfolio, on 
average, 120 domestic stocks concentrated in large market capitalization stocks.   
For each month, I classify the stocks in (i) market value quintiles, (ii) return 
quintiles, and (iii) ownership concentration quintiles, and I determine the number of 
traders per stock (i,t), being i =1,2….125 stocks and t =1,2…55 periods and the herding 
value.  This measure provides 3,052 observations, of which only 1,312 are positive and 
valid.33  To analyze these numbers, I require the condition of regarding at least two funds 
trading a given stock-month to be considered as herding.  
The results show a herding level with a mean of 1.8 percent (highly significant 
with a t-value of 5.40).  Comparatively, LSV (1992) claim that their herding value of 2.7 
percent is relatively small to indicate herding in a broad sense.  Similarly, GTW (1995) 
argue that their herding measure of 2.5 percent weakly supports herding behavior, and 
Wermers (1999) verifies a herding of 3.4 percent in mutual funds.  Despite the small 
herding mean value, Panel A of Table 3.6 draws attention, illustrating that the herding 
value in pension funds undoubtedly rises with the number of trading funds; that is, funds 
trade the same stock-month more often when they see others doing so.   
From Table 3.6–Panel B, it is noted that the larger the number of funds trading, 
the greater the herding mean. The herding mean climbs to over 18 percent when there are 
 
33 I adjust for takeovers occurred in the stock market in 2001 and that obligated to pension funds to sell 
their holdings in some stocks. The stocks that disappeared of PFA holdings were Chilgener, Chilquinta and 
LabChile. 
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ten pension funds trading in the same stock-month direction.  The highest reported value 
skyrockets up to 34.5 percent when there are thirteen funds involved in trading activities.  
As referenced, Wermers (1999) and LSV (1992) find values as high as 2.7 percent and 
3.6 percent respectively when the number of traders increases. The Chilean pension funds 
show evidence of a larger herding mean before the acquisition of funds when there were 
more funds trading.34   
However, Sias (2004) in his document finds a beta coefficient of 11 percent, 
which is explained equally by both trades.  Using this approach in PFAs, Table 3.7 shows 
that on average, the beta coefficient is 34 percent.  Therefore, the data once again suggest 
that PFAs herd significantly.  The main reason for this result is that fund managers tend 
to follow others’ trades, i.e., the investment strategy in domestic stocks of PFA (i) is 
driven by PFA’s (j) with (i≠j).  This evidence is consistent with previous Granger 
causality findings.  
3.4.2.  Herding in Different Periods 
In the period under analysis, I encounter several important events that allow a 
closer look at the herding behavior of pension funds.  These include two financial 
crises—the Asian “flu” in the period 1997:06–1998:01 and the Russian crisis in 1998:08 
that hit the Chilean Stock Exchange strongly—and changes in regulations such as the 
amendment that modified the way of calculating the MGR in 1999:10.   
3.4.2.1.  Financial Crises 
The most precipitous drops of the Chilean Stock Exchange occurred in 1998:01 
and 1998:08, at 12 percent and 30 percent respectively.  The Asian crisis lasted 8 months, 
 
34 Lobao and Serra (2003) also describe a similar tendency in Portuguese mutual funds, and with a herding 
value of 11.3 percent.  In contrast, Wermers (1999) shows that the herding level decreases with the increase 
in trading activity of mutual funds (when 50 or more mutual funds trade over 274). 
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and the Russian crisis just 1 month.  From Panel A in Table 3.8, no herding activity can 
be seen in the month of the Russian fall.  In a bearish market, if most agents follow the 
market trend, then the herding value for several stocks tends to be zero; however, if a 
group of agents is involved in buying the stock (i), then the herding value is going to be 
positive for that stock.  Despite the high correlation in stock trading activity during 
financial crises, herding values are relatively small or zero, as documented by Choe et al. 
(1999) in the Korean market.  In particular, the Chilean stock market plunged 28 percent 
during the month of the Russian crisis.  In that month, the herding measure is negligible 
because PFAs uniformly reduced their holdings in stocks.  In the next month, the herding 
value is positive.  The lowest correlation across funds on changes in stock weights for the 
3-month period of one month before (t-1) and one month after (t+1) the Russian crisis (t) 
is 0.99, but three months after this window (t+2, t+4), it is 0.90.   
The LSV (1992) herding measurement allows capturing the effect of spurious 
herding when institutions not only react together to the same information but also assess 
fundamentals in the same direction.  However, this figure is completely different during 
the Asian crisis period.  To examine in particular this crisis, this study takes into account 
two sub-periods, 1998:01 (the deeper stock market fall) and 1997:06–1998:01, adding the 
criterion of observing different numbers (N) of funds trading at the same time, with N>1 
and N>5.  I document a herding mean of 7.43 percent for the period 1997:06–1998:01, 
which is considerably higher and statistically more significant than that of 1998:01 (3.46 
percent) when N>5.  When N>1, herding levels in both sub-periods tend to be very 
similar.  To explain this difference, I separate the trading activity in buyer and seller 
positions.  As described before, in a bearish market I would expect to view that a large 
herding mean comes from net buyer positions.  The greatest herding values arise when 
effectively more buyers than sellers are trading.  With 35 percent of these observations 
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corresponding to the number of buying funds greater than the number of selling funds, 
the herding mean is 18.7 percent (at 1 percent of significance). When the number of 
sellers is equal to the number of buyers (12 percent of observations), there is no evidence 
of herding.  With the remaining 53 percent of observations, I document a slight herding 
value of 2.1 percent.35  One possible explanation for the existence of herding during the 
Asian but not the Russian crisis is that the uncertainty of the duration of a crisis has 
tended to make herding activity more plausible as a mechanism of protection in favor of 
the MGR. 36   One month is just 1/12 of the MGR evaluation period, and the Asian crisis 
period represents 8/12 of the year.  Fund managers are more concerned about the danger 
of deviating from the herd in their stock selection, and so are evidently inclined in 
mimicking what other managers are doing in a longer financial crisis. 
3.4.2.2.  Changes in MGR Regulations 
In October of 1999, the SPFA enacted an amendment whose aim was to extend 
the MGR appraisal period from the past 12 months to the past 36 months.  The main 
objective pursued by the government was to remove the uncertainty in returns due to the 
short MGR period and two stock market crises.  However, I would expect that fund 
managers continue watching each other to make their investment decisions because the 
penalty of deviating from the MGR still remains in the system.  Probably, at the 
beginning of this amendment, managers could diverge in asset allocation and selection, 
but within 36 months, they would come back to replicate their previous investment style.  
In order to evaluate whether the effects of this change (the extension of the MGR 
 
35 In the case of N>1, 26 percent of observations (buyers > sellers) brings about a herding mean of 14.5 
percent; 18 percent (buyers equal to sellers) does not account for herding; and the remaining (buyers < 
sellers) produces 3.5 percent.  When I say “no” herding, it does not mean the value is zero, but either zero 
or negative.  Herding refers only to positive values. When N>1 and N>5, the weighted average of the 
herding level is computed using the negative values as well.  
36 In contrast, Choe, Boe and Stulz (1999) examine the behavior of foreign investors in the South Korean 
market during 1996-1997 and find no support for a herding level during the Korean financial crisis. 
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evaluation period) altered to some extent the trading behavior among funds, I divide the 
sample into four periods, 1997:06–1998:07, 1998:09–1999:10, 1999:11–2000:11, and 
2000:12–2001:12.  The months of the two greatest falls in the stock market are removed 
as a way of shrinking the volatility by shocks.37  The scenario base under this analysis is 
the period 1998:09–1999:10; the amendment was in force during the following two years.  
I separate once more the sample by number of funds trading at each time such as N>1, 
N>2, and N>3.   
Panel B of Table 3.8 reveals a U-shape in the herding value when there are at 
least two or three funds trading at the same time.  With N>2 (N>3), the base period 
illustrates a herding level of 1.8 percent (2.5 percent), which decreases to 0.9 percent (1.9 
percent) in the following period, but later rises to 3.3 percent (4.0 percent).  If the 
information is observed with N>1, the outcomes show that the herding level increases in 
the two subsequent periods from 0.3 percent to 1.4 percent and 1.5 percent respectively.  
In light of this evidence, it appears that the amendment had an impact on herding activity 
but its effect was ephemeral.38  Pension funds came back to herd a year after the 
amendment was enacted.  
3.4.3.  Herding in Stocks with Different Characteristics 
In this section, I explore what kinds of stocks experience more herding.  To do so, 
the stock sample is divided into quintiles of market capitalization (size) and in economic 
sectors.  The idea is to find out whether PFAs are predisposed to herd more (a) in small 
market capitalization stocks as documented by Wermers (1999) and LSV (1992) or (b) in 
 
37 The dates are 1998:01 and 1998:08.  In any case, this information does not affect results because the 
relevant comparison lies on dates starting from 1998:09, one year before the amendment, up to 2001:12.  
The initial period 1997:06–1998:07 is shown so readers can keep in mind the whole cycle.  
38 In unreported results, when the number of traders used equals N>3, N>4, and N>5, the evidence 
continues being a U shape. 
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large market capitalization stocks, considering that a great proportion of the stock 
holdings are concentrated in this kind of stocks. 
3.4.3.1.  Market Capitalization Stocks 
I compute the market capitalization of each stock (i) and classify them in 
quintiles, the largest being (Q1) and the smallest (Q5).  In each period, I change the 
quintiles’ composition on the basis of fluctuation experienced in market capitalization.  In 
1997:06, pension funds, on average, held 125 stocks in their portfolios but at the end of 
the sample period, 2001:12, this number fell to 95.  In the same way, the stock weight in 
asset allocation shrank from 30 percent to 10 percent.  Most empirical studies of herding 
show evidence of more trading activity in larger stocks but with a lower herding level. 
LSV (1992) and Wermers (1999) find that smaller stocks exhibit considerably higher 
herding values than larger stocks.  Nevertheless, findings in Panel A of Table 3.9 show 
that higher herding values correspond to the largest quintile (Q1) and the smallest quintile 
(Q5), being highly significant at 1 percent.  With the number of traders greater than 1 
(N>1), herding levels per quintile are 2.9 percent (Q1) and 5.9 percent (Q5).  The trend is 
almost the same when there are more than three funds trading except that the herding 
means jumps to 4.1 percent and 9.2 percent respectively.  These results are also are 
consistent with those of Sias’s (2004) measure illustrated in Table 3.7.  Herding values 
significantly increase when PFAs trade stocks classified in the Q1 and when there are 
more PFAs trading stocks in the same direction.  The results of herding in large market 
capitalization stocks are consistent with the incentives that regulation produces on fund 
managers.  PFAs have to herd in large stocks to keep their portfolio close to the 
benchmark.  If one fund does not follow the same strategy in these stocks, its 
performance would deviate from the benchmark return, but if it does not herd in the small 
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capitalization stocks, its performance would not diverge significantly from the 
benchmark because this group of stock accounts for less 5 percent of stock holdings.  
3.4.3.2.  Economic Sectors 
I account for sixteen business sectors and show in Panel B of Table 3.9 just eight 
sectors that comprise each one at least 10 percent of observations and with numbers of 
traders of N>1 and N>3.  I discard the other eight sectors because of their small 
importance relative to the first eight sectors.  The largest and most significant herding 
values under LSV (1992) correspond to areas of power plants (4.4 percent), food and 
beverages (3.4 percent) and telecommunications (3.0 percent).  Not much herding activity 
is seen in either retailers (department stores, supermarkets) or banking segments.  The 
other sectors not listed in Table 3.9–Panel B exhibit irrelevant or no herding values.  To 
greater extent, I examine mainly the largest two stocks corresponding to each economic 
segment and find that larger stocks related to three economic sectors—power plants, food 
and beverages, and telecommunications—are preferred by PFAs to herd.  Most of their 
herding levels, reported in Table 3.9–Panel C, are statistically significant and fluctuate 
between 2.9 percent and 6.8 percent with N>1.  The herding values range between 2.1 
percent and 9.1 percent when there are at least three funds trading (N>3).  
3.4.4.  Additional Tests on the Determinants of Herding 
Aside from herding values, what is more remarkable to know is when it is more 
likely to see pension funds herd.  The procedure I apply to statistically response the 
question is to (i) rank stocks from the larger market cap to the smaller one and group 
them in bundles of five or ten shares, and (ii) regress a Tobit model with a right-censored 
dependent variable, Herd*, herding value per stock, to be greater than zero.  The model 
defined in Model (3.8) is useful when the dependent variable is limited to certain values.  
The independent variables are StockSize (as a variable for the larger five, ten stocks and 
so on) and NumberTraders both from N>1 to N>10 and with ranges as 2≤N≤3, 4≤N≤5).39  
Econometrically speaking, I cannot use an OLS regression because the relevant herding 
values are only the positive ones.  The solution is to use a Tobit model (maximum 
likelihood estimation) that provides the probability of reaching an observation beyond 
zero. 
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In Table 3.10, I report the values of censored regression models. The first 
censored-data regression run is considering quintiles: 
(3.9) * 1 2 3 41 2 4 5iHerd Q Q Q Qα β β β β= + + + + + ε
                                                
 where Qi = Quintile (i), i=1,2,4 and 5 
Table 3.10 -Panel A’s result shows that the constant (α) and the β1 are the unique 
statistically significant coefficients.  The positive sign of Q1 (the largest market cap) is 
econometrically correct.  Quintile Q5 (the smallest market cap) is no longer a valid 
explanatory variable due to its negative sign and non-significance.  Panel A also indicates 
the probability that {Herd*| Q(i)} will be observed in a herding interval.40  The likelihood 
of observing herding in the range 0.0<Herd*< 0.05 given Q1 occurs is 17.5 percent.  The 
chances decrease slightly for higher herding values.  The outcome of Model (3.10) is 
listed in Table 3.10 -Panel B.  The independent variable is NumberTraders trading stock 
(i) at month (t): 
 
39 I consider the variable StockSize with different meanings.  It is used as a dummy for the variable 
Rank1_5: the largest 5 stocks or Rank6_10: the following 5 largest stocks and so on.  Also, the market cap 
quintiles are referred to as part of this variable.  Likewise, NumberTraders means number of traders greater 
than X or number of pension funds trading between X and Y.  In addition, some interaction variables are 
used.  In any case, in Table 3.10, I specify the “real name” of used variables as regressors. 
40 It is the probability that the linear prediction lies in the range (a,b), i.e., Prob(a <Xjβ+εj< b).  Regression 
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Previously, I accounted for herding with number of traders greater than one (N≥2) 
(Table 3.6).  Nevertheless, the picture is to some extent different now.  Unlike the first 
variable 2≤Trader≤3, all of the coefficients are positive and individually statistically 
significant with a significant Chi-square value at 1 percent.  When the number of traders 
is larger than six (N>6), the probability of seeing funds herding is near 18.0 percent and 
tends to be stable across herding ranges.  In contrast, if there are 4 to 5 traders, the 
probability decreases in relation to the herding values range.  These results are 
completely expected since the herding measure increasingly rises with more pension 
funds trading at the same time.  Due to this fact, the probability of having 4 to 5 traders 
trading is inversely proportional to high herding values, which are present when several 
funds are trading.  Perhaps more interesting is to spread out the sample by individual 
stocks.  To regress Model (3.11), stocks are ranked by size (StockSize1_5 includes the 5 
largest shares) and put into groups of five and ten shares.  What this regression tries to 
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Panel C of Table 3.10 strongly supports the evidence that herding is more likely 
when funds are trading in largest market cap stocks.  The chances of finding herding 
value between 0 percent and 5 percent when trading larger market cap stocks is 55 
percent, the highest values provided by the regression for any herding value.  Going 
deeper in the analysis, in Model (3.12), I select the individual stock names that are 
grouped in StockSize1_10 and StockSize81_more and that belong to quintiles Q1 and Q5 
respectively.  “β” coefficients are assigned to larger stocks and “γ” coefficients are for 
smaller stocks.  I pick the 5 largest stocks of each group, because they have more 






1 2 3 4
5 1 2 3
4 5
( 1_ ) ( 1_ ) ( 1_ ) ( 1_ )
( 1_ ) ( 5 _ ) ( 5 _ ) ( 5 _ )
( 5 _ ) ( 5 _ )
i
i
Herd Q CTC Q Endesa Q Enersis Q Entel
Q Cervezas Q Maderas Q Pilmaiq Q Quemchi
Q Quilic Q Somela
α β β β β
β γ γ γ
γ γ ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
+ +
Panel D of Table 3.10 shows evidence that not only do larger stocks effectively 
drive the herding values, but also, statistically, all the beta coefficients but no gamma 
coefficients are significant.  
In unreported results, when a Tobit regression is run using only the 5 largest 
stocks of the smallest quintile (Q5), none of the regressors is statistically significant.  
When only the five largest stocks of the largest quintile (Q1) are regressed, their beta 
coefficients are highly statistically significant and positive.  The probability of 
0.0<Herd*<0.05 is similar to 15 percent within this group.  All the evidence shown 
considerably strengthens the assertion that PFAs herd more in the largest stocks because 
20 stocks represent a great proportion of the asset selection in stocks and hence may 
definitively explain the similarities in returns driven by this variable income security. 
When the hypothesis of differences in returns among PFAs is tested, the statistical 
evidence does not reject the null hypothesis ReturnPFA(i)= ReturnPFA(j).   
In sum, it appears that both herding in asset allocation and herding in variable-
income securities allow Chilean Pension Funds to achieve the same returns.  There exists 
no real competition in the market in returns, since fund managers of smaller pension 
funds mimic investment strategies of the three leaders, on average, and the larger funds 
look among themselves for guidance on what they sell or buy.  The pressure on funds 
managers to herd arises directly from the MGR since it punishes managers who fall 
below this floor. 
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3.5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The current Chilean Pension Funds law, which requires managing institutions to 
meet a minimum return, offers a natural scenario to understand the investment behavior 
of fund managers.  The minimum guaranteed return (MGR) is computed based on the 
weighted average of the past-12-months real return across funds, but as of 1999, the 
assessment period is changed to the past-36-months return.  I find that the MGR 
encourages managers to hold similar portfolios to reach similarities in return.   
The mechanism that they use is to copy or herd both asset allocation and stock 
trading.  In relation to asset allocation, there is a 99 percent correlation between the 
variability in return of individual pension funds and the weighted average return 
(benchmark), i.e., funds tend to replicate the performance of this kind of “natural” index 
built from the weighted average portfolio.  At the macro level, I document no differences 
in asset allocation among funds. I am unable to statistically reject the hypothesis that the 
weight coefficients are equal for each pension fund or for sub-groups of funds.  I show 
evidence of a high positive correlation among funds in changes in stock weights but not 
in other asset classes.  The Granger causality test reports that the PFAs that were acquired 
by other funds pursued the same strategies as the three leaders or the benchmark with a 
one-lag period.  The three leaders seem to mimic each other.   
At the micro level, I study stock trading using the methodologies of Lakonishok et 
al. (1992) and Sias (2004).  Using LSV (1992), I find a herding mean of 1.8 percent. 
Nevertheless, this value strongly increases to 18 percent when there are more PFAs 
trading in the market.  Under Sias (2004), the correlation between trades of past period 
and this period of fund (i) is mainly explained by PFA (j)’s trades.  Both methodologies 
show that herding activity increases when PFAs trade in large market cap stocks and 
when there are more traders in the market.  PFAs herd in this group of stocks because the 
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30 largest market cap stocks account for at least 85 percent of stock holdings.  Although 
the amendment of 1999 extended the evaluation period of the MGR from the past 12 
months to the past 36 months, it seemed to decrease herding values for only a short time, 
because after a year, PFAs increased their herding activity.  
The MGR induces fund managers to herd and not to deviate from the benchmark 
portfolio.  The penalty of PFAs diverging from each other, not constraint on investment, 
is a reason that PFAs realize similar returns.  The documented similarity in returns raises 
two related questions:  (i) what makes a client choose one fund over another? and (ii) 
how do funds compete with each other for customers?  These questions and other related 




Chapter 4:  Competition and Clients’ Decisions in the 
Pension Funds Market 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Several studies in the U.S. mutual funds literature have focused on the 
relationship between fund flows and performance.  They have found that clients 
asymmetrically respond to past performance.  I study this relationship as well as which 
funds in the Chilean pension fund market include advertising among their strategies to 
attract clients.  The special setting provided by the laws regulating Chilean pension funds, 
in which peer relative performance comes out as the market benchmark, offers an 
interesting opportunity to comprehend how customers react to performance and what it is 
that pension funds publicize in their marketing policies. 
In a previous study, I describe the existence of similarities in pension fund returns 
and infer that the similarities can be attributed to the tendency of managers to mimic each 
other’s investment strategies.  It is in this context that, in the present study, I examine 
how the clients choose among funds and how the pension funds compete to attract 
customers.  In particular, I examine whether past performance or ranking on performance 
influences the investors’ decisions, and whether the fee scheme and standard deviation of 
returns have an impact on fund flows.  The second aim of this chapter is to study how 
pension funds compete to attract their clients.  I examine whether advertising is 
commonly used to divulge information about significant events such as past performance 
and reductions in fees.  To also evaluate how long a marketing campaign lasts, the share 
of marketing expenses is computed across funds on a rolling basis of 1 month, 3 months, 
6 months, and 12 months and is run with the independent variables of performance, 
ranking, and fees. 
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Several studies on the flow–performance relationship have shown the importance 
of past performance on investors’ decisions (Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Zheng (1999), 
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and Huang et al. (2003)).  Some of them find non-linearity 
in the relationship, and some find that fund flows do not reflect flight from poor 
performers.  In contrast, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) show that U.S. pension funds 
exhibit not only linearity in performance but also that customers run away from poorly-
performing funds and that there is only a weak incentive for managers to alter the 
portfolio risk due to the explicit punishment for deviating from plans. 
I measure net fund flows as monthly percentage variation in asset values adjusted 
by appreciation and mergers, and divide this flow definition into parts: net percentage 
change in account size (value flow) and the number of clients (quantity flow).  In 
addition, I use percentage change in the number of clients (client flow).41  The 
performance is assessed as both raw return and excess return over the benchmark, the 
weighted average return across funds, for different rolling periods: 1 month, 3 months, 6 
months, and 12 months. 
I find evidence of a positive and non-linear relationship between flows and past-
12-months performance.  This result is mainly due to changes in the larger accounts 
(value flow), which correspond to elderly or wealthier clients.  I also find that the number 
of clients in each fund remains relatively steady despite some funds being classified as 
losers in the ranking—that is, clients are less performance-sensitive to poor performers.  
In other words, only the best-performing fund is able to get positive net flows driven by 
large saving accounts.  Runner-up funds do not experience significant changes in the 
 
41 Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) use change and net percentage flows in asset values not adjusted by 
mergers.  As a robustness check, they use percentage change in the number of pension clients.  My 
definition of client flow is adjusted by mergers. 
 56
                                                
level of consumers.  I also document a negative relationship between net flows and both 
types of fees.  Similar to the findings of Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Barber et al. (2002), 
I find that investors are fee-sensitive and make their decisions on the basis of 
management fees. 
I find that the biggest marketing efforts are mainly carried out by the winner fund 
in order to promote its past performance.  Funds that rank lower tend to spend less on 
their marketing strategy.  I also find that the best performer increases its share of 
advertising expenses in a period between 1 month and 3 months.  This finding seems 
consistent with the notion of the lack of stability in maintaining first place in the ranking 
of funds.  Additionally, in the period under study, I observe a systematic drop in industry 
variable fees, something that is also stressed in the advertising campaigns.  My results 
support the idea that clients rely on the information about fees and performance provided 
by media advertising and by salespersons’ visits.42  Marketing campaigns are short-lived.  
The winner fund increases its advertising during the next three periods after achieving 
first place in the ranking. 
In sum, the results show a non-linear relationship between fund flows and 
performance.  Because of frequent fluctuation in which fund is the winner fund, clients 
neither flee poorly-performing funds nor do they flock to the best performer.  Lower fees 
and past-12-month performance explain the percentage change in fund flows but not the 
flow of clients.  The evidence also suggests that PFA marketing strategies exclusively 
emphasize the top-performing fund during the three months after the fund reached first 
place.  I find that volatility is not significant.  I think the MGR encourages a lack of 
differentiation among fund returns, and the penalty for falling below it spurs managers to 
not alter their portfolio risk, even if they are behind in ranking.  The explicit punishment 
 
42 Sirri and Tufano (1998) perfectly describe a similar situation in U.S. mutual funds arguing that 
households are not trained in financial analysis and their purchasing decision is related to search costs.   
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outweighs the implicit reward to attract flows by altering the portfolio risk.  Incentive 
contracts may be seen as financial future-like rather than call option-like, as exhibited in 
the U.S. mutual fund market. 
4.2. DESCRIPTION OF MARKET SHARE, FEE SCHEMES, REVENUES, 
EXPENSES AND ASSETS 
4.2.1.  Market Share in the Pension Funds Industry (June 1997–
December 2001) 
In the sample period, the number of PFAs went from thirteen (in 1997) to seven 
(in 2001) as a result of a series of mergers.  Mergers have been the most effective 
mechanism used by funds to increase market share.  The absorbed institutions were not 
capable of achieving the break-even point in the number of clients.  Table 4.1 illustrates 
the evolution of the market share of survivor and defunct funds through time, measured 
by the number of clients (Panel A) and by asset values (Panel B).  By 2001, the largest 
fund (PFA Provida) has 40 percent of all clients and 31 percent of assets.  With 6.9 
percent of the clients but 17.5 percent of the assets, PFA Cuprum has the greatest account 
value per client.  Another crucial feature in the sample period was the drop in mean value 
of monthly variable fees across funds from 3.0 percent to 2.5 percent.  Unlike the pension 
fund market, Chilean mutual funds epitomize a steady growth in the number of funds and 
dissimilarity in performance.  As of December 1999, there existed 14 mutual funds with 
115 funds, and in 2001, this industry was composed of 17 mutual funds and 177 funds.  
Their asset values, equivalent to 10 percent of PFAs’ asset values, grew between those 
years from $2,151 million to $3,313 million.  Also, regulation of mutual funds is less 
restrictive than that of pension funds.  Investment constraints are fundamentally focused 
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on avoiding concentration by security issuers43.  Neither the government nor mutual 
funds are obligated to guarantee any minimum return on funds.  Each mutual fund may 
charge any fee by management on the basis of asset values.  PFAs, on the other hand, 
cannot charge fees on asset values.  Within each category, mutual funds have exhibited a 
wide range of management fees and returns.  In fact, Maturana and Walker (1999) find 
that stock funds present similar returns to passive strategies, but the differences in annual 
returns among funds are as large as 10 percent. 
4.2.2. Fee Schemes and Revenues 
Pension fund fee schemes are composed of a fixed fee and a variable fee.  PFAs 
may charge any fee plan, but that fee plan must be uniform for all their clients.  
Furthermore, no management fee is allowed on asset values.  PFAs are prohibited from 
creating new funds to increase the degree of product differentiation, unlike Chilean 
mutual funds44. 
Each dependent worker is obligated to hold a personal savings account in only 
one PFA and is not allowed to redistribute the resources among several funds.  Each 
month, workers must contribute 10 percent of their taxable income (salary) to their 
individual accounts and pay both management and life insurance fees45.  Although the 
law allows each PFA to freely decide its fee plan, pension funds may only charge two 
types of monthly commissions, a fixed fee and a variable fee.  The fixed fee is a monthly 
flat amount of money charged by management.  The variable fee is entirely calculated as 
 
43 Unlike mutual fund regulation, PFA legislation considers liquidity and concentration factors to estimate 
the investment constraints.  Olivares (2003) describes the PFA constraints. 
44 Massa (2003) uses the term degree of product differentiation to refer to competitive strategies employed 
by mutual fund families.  Khorana and Servaes (2003) find that when a fund family outperforms 
competitors, starting a new fund is an innovation factor in this competition. 
45 The PFA legislation establishes a maximum taxable salary ($950,000 as of December of 2001) to make 
contributions to a savings account—that is, the maximum revenue per client that a PFA may realize is the 
variable fee times $950,000.  However, over this amount, workers may freely decide to make additional 
payments without paying any additional fee. 
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a percentage of the monthly taxable incomes of workers.  In 2001, the average monthly 
fixed and variable fees were $581 and 2.5 percent, respectively.  For instance, if the 
worker’s taxable monthly salary were $800,000, then the PFA monthly revenues would 
be $20,581.  Additionally, PFAs are not permitted to apply distinct commissions to 
clients on the basis of either taxable salaries or savings account balances.  In effect, the 
law precludes the possibility of discrimination in fees among consumers and mandates 
that both types of fees must uniformly be charged to each client.  No fee is allowed to be 
charged on the assets value of savings accounts.  This means that if a worker is fired or 
otherwise interrupts his stream of monthly wages, then the PFA would not get any 
commission. 
Fixed and variable fees represent 91 percent of PFAs’ total revenues46.  PFAs’ 
variable fees represent 80 percent of total revenues.  Table 4.2 lists monthly values of 
some revenues, expenses, and asset values.  Table 4.2–Panel A describes monthly 
average values of revenues and fee plans for each year.47.  The variable fee diminishes 
from 3.0 percent to 2.5 percent, and the fixed fee increases from $216 to $581.  The final 
effect of these variations in fees is illustrated by total income per client, which has ranged 
from $4,029 to $4,296.  This variation is equivalent to a decrease of 6.7 percent in real 
terms; however, the earnings realized by PFAs per client reflected in net operating 
income skyrocketed 324 percent, from $355 to $1,508. 
 
46 The remaining 9 percent comes from capital gains of the Mandatory Reserve account.  This account 
operates as a margin account and is equivalent to 1 percent of managed funds; it is invested in the same 
portfolio as the fund’s portfolio.  This account is deposited in the Central Bank of Chile to guarantee 
compliance with the minimum return of funds.  See Olivares (2003) for a more extensive analysis of the 
minimum return.  
47 At the bottom of Table 3–Panel C, I present the values of the exchange rate ($ per US$) and inflation 
rate (percent) if the reader wants to translate Chilean pesos to US$ for both nominal and real values. 
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4.2.3.  Expenses and Assets 
With respect to expenses, salespersons’ commissions, administration, personnel, 
and marketing (advertising) are the most important in size.  The most remarkable 
characteristic of Table 4.2–Panel B is the ratio expenses-to-revenues, which persistently 
shrinks through the years from 0.82 to 0.61.  I suspect that the primary reason for this 
systematic fall rests on the abrupt drop in ratio salespersons-expenses-to-total-expenses, 
which varies from 0.35 to 0.14 due to a regulatory change that limited the number of 
clients’ transfers from six to two among funds within a year; as a consequence, PFAs 
reduced their sales forces.  Despite the considerable reduction in variable fees, there was 
a substantial increase in the net operating income per client, as shown in Table 4.2–Panel 
A, which might be due entirely to the lessening in expenditures, i.e., in salespeople’s 
commissions.  The marginal contribution per client dramatically increased by $1,153 
(from $355 to $1,508), while salespersons’ expenses per client decreased by $940 (from 
$1,305 to $365) due to the significant reduction of the number of salespersons in the 
pension funds system.  Table 4.2–Panel C shows that the total assets value managed by 
pension funds has systematically grown (in pesos), despite severe falls in the stock 
market because of the Asian and Russian crises.48.  As of 2001, the total value of the 
funds reached $22,100 billion (US$35.0 billion), equivalent to 50 percent of the Chilean 
GDP.49.  The number of clients steadily increases every period.  On average, the monthly 
growth rate of new clients going into the system is around 0.24 percent, which is slightly 
higher than the national population growth rate.  As mentioned, the most significant event 
in this market was the variation in salesperson expenses.  During the sample period, the 
 
48 In 1997-98, stock holdings accounted for nearly to 30 percent of portfolio value.  Stock market returns 
during the Asian and Russian crises accounted for -30 percent and -28 percent respectively.  
49 The exchange rate between the Chilean peso and the U.S. dollar increased from $417 to $670 in the 
period 1997:06–2001:12.   
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number of salespersons decreased drastically, by 86 percent.  As a proportion of total 
workers of PFAs, the level of salespersons shrank from 79 percent to 43 percent during 
the sample period. 
To get a more informative overview of the features of distinct PFAs, I calculate 
ratios of revenues, expenses, and net operating income relative to asset values and I 
classify PFAs into four different groups: industry value (computed on industry values), 
merged funds (those acquired by other funds), survivors, and leaders (three largest 
funds).50  Table 4.3 displays these ratios that are determined as of December of each year.  
The fee scheme across groups does not exhibit important differences at the end of each 
year.  However, in 1997, merged funds disbursed more in marketing expenses and 
realized operating losses, unlike the leader funds, which exhibited the lowest ratio in 
expenses and the largest operating profits.  Leader funds always made an operating 
benefit over fund assets near 0.5 percent.  Survivor funds spent less money on expenses 
than leader funds, but their fees were very similar to those of the leaders. 
4.3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1.  Data 
The data used in this study is directly obtained from the Chilean Superintendence 
of Pension Funds Administrators and covers the period June 1997 to December 2001.  It 
includes monthly information per pension fund on interim income statement reports, 
stock prices, fund asset values, fund quota values, and general statistics on the numbers 
of clients, salespersons, and workers.  In the sample period, there are two types of funds 
managed by each PFA; however, fund type II wasn’t in operation until 2000, so this 
study focuses only on fund type I.  The database is free of survivorship bias and is 
 
50 Each PFA has its own financial statement completely unrelated to its pension fund.  Pension funds have 
no liabilities, only assets and equities.  However, I use the terms PFA and pension funds interchangeably. 
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presented as panel data.51  The number of pension funds decreases through the sample 
period from thirteen to seven.  The fund return is determined using the quota values 
between two periods beginning with May 1997.  Quota value refers to the fund assets 
value divided by outstanding shares.52  The monthly contributions of clients are 
expressed in number of quotas.  As most of the variables, expressed in domestic 
currency, come from income statements, I compute the monthly variation of incomes and 
expenses.  The cumulated return is determined by 1-month, 2-month, 3-month, 6-month, 
9-month, and 12-month periods, and so is the standard deviation of such returns. 
4.3.2.  Hypotheses 
The two questions I want to examine are (i) how clients choose among funds and 
(ii) what pension funds advertise to compete and to attract customers.  To address the first 
question, I investigate the relationship between fund flows and performance to examine 
whether past performance matters to clients.  Several studies on U.S. mutual funds have 
documented that investors asymmetrically respond to past performance.  However, the 
case of Chilean pension funds may not necessarily follow that pattern.  In addition, unlike 
mutual fund investors, clients have neither investment agents nor financial advisors to 
advise them on the distinct opportunities offered by funds.  Their inability to understand 
the meaning of risk–return may be another reason to think that performance might not 
matter.  I investigate whether ranking on past performance affects fund flows.  Ranking is 
another way to refer to the importance of performance of a fund in relation to others.  
Through ranking variables, I study whether clients tend to move toward better performing 
funds, that is, if the place in the ranking is informative to clients.  I also examine whether 
clients focus on fixed and variable fees as a factor in choosing among funds.  If funds 
 
51 Zheng (1999) argues that mergers do not provoke survivorship bias because her tests include the defunct 
funds before they disappear.  Likewise, I do not exclude any fund in our sample even if it has merged.  
52 These shares are not traded in markets. 
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present statistical differences in returns, then lower fee schemes tend to attract more fund 
flows. 
The second question is how PFAs try to lure fund flows.  To answer this question, 
I analyze the variables (performance and fees) that are stressed in PFAs’ marketing 
strategies by examining marketing and salesperson expenses.  I specifically calculate as 
dependent variables the changes and the weight of both expenses.  Changes refer to 
variation in expenses between two periods, and weight means the share of expenses 
disbursed by PFA(i) over the total expenses incurred by the whole set of pension funds.  
The same normalization is realized for the variable: number of salespersons for a fund (i) 
over the total number of salespersons.  In fact, what I want to evaluate is whether a fund’s 
advertising policy changes when it (i) performs better or (ii) lowers its fee schemes or 
(iii) simply advertises to be competitive in the market—that is, whether funds with 
superior performance or high ranking or with lower fees tend to increase their advertising 
expenses to attract clients.53  In addition, I study how long the marketing campaign is 
carried out by funds. 
4.3.3.  Methodology 
4.3.3.1.  Flow Measures 
In order to answer the first question, I define fund flows as the monthly 
percentage change in asset values adjusted by appreciation and mergers.  This approach is 
more suitable than the simple change in flows because larger PFAs tend to receive larger 
funds irrespective of their performance.54  To determine the net percentage change in 
asset values exclusively caused by movement of clients’ cash flows, I subtract not only 
 
53 For instance, Sirri and Tufano (1998) find media attention considers bad and good performers equally. 
54 Market share in asset values, from Table 1, has remained constant across funds.  Only mergers have 
realized great inflows to acquiring funds. 
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the appreciation of fund assets given by a fund’s past return over the prior month 
corresponding to capital gains and dividends, but also the increase in total assets derived 
from mergers.  When a fund is merged into another fund, automatically its assets are 
augmented by the total asset value of the other fund.  Adjustment by mergers is of 
tremendous importance in my flow definition because around half of the funds 
disappeared by this process.  Table 4.1 illustrates the relevance and impact of this point.  
For instance, PFA Provida increased its market share by 4.3 percent, in terms of asset 
values, after acquiring PFA Union, which had accounted for 4.5 percent of the market 
share.  Almost 96 percent of PFA Union’s client resources remained in PFA Provida.  
When an acquiring fund holds a great proportion of a defunct fund’s money, it is called 
“follow the money” approach and is described by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996), 
Gruber (1996), and Zheng (1999) for the mutual funds industry.  These authors (unlike 
me) assume the existence of this pattern to control for survivorship bias.55  Numerous 
studies employ the measure of flow as asset values minus appreciation scaled by past 
period asset values.56  However, only two incorporate the variable mergers: (Zheng 
(1999) and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003). 
Fund flows of each fund are measured by Flow_Pesos, given by Model (4.1), 
which corresponds to percentage variation in asset values, adjusted by investment return 
and mergers.  Asseti,t is the asset value of the fund (i) at the end of the month (t) (in local 
currency), Returni,t is the return of fund (i) during the month (t), and Mergeri,t accounts for 
 
55 After studying only two cases, Gruber (1996) finds 90 percent of funds remain in the acquiring fund.  In 
this paper, the evidence is almost 95 percent.  
56 Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2004), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002), 
Shu, Yeh, and Yamada (2002), Jain and Wu (2000), Sawicki (2001), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997), Gruber (1996), Ippolito (1992).  Other papers, such as Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
and Zheng (1999), use change in dollar flow despite checking robustness by using percentage change in 
flow. 
increases in Asseti,t due to mergers.  With regard to specification data, changes in flows 
occur at the end of each month. 
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Similarly, the percent change in the value of funds between (t1–t0) may be written as: 
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The term Clientsi,t refers to the number of clients in the fund (i) at the end of month (t).  
Model (4.2) may be divided into two parts, which I will call (4.2a) Value_Flow (VF) and 
(4.2b) Quantity_Flow (QF) such that Flow_Pesos is equal to Value_Flow plus 
Quantity_Flow.57
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The percentage variation in Flow_Pesos is driven by VF, the percentage change in the 
asset value per client (variation in value), and QF, the percentage change in the number 
of the clients (variation in quantity).58  This separation of flows allows us to capture the 
effect in changes in funds driven by investors with larger accounts (Value), i.e., older or 
wealthier clients, or by the mass of clients (Quantity). 
                                                 
57 To obtain (4.2a) and (4.2b) from Model (4.2), I add and subtract the term 
( ) *, 1 , 1 , 1 , 0Asset Merger Clients Clientsi t i t i t i t
⎡± −⎣
⎤
⎦ and later I reorder the factors. 
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58 To my knowledge, no one has documented this separation to study flows.  Del Guercio and Tkac (2000), 
in spite of holding the number of pension clients, do not use this analysis. 
Finally, I measure the percentage variation in the number of clients in a PFA, 
defined by Flow_Clients with Model (4.3). In this model, Clients.Mergeri,t1 refers to the 
quantity of clients added to fund (i) from fund (j) with (i≠j) at time (t) due to mergers. 
(4.3) , , 1,
, 1
.
_ i t i t i ti t
i t





,− −=  
In Table 4.4, I illustrate the analysis of flow definitions of the four flow 
definitions before and after the series of mergers to better comprehend the changes in this 
industry.  Before any mergers (1997:06–1998:05) in Table 4.4–Panel A, four of six 
defunct PFAs mainly exhibited negative Flow_Pesos explained by reduction in 
Quantity_Flow, i.e., by drops in the number of clients, even though the entire industry’s 
monthly flow grew by 0.37 percent.  Not only did these funds consistently lose clients, 
but they also disbursed more in operating expenses.  They could never reach their break-
even point.  In Table 4.4–Panel B, we see that after four mergers, all of the fund survivors 
experienced positive flows, and the industry’s Flow_Pesos monthly growth rate reached 
0.29 percent, driven also by the number of clients (QF).  Table 4.4–Panel C lists the 
seven fund survivors, after six mergers.  The industry steadily grew to 0.25 percent, 
influenced by the quantity of clients.  Results obtained from Quantity_Flow are 
equivalent to those from Flow_Clients. 
4.3.3.2.  Marketing Variables 
Clients receive information about performance through two mechanisms.  First, 
PFAs are obligated to issue quarterly savings account statements informing their clients 
about the monthly inflows, ending balances, management fees, and the annual achieved 
return.  Second, the Superintendence of Pension Funds Administrators (SPFA) holds a 
monthly press conference to disclose monthly and yearly returns achieved by the system 
as a way to diminish the cost of informing clients about the funds’ performance and to 
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encourage competition within the industry59.  In fact, as a way to compete, PFAs 
frequently advertise their performance in the past 1 to 12 months.  As a mechanism to 
make this information clearer to clients, PFAs commonly realize ranking based on these 
performances.  To address the question of how PFAs compete to draw clients, I examine 
whether pension funds advertise past performance and fee schemes in their marketing 
strategies.  As part of these marketing strategies, funds utilize advertising, direct mailing, 
and salespersons. 
Information on marketing expenses is obtained from monthly income statement 
accounts.  Marketing is measured by considering both the variation of monthly 
advertising expenses and the proportion of advertising expenses of a PFA over the 
industry’s.  Salespersons’ activity is mainly assessed by the share of the number of 
salespersons of fund (i) over the total salespersons in the industry.  I disregard the change 
in salespersons’ commissions because the number of vendors systematically shrank and 
so did commissions, as explained previously. 
Two different regression models are run using changes in marketing expenditures 
and the weight of marketing expenses as dependent variables.  The weight of marketing 
expenses is defined as the advertising expenses of fund (i) over the total advertising 
expenses of the industry for period (T).  For instance, in 1997:06, PFA Cuprum spent 
M$944 on advertising, while the whole industry disbursed M$5,080; thus, the 
weight_marketing of PFA Cuprum is 18 percent.60.  This last variable allows capturing 
the effect of whether a PFA’s increase in advertising is proportionately larger than that of 
the industry since all pension funds increase their advertising in several of the periods.  
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/
59 Aside from past performance, the SPFA informs on total assets evolution, number of clients, total 
revenues, earnings, and returns realized by pension funds administrators. 
60 Market share of PFA advertising expenses (i) is  
 where 
( )[ _i iPFA Advertis Expensesα =
_ ]PFAs Advertis Expenses∑ 1iα =∑  
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The three independent variables are performance, fixed fees, and variable fees, and the 
two control variables are fund size and standard deviation of past performance. 
Several papers on mutual funds examine the effect of marketing expenses.  Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) compute marketing expenditures and the weight of media citation of 
major periodicals (a fund’s share of media citation over the total industry’s media 
citation) as measures of search costs, assuming that high fees can be considered a good 
proxy for these expenses; however, they are not sure that high fee funds correlate with 
high marketing funds.  Jain and Wu (2000) test whether advertising is used to attract 
more money to advertised funds; they find that flows are larger to advertised funds.  
Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) argue that investors learn to avoid load funds; they also 
find a negative relationship between flows and load fees.  Mamaysky and Spiegel (2001) 
design a model to explain the existence of fund families that emphasize investors who 
prefer dynamic trading strategies and do not stay in the market all the time.  Khorana and 
Servaes (2003), in analyzing fund family strategies, show that fund families gain market 
share with lower fees and with higher performance.  Massa (2003) claims that even when 
a fund family underperforms, it may remain competitive by shrinking fees or offering 
more funds within the family to attract heterogeneous clients.  Gallaher, Kaniel, and 
Starks (2004) focus on the determinants of flows to fund families and find that 
advertising has no linear impact in flows and that there is no relation between advertising 
expenses and fund flow volatility. 
4.3.3.3.  Specification of Regression Models 
The dependent variables are Flow_Pesos, divided into Value_Flow, and 
Quantity_Flow and Flow_Clients61.  I measure performance in three ways: as excess 
 
61 Flow_Pesos and Flow_Clients are the main dependent variables used to study the relationship between 
flows and performance.  The use of the latter variable constitutes my unique contribution to the knowledge 
of this topic.  
returns over the benchmark (premium), as excess returns over the average return of 
industry, and as raw fund returns.  As the benchmark, I use the weighted average return 
across funds, which is used by the SPFA to determine the accomplishment of the 
minimum guaranteed return (MGR).  I do not preclude, a priori, any length of period to 
measure performance.  These performance definitions are measured on the basis of 
rolling months of 1, 6, and 12 months (T=1,6,12) to determine what performance period 
is the most important to clients when making their decision.  From premium in returns, I 
proceed to rank PFAs from the highest (with value=1) to the lowest (with value=13) past 
performance and classify PFAs into three categories: top place (winner fund, with 
value=1), middle place (funds with values=2, 3, 4, 5), and bottom place (funds with 
values=6 through 13).  As the number of PFAs decreases (through mergers), the bottom 
place gathers values numbers 6 through the number of funds existing.  In addition, I 
define a set of dummy variables to precisely represent the final position in the ranking of 
each PFA.  For instance, Ranking_1st is equal to 1 if fund is the winner and 0 otherwise.  
Ranking_2nd_3rd is equal to 1 if the fund achieved either second or third place in the 
ranking and 0 otherwise. 
Because fund flows have a delayed response to the explanatory variables, I 
consider that there is a 3-month lag between the explanatory variables and the time the 
fund flow occurs, as represented in Diagram 1: 
Diagram 1.  Timeline of the Decision-Making Process 
t0 t1 t2 t3
Returns PFA advertises its Client makes Transfer is booked




                                                
The timing of the pension fund system’s information disclosure starts when the 
SPFA reveals the monthly- and yearly-earned performance of each PFA at the end of 
each month (t0).62.  This official information is heavily used by PFAs to advertise past 
performance in the period.  The more aggressive marketing campaigns advertise through 
both media and salespersons.63.  Media coverage includes ads in newspapers and TV.  
Similar to Sirri and Tufano’s (1998) comment on mutual fund consumers, pension fund 
clients are incessantly bombarded by vendor solicitations.  Salespeople engage in 
cutthroat competition to get appointments to visit potential new customers, because an 
important part of their compensation is based on the number of clients that they capture.  
Unlike mutual funds, pension funds directly commercialize their product through vendors 
and branches.  No external institution is allowed to distribute the pension funds service.  
During the period of great exposure to PFAs’ marketing activity (t1), clients make their 
choice.  Their decision to transfer their funds from PFA (i) to PFA (j) takes effect when 
they sign the transfer forms provided by a salesperson or at any branch office (t2).  Each 
PFA processes the transfer papers by checking appropriate signatures and clients’ 
identification data.  After transfer forms have been cleared, PFA (i) proceeds to pass on 
funds to PFA (j).  This final step is booked by both PFAs in their accounting system, and 
their magnetic tapes are forwarded to the SPFA, which confirms the transfer of funds and 
discloses it at (t3). 
Diagram 1 is read as follows:  returns are endogenously realized at the end of 
month (t), and PFAs advertise this information throughout the following month (t+1).64  
During that period, clients are exposed to advertising, and then they select a fund in the 
 
62 Monthly and annual returns are computed on a calendar-month basis. 
63 The Pension Fund Act exclusively allows PFAs to advertise and promote information to clients relative 
to investments, performance, fee schemes, type of funds, number of branches and market share.    
64 As financial reports are referred to at the end of each month, I assume that advertising expenses may 
happen during the month. 
following month (t+2) by signing the transfer document, which is processed in the next 
period (t+3) by PFAs.  In that last period, inflow and outflow are recognized in 
Flow_Pesos and Flow_Clients.  As a change in fee is a non-endogenous decision, PFAs 
may decide when to modify their fee schemes and immediately advertise this change.  
Flows would be booked at (t2). 
Returning to the first of my two questions (how clients choose among funds and 
what pension funds advertise in order to compete), I follow Sirri and Tufano’s (1998) 
approach (exhibited in their Table 2) and define the following specification that relates 
excess returns, fees, and total risk to regression Models (4.4) and (4.5), which consider as 
dependent variables Flow_Pesos and Flow_Clients.65
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Variables FixFeei,t-1 and VarFeei,t-1 refer to the fixed and variable fees, respectively.66  
Performance, Premiumi,t-k_Tmonth, is assessed as (i) excess return over the benchmark, 
(ii) excess return over the average return, and (iii) raw returns for the rolling periods of 1, 
6, and 12 months (T=1,6,12) and with up to three lagged months (k=1,2,3).  This model 
is run cross-sectionally for each individual holding period to determine what past month 
effectively drives movements in flows.  In addition, the model employs the control 
variables LOG(Asset)i,t-1, which refer to the natural logarithm of asset values of fund (i) to 
account for the effect of fund size (i.e., the fact that $1 of fund flow has a more 
significant influence on smaller funds) and Standard.Deviationi,t, the standard deviation 
                                                 
65  The definition of Flow_Clients has not been explored in the context of U.S. mutual funds.  Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2002), to check robustness in results of their Flow variable (in $ and in  percent), use growth in 
the number of clients for the U.S. pension fund segment.  
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66 The data delivers disaggregated information of fixed and variable fees per PFA.  Each PFA must charge 
the same fee schemes to its clients. 
of 3-month returns as measures of a fund’s total risk.67  Brown, Harlow, and Starks 
(1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003) have extensively 
demonstrated the effect of performance volatility on fund flows.  If funds reward 
managers based on asset level, and if clients react to past performance, then managers 
have an implicit incentive to lure more clients by altering portfolio risk, especially if they 
have underperformed benchmarks. 
Among the most relevant works on mutual funds that have employed Model (4.4) 
are:  
• Sirri and Tufano (1998), who use a breakdown of performance ranking in 
quintiles and control variables LOG(Asset)i,t-1, monthly standard deviation, 
total fees, and fund category. 
• Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003), who regress performance and control by 
LOG(Asset)i,t-1, expenses ratio, and fund age. 
• Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), who include excess returns, Jensen’s alpha, and 
tracking error. 
• Shu, Yeh, and Yamada (2002), who regress performance, fee ratios, standard 
deviation, account size, and turnover ratio.  
However, with regard to Model (4.5), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) reduce the 
importance of the variable growth of the number of clients to robustness. 
As in Sirri and Tufano (1998) (in their Table 6), I examine what PFAs advertise in 
their strategies and use the following model: 
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67 Log(Asset) helps control when fund flows may be positively correlated to fund size.  In fact, as shown in 
Table 4.1, larger funds tend to attract more funds because their market share increases slightly. 
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The dependent variable, weight of marketing expenses of each fund (i) for 
different rolling cumulative periods (T =1,3,6,12 months), is regressed against the 
dummy variables of position in the ranking on past-12-months performance (1st through 
13th) and variable fees and against control variables fund size (LOG(Asset)i,t-1), change in 
total expenses, and standard deviation of past-3-months return.  I consider four different 
periods to measure the cumulative effect of marketing expenses in order to know whether 
funds advertise their attributes for short or long periods.  I run one regression for each 
period (T) with different dummy variables on ranking.  With this model I may investigate 
how long a PFA advertises its performance ranking and whether a PFA changes its 
advertising expenditure depending on its position in the performance ranking.  Other 
types of specifications exhibited in the literature are empirical works such as Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), who use as a dependent variable the weight of media citation of major 
periodicals against performance quintiles, fees, monthly standard deviation, 
LOG(Asset)i,t-1 and fund complex assets.  Jain and Wu (2000) regress flows against a 
dummy variable for advertised funds and control by size and past performance and flows. 
I estimate both types of regression models using the methodology proposed by 
Fama and Macbeth (1973), broadly used in the literature of mutual funds (by Gallaher, 
Kaniel, and Starks (2004), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003), Shu, Yeh, and Yamada (2002), 
Sawicki (2001), and Sirri and Tufano (1998)).  Specifically, I carry out 43 cross-sectional 
regressions on fund flows across PFAs for each month and inform the means and t-
statistics from the time series of coefficients.68  The Fama-Macbeth procedure provides 
more suitable standard errors than a pooled OLS model, which tends to understate 
standard errors and hence overestimate t-values because monthly observations may be 
correlated with previous months.  However, given the small number of PFAs existing in 
 
68 Shu et al. (2002) study a sample of 37 open-end equity mutual funds in Taiwan between 1996:11 and 
1999:10 and run 36 cross-sectional regressions.  Sawicki (2001) examines 55 Australian funds for 15 years.   
the market (only seven since 2001:02), the Fama-Macbeth approach shows a significant 
statistical problem with the degrees of freedom.  Therefore, I use fewer than six 
explanatory variables in the regression models for a better econometric analysis.  
Nevertheless, and using the same set of variables, I alternatively estimate a fixed-effects 
model to check robustness of the findings.  The estimation disregards cross-sectional 
variation in the data that is common to funds over time as mentioned by Ippolito (1992).69  
Besides, a fixed-effect model is more suitable, considering that our data contains all 
pension funds (i-th), allows controlling for any individual heterogeneity, and reduces the 
aggregation bias.70  In this type of model, intercepts are different for each i-th, but slopes 
are constrained to be the same across units.  Each regression model is tested under a 
fixed-effect model by using the Hausman specification test, which suggests that if there is 
a correlation between the unit-specific residual error (ui) and the set of explanatory 
variables (Xit), then OLS with fixed effect emerges as a consistent model.  In the tables, I 
report results of coefficient values and their t-test values obtained by the Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) approach and by the fixed-effect model. 71
4.4.  HOW DO CLIENTS CHOOSE AMONG PENSION FUNDS? 
In this section, I consider how clients choose among funds by studying how fund 
flows move across funds and whether past performance and fee schemes affect 
movements of flows. 
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69 Ippolito (1992) runs a pooled regression model that exhibits the aforementioned problems.  To correct 
these issues, he utilizes a fixed-effect model.  
70 The general estimating model is y X uit it i itα β ε= + + + and the fixed-effect model is represented as 
( ) ( ) (it i it i it iy y x x )β ε ε− = − + − .  Intercept is not reported as output since it is equivalent to .  
Fixed-effect is Least Squared Dummy Variables (LSDV) model, where each unit (i-th) is a dummy 
variable.  Ui refers to the extent to which 
( )uiα +
α of the cross-sectional PFA (i-th) differs from the overall 
intercept. 
71 I also estimate t-statistics using Newey and West’s (1987) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors, and the results are still consistent with those presented. 
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4.4.1.  Does Past Performance Matter? 
I examine the relationship between flow and past performance through the 
dependent variables Flow_Pesos and Flow_Client.  To find out whether past performance 
matters in a scenario of similar returns, I run Models (4.4) and (4.5) with past 
performance of 1-month, 6-month, and 12-month periods (T=1, 6, 12), lagged 3 
months.72  Each regression is individually run to determine to what extent flows react to 
different rolling periods (T), and the results are listed in Table 4.5–Panels A1 
(Flow_Pesos) and A2 (Flow_Client) with the Fama-Macbeth method and Table 4.5–
Panels B1 and B2 with the fixed-effects model, respectively.  Each month-period is 
presented in 3 different models: A (T=1 month), B (T=6 months), C (T=12 months) 
under Fama-Macbeth methodology and with a fixed-effect model.  I find that flows do 
not respond to 1-month and 6-month premium with 3-month lag periods, but are more 
sensitive to past-12-month premium with 3-month lags73.  Table 4.5–Panels A1 and A2 
show that fund flows are sensitive exclusively to 12 months performance, but client flows 
do not exhibit any significant coefficient.  This means that a number of clients does not 
care about past performance, but a small segment of clients seeks higher performance, 
which may explain the significant result of 12-month performance in Model (4.4).  This 
point deserves deeper study through the partition of Flow_Pesos into Quantity_Flow and 
Value_Flow. 
In results not shown, no premium (1-, 6- and 12-months) is significant with both 
1-month lag and 2-month lags (k=1,2).  This result is consistent with Diagram 1.  The 
importance of this finding rests on the fact that despite the returns being disclosed by the 
SPFA at t0, none of the clients makes a choice at t1.  I could argue that the SPFA’s press 
 
72 I use lagged performance up to 3 months to be consistent with Diagram 1.  
73 I also compute rolling 3-month premium and flows do not react to this period either. Results not showed. 
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conferences do not generate any impact on the decision-making process of clients; rather, 
the active advertising campaign carried out by PFAs does.  Statistical evidence supports 
the notion that individuals delay two periods in incorporating information on new returns 
and in transferring their funds from PFA(i) to PFA(j) at t2 which is reflected in PFAs’ 
accounting at t3. 
In Model (4.4c) (using T=12 months) with the Fama Macbeth method, the 
coefficient of 12-month premium (Lag3 Prem_12m) is equal to 0.38 and significant at 5 
percent.  An increase of 10 basis points in this premium would imply an augmentation of 
3.8 percent in flows (+0.38*10). Consistent with this evidence, in Table 4.5–Panel D with 
fixed effect regression, Model (4.4c) shows a 12-month premium of 0.48, significant at 1 
percent.  Identical findings are also achieved (but not shown) when premium is defined as 
returni,t minus simple average returnt. 
In relation to fees, I notice from Model (4.4c) in Table 4.5–Panel A1 that fund 
flows go to pension funds with lower fee schemes.  Variable and fixed fee regressors are 
negative and significant at 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, which is also consistent 
with other empirical studies on U.S. mutual funds (Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Barber et 
al. (2002)).  Clients prefer to pay a lower cost when there is no difference in service.74  
However, which fees have a greater impact on flows?  As of December 2001, the means 
of variable and fixed fees are 2.5 percent and $561.  With a reduction of 20 percent in the 
variable fee, from 2.5 percent to 2.0 percent, fund flows are forecasted to increase 2.0 
percent (-4.01 * - 0.5 percent).  Likewise, a drop of 20 percent in fixed fees (from $561 to 
$449) would increase flows 1.79 percent (-0.016 * -$112) ceteris paribus.  The same 
percentage variation in the variable fee has a larger impact on fund flows than that of the 
fixed fee.  The negative sign in the fund size variable demonstrates that changes in asset 
 
74 Given that returns across funds do not exhibit statistical differences and clients may not split their 
savings into different funds, the pension funds service is virtually a commodity. 
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value have a lower impact on larger funds.  However, the number of clients, Flow-Clients 
in Table 4.5Panel A2, illustrates the negative signs in both types of fees, but their 
coefficients are not significant.  A possible explanation of this result is that the whole set 
of clients may see the PFA service(i) as a substitute of PFA(j)’s in terms of performance 
and fee schemes.  In fact, in the period under analysis, all PFAs permanently reduced 
their fees, which could have confused clients over the final price of management service 
commissions, but fund flows react to fee schemes.  The standard deviation is not 
significant in any regressions of Models (4.4) and (4.5). 
Additionally, Table 4.5–Panels B1 and B2 that compute Models (4.4) and (4.5) 
under the fixed-effect model present results that are in concordance with those of prior 
Panels.  Past-12-months performance is highly significant in Flow_Pesos and 
Flow_Clients specified by Models (4.4c) and (4.5c) (T=12).  In the case of Flow_Pesos, 
and comparing Fama-Macbeth to fixed effect results, 12-month performance coefficients 
are positive with values of 0.38 and 0.48, respectively.  Fund flows negatively react to fee 
schemes.  The significant coefficients of variable fees are very similar, -4.01 and -3.83, 
respectively.  Fixed fees show negative and significant coefficients of -0.016 and -0.035.  
Similarly, in the case of Flow_Clients, the results under the fixed effect model (Table 
4.5–Panel B2) are consistent with those of Flow_Pesos (Table 4.5–Panel A2).  The past-
12-months performance coefficient is positive and significant.  Coefficient values of 
variable and fixed fees are -1.97 and -0.017, respectively.  The standard deviation is 
negative, as expected, but in none of the models is it significant.  In sum, findings prove 
to be consistent with both Fama-MacBeth and fixed effect model methodologies.  Fund 
flows respond to performance and fees schemes; however, client flows exhibit different 
results.  To explicate this difference in both flows, I investigate in more detail the 
division of Flow_Pesos. 
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In Table 4.5–Panel C, I analyze the separation of fund flows by running the 
regression Model (4.4) with the dependent variables Value_Flow (Equation (4.2a)) and 
Quantity_Flow (Equation (4.2b)) and find that in Model (4.4b) (6-month premium), 
performance is non-significant.  In contrast, in Model (4.4c,) the 12-month premium is 
positive and highly significant at 1 percent in Value_Flow, which explains wholly the 12-
month premium coefficient in Flow_Pesos (0.35 over 0.38).   
Fees are also an important variable in describing flow movements.  Percentage 
variation in fund flows is not driven by the number of clients (Quantity_Flow), but by the 
account size in funds (Value_Flow).  Elderly or affluent clients with large savings 
accounts tend to focus more on past performance when selecting funds.  I think this group 
of investors pays more attention to performance because small differences in returns have 
a larger impact on their saving account values.  In contrast, I believe that the number of 
clients (Quantity_Flow) is not sensitive to performance because they hold lower savings 
balances and do not persistently search for differences in returns.  They do not 
significantly appreciate that the tiny differences in performance among funds help them 
increase their balance.  I reach the same interpretation with respect to the 12-month 
premium in Table 4.5–Panel D under fixed-effect.  No significance is obtained in 
coefficients of past-6-months performance.  Table 4.5–Panel E runs regressions under 
both Fama-MacBeth and fixed-effect for the dependent variables Flow_Pesos and 
Flow_Clients and uses 12-month raw return as a measure of performance; its findings are 
consistent with those of Table 4.5–Panels A and B.  Here I note the great similarity in the 
regression of Flow_Pesos between the 12-month premium coefficients, 0.38 and 0.36, 
with both methodologies.  The same analogy is observed when analyzing the result for 
the variable fee, whose significant coefficients are -4.01 and -4.17 for Fama-Macbeth and 
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fixed-effect, respectively.  For Flow_Clients, performance is not significant under Fama-
Macbeth, but is slightly significant under fixed-effect. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, if PFAs exhibit similarities 
in returns, one could anticipate a weak relationship between fund flows and performance.  
Despite the PFAs’ performance being almost identical, Value_Flow explicates a great 
proportion of fund flows, showing that fund flows react to higher performance and fees.  
I conjecture, based on these results, that a small number of clients are more sensitive to 
performance than the whole group represented by Flow_Clients and Quantity_Flow, 
which do not respond to higher performance, as perhaps one could have expected. 
In order to examine whether clients respond equally to higher performance, I 
study in the next section the relationship between flows and ranking through dummy 
variables for ranking. 
4.4.2.  How Sensitive Are Flows to Ranking? 
To explore whether the response to performance is identical among clients and 
whether relative performance among funds is important, I order the 12-month premium 
of PFAs from the highest (value=1) to the lowest (value=13) place and classify them in 
three categories: top (value=1), middle (values=2, 3, 4 and 5) and bottom (value=6 
through 13).75  I also define dummy variables relative to place achieved in the 12-month 
performance ranking: 
• Ranking_1st, which equals 1 if PFA (i) is in the first place and 0 otherwise;  
• Ranking_2nd_3rd, which equals 1 if PFA (i) is in either second or third place 
and 0 otherwise; 
• Ranking_4th_5th, which equals 1 if PFA (i) is in fourth or fifth place and 0 
otherwise; and finally,  
 
75 As the number of PFAs decreases, the bottom place comprises funds ranked 6th and below. 
• Ranking 6th_lower, which equals 1 if PFA (i) is in sixth place or below and 0 
otherwise.   
I denote that a fund is the winner (Ranking_1st) and runners-up (Ranking_2nd_3rd).76  The 
premium definition used to calculate ranking is the excess return on the benchmark, 
which is computed for rolling 12-month periods and lagged 3-month periods.  I do not 
report rankings lagged 1 month and 2 months because, similar to 12-month premium with 
these lags, they do not statistically explain flow variations.  In the following models, I 
refer Flowi,t to the dependent variables Flow_Pesos and Flow_Clients.  In Table 4.6, 
Panels A1 (Flow_Pesos) and A2 (Flow_Clients) present results of four regression 
models—(4.7) to (4.10)—under the Fama-Macbeth procedure.  Models (4.8) through 
(4.10) regress the ranking variables pairwise to make a better comparison of the flow 
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Table 4.6–Panel A1 shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient in 
variable fees (at 5 percent) and fixed fees (at 10 percent) in Model (4.7).  The 1st place 
dummy coefficient in past-12 premium ranking is positive (0.006) and significant at 10 
percent.  This means that clients tend to follow the winner fund in the ranking.  To better 
analyze consumers’ preferences in returns, I define Model (4.8) with dummy variables of 
Ranking1st and Ranking2nd_3rd to refer to the fund in 1st place and funds in either 2nd or 
3rd place.  The outcomes illustrate that Ranking1st is positive (0.005) and significant (at 5 
percent); however, Ranking2nd_3rd is positive, not significant, and lower in value.  This 
finding supports the notion that clients do not react equally to performance.  The flow 
sensitivity is statistically stronger in superior performers. 
 
76 Sirri and Tufano (1998) use performance quintiles to categorize funds.  In this paper, due to the number 
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In Model (4.9), I change the variable Ranking2nd_3rd to Ranking6th_lower.  
Ranking1st coefficient still is positive (0.006) and significant at 5 percent, whereas 
Ranking6th_lower is negative in sign and non-significant.  This outcome contributes to 
evidence that clients do not react equally to performance.  Basically, the winner fund in 
the ranking draws fund flows of their clients, while poorly-performing funds do not 
change their fund flows.  When using Flow_Clients in Table 4.6–Panel A2, no significant 
results are obtained.  The number of clients does not seem to respond to any independent 
variables.  As mentioned before, I hypothesize that a small group of clients drives the 
results of fund flows.  When the fixed-effect model is used, the results of Table 4.6–Panel 
B1 (Flow_Pesos) are consistent in sign and significance with the above rankings. 
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Slightly different from previous models, in Model (4.10) I gather three ranking 
variables from 1st to 6th place, Ranking1st, Ranking2nd_3rd and Ranking 4th_5th_6th.  The 
results confirm that the top fund tends to attract more clients than those in lower 
positions.  The coefficient in Ranking1st is positive (0.004), statistically significant (at 10 
percent) and larger than those of Ranking2nd_3rd and Ranking4th_5th_6th.  Performance is 
important to clients; however, when it is divided into categories as documented by 
Sawicki (2003), Shu et al. (2002), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Ippolito (1992), I find that 
there exists an asymmetric reaction, depending on the ranking position of funds.  Funds 
that perform better receive a stronger impact on flows than those that do worse, despite 
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similarity in returns.  Relative performance evaluation among funds matters to affluent or 
elderly clients when deciding on allocation.  Likewise, Table 4.6–Panel B1 with Models 
(4.9) and (4.10) delivers the same evidence exhibited in Table 4.6–Panel A1—mainly, the 
best performer in the rolling 12-month period of the ranking is capable of increasing fund 
flows. 
Now, I will examine what part of flow definition drives these results.  Table 4.6–
Panel B2 with the variable Flow_Clients exhibits no significant coefficients for ranking 
from 2nd place through 6th and lower.  The same results are obtained for the top performer 
fund (1st place) in models (4.8) and (4.10).  In the other two models, 1st place coefficient 
is consistent in sign and barely significant at 10 percent.  Consistent with Table 4.6–Panel 
A2’s results, coefficients of Models (4.8) through (4.10) of Table 4.6–Panel B2 in the 
variable fees are not significant.  I infer that the clients’ flow does not move looking for 
lower fees or high past performance due to the law’s prohibition of the differentiation in 
fund services.77  In fact, the MGR encourages the likeness in funds’ performance, and 
PFAs cannot increase the number of new funds.  As funds started steadily decreasing 
their fees from 1998:04, clients may have been confused in identifying which fund 
offered the lowest management charges.  The hypothesis that clients do not perceive any 
significant benefits from changing from one PFA to another is supported, not only by the 
results of Flow_Clients but also by the fact that PFAs do not significantly change their 
market share, as illustrated in Table 4.1. 
Models (4.8) and (4.9) are run using the decomposition of flows in Value_Flow 
and Quantity_Flow, and their outcomes are exhibited in Table 4.6–Panel C under the 
Fama-Macbeth procedure.78  Model (4.8), at first glance, illustrates that Value_Flow 
 
77 Massa (2003) identifies that among fund families, different fees and new funds increase product 
differentiation.  
78 Results of Model (4.7) with Value and Quantity are consistent with those of Models (4.8) and (4.9) and 
are not shown. 
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drives changes in Flow_Pesos.  The coefficient value of the Ranking1st variable is 
identical between both flows (0.005) and significant at 5 percent.  In contrast, Ranking 
2nd_3rd coefficients are non-significant and equal.  However, Quantity_Flow shows that 
the ranking variable is not different from zero, i.e., the number of clients does not 
consider the ranking position material, unlike elderly or affluent clients.  Consistent with 
the previous results, the price variable is highly important to large accounts.  The variable 
fee is negative and significant at 5 percent.  Similar evidence is inferred from Model 
(4.9).  In both models, Ranking1st coefficient of Value_Flow explains a considerable part 
of the coefficient of Flow_Pesos (more than 80 percent) and is significant at 5 percent.  
Both Ranking2nd_3rd and Ranking6th_lower are non-significant, and the latter variable 
shows a negative sign.  Most of the Quantity_Flow coefficients that are consistent with 
the findings of Panel A2 when Flow_Clients is used are definitely non-significant.  In 
Panel D, fixed-effect models show that the ranking coefficient of 1st place in Value_Flow 
is positive, significant at 1 percent, and almost equal to that of Panel C.  The other 
ranking variables are non-significant. 
Additionally, Table 4.6–Panel E shows the percentage change in average asset 
value per client (total assets over total number of clients) that the 12-month performance 
winner fund experiences, realized through two windows.  The first window, called 
before-current, computes the variation between one month before (t-1) and the current 
month (t0), and the second window, called before-after, refers to one month before (t-1) 
and one month after (t+1) the winner fund achieves the top place (t).  Both measures are 
adjusted by return and merger.79  To compare results in Table 4.6–Panel E, I add 
percentage change in the number of clients using the same two windows.  Remarkably, 
the variation of average value per client is greater than that of the number of clients, 
 
79 It is reported only quarterly because the monthly results are identical to quarterly results through the 
period.  The 12-month performance values arise from 1998:05. 
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which is consistent with the prior explanations that fund flows are explained more by 
movements in larger accounts than by changes in the number of clients.  For instance, as 
of June 1998, PFA 5 increased its average asset per client by 7.7 percent and its number 
of clients by 1.45 percent.  In the period 1998:05–2001:12, top performers exhibit a mean 
of the percentage change in asset value per client and number of clients of 2.11 percent 
and 0.23 percent, respectively, for the window of the periods (t-1) and (t+1). 
In all the models discussed, the standard deviation is not a significant variable in 
the decision-making process of clients.  A possible reason for this is that volatility is a 
technical concept, one that is not easily understood by clients since it would require 
extensive knowledge of portfolio management.  Another possible explanation is that 
when testing differences in standard deviations in pairwise funds, I find that these 
differences are statistically not significant.  If investors were capable of recognizing this 
fact, then standard deviations evidently would be irrelevant.  However, these investors 
(the clients) are lay people—simple workers—so I hypothesize that volatility is a very 
specific concept that is not well understood by most clients, and at the same time, 
insignificant in magnitude when considered by the more investment-savvy clients and 
performance chasers. 
4.5.  WHAT DO PFAS ADVERTISE TO ATTRACT MORE FUND FLOWS? 
The second question that I address is how pension funds compete to gain market 
share.  From the previous section, I find that clients principally follow the winner fund, 
and I conjecture that fund strategies tend to highlight past performance, ranking position, 
and lower fee schemes to attract customers.  As pictured in Diagram 1, when returns are 
realized, funds start publicizing performance in the media and through their fund vendors. 
However, excessive promotion through ads and vendors has two effects.  On the one 
hand, it may overwhelm consumers, make them less sensitive to performance, and 
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confuse them about the effective message that the pension fund wants to disclose.  On the 
other hand, it may emphasize relevant factors such as historical performance, drops in 
fees, etc. that make consumers more aware of the real advantages of a specific fund.  Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) evaluate the media attention given by positive, neutral, and bad news 
and use as a dependent variable the share of circulation cites.  They conclude that 
consumers react uniformly to top and bottom performers. 
I examine specifically whether and how long funds promote performance and 
decrease in fees and I compute the variables of marketing and salespersons of each fund 
normalized by the values of the industry.  Weight_Marketing_Tmonthi,t is defined as the 
share of advertising expenses realized by PFA (i) for different cumulative periods (T = 1, 
3, 6 and 12 months) over total advertising expenses incurred by the industry for the 
period (T).  The other variable considered is Weight_Salesperson_Tmonthi,t, the share of 
the number of salespersons of each fund for different cumulated months (T = 1, 3, 6 and 
12).  This variable is computed similar to the weight_marketing, by dividing the number 
of salespersons of each PFA over the total number of salespersons in the industry.  The 
significance of these two variables over the simple variation in pesos or in percentage is 
that it captures the effect of the amount of a particular PFA’s advertising relative to the 
entire PFA system’s adverstising in certain period of time, since all PFAs could be 
increasing their advertising during that time, and hence I would be unable to distinguish 
which of them is doing a larger campaign.  I intend to identify how important is the 
PFA(i) marketing expense in relation to the industry.  Sirri and Tufano (1998) use the 
share of media cites and find no difference between flow-performance and funds 
receiving media attention, because media coverage of U.S. mutual funds has increased 
over time. 
Results are illustrated in Table 4.7, and the models are as follow: 
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In Panel A, I display four regressions with Model (4.11) for four different periods 
of (T) of the dependent variable weight of marketing.  I use Ranking1st as independent 
variable and logarithm of asset values, standard deviation of past-3-months returns, and 
change in total expenses as control variables.  These models are computed under Fama-
Macbeth (1973).  Table 4.7–Panel B considers the four above models under fixed-effect 
regression.  Unlike Table 4.7–Panel A, Panel C utilizes the independent variable 
Ranking6th_lower instead of Ranking1st.  Table 4.7–Panel D exhibits results under fixed-
effect as robustness with the same models of Table 4.7–Panel C. 
The results of Table 4.7–Panel A show that winner pension funds tend to 
advertise more and their ad campaigns do not last long.  Marketing efforts are highly 
concentrated in 1-month and 3-month periods after that the 12-month ranking winner is 
known.  For T=1 and T=3, the coefficient value of Ranking1st is 0.066 (at 5 percent) and 
0.060 (at 10 percent).  No significance is found for 6-month and 12-month periods in the 
weight of marketing expenses.  Consistent with this evidence, Table 4.7–Panel B displays 
identical information.  The coefficients of Ranking1st are 0.037 and 0.022, both 
significant at 5 percent.  I discover in Panel C that loser funds, those ranked 6th or lower, 
exhibit lower expense levels in relation to the others.  In fact, the ranking coefficient of 
poorly-performing funds is negative, meaning that the relative importance of their 
marketing expenses decreases with their performance.  Table 4.7–Panel D shows the 
same conclusion.  In sum, top funds advertise proportionately more than loser funds; 
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however, their marketing campaigns do not last beyond three months.  To check this 
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Model (4.12) in Table 4.7–Panel E considers as a dependent variable 
Weight_Marketing_3monthi,t.  It is the weight of marketing expenses with three 
accumulated months and is run in pairwise ranking variables.  Model (4.12a), with 
dummy variables Ranking1st and Ranking6th_lower, shows that the coefficient of the top 
fund is positive and significant at 5 percent.  In contrast, loser funds tend to decrease their 
advertising expenses.  Similarly, Model (4.12b) employs variables Ranking1st and 
Ranking2nd_3rd and exhibits that Ranking1st is positive, significant at 5 percent, and 
superior to Ranking2nd_3rd.  Funds that do not reach the top position in performance 
expend the same share or less on marketing expenses.  Table 4.7–Panel F displays the 
same model (4.12), but under fixed-effect, and its results support Table 4.7–Panel E’s 
findings that funds below 1st place in the ranking spend less than the winner.  No 
significant results are obtained when running the weight of salespersons against the same 
variable set used in Models (4.11) and (4.12) since the number of workers steadily falls 
through time and every fund tends to keep its weight.  In Table 4.7–Panel G, I use the 
variable marketing expenses of 3 months scaled by asset value for each fund.  The 
regressions that are run under both Fama-Macbeth and fixed-effect use as independent 
variables performance ranking and fee schemes as well as the same control variables 
employed throughout this document.  The results still support the hypothesis that funds 
advertise top performers.  The coefficient of ranking 1st place is positive and significant, 
and the other ranking coefficients are not significant. 
Consistent with our previous findings, PFAs increase advertising in the short 
term. Their policies are driven by marketing efforts that increase in the period after 
reaching the top position, but the effect of these efforts is very ephemeral, since the next 
period’s winner will apply the same plan.  In this “spinning wheel,” PFAs regularly rotate 
from the top to lower positions.  However, the commercial strategy to hold onto market 
share is to advertise when one is on top.  The lack of a diverse service encourages funds 
to principally focus their marketing effort uselessly on short-term performance because 
the winner is never the top performer for more than 3 periods.  The transition probability 
of a fund’s being the top fund for the next period, given that it was a winner in the past 12 
months or in the past 1 month, is less than 4 percent and 7 percent, respectively. 
4.6.  WHAT PART OF FLOWS EXPLAINS THE DECISIONS OF CLIENTS? 
To investigate the variables that are definitely relevant to consumers in selecting a 
pension fund, I use as control variables logarithm of asset values and the weight of the 
number of salespersons and run models under the four flow definitions, Flow_Pesos, 
Value_Flow, Quantity_Flow and Flow_Clients, characterized in Model (4.13) with the 
variable Flowi,t.  In this model, I use variable and fixed fees as independent regressors 
with a 1-month lag (VarFeei,t-1, FixFeei,t-1).  Performance (Premium_12m) is measured as 
excess return on the benchmark lagged 3 months.  Results under Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
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The evidence confirms a positive and significant relationship between flow and 
past performance, consistent with other studies.80  An increase of 10 basis points in 
                                                 
80 Huang et al. (2003), Shu et al. (2002), Sawicki (2001), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) and Ippolito (1992). 
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premium could drive fund flows to move up 3.3 percent.  Fees and premiums are highly 
significant at 5 percent.  The coefficients of the fixed fee and variable fee variables in the 
regression Flow_Pesos are explained importantly by the value of the same coefficients in 
Value_Flows.  The fixed fee coefficient in Flow_Pesos is 88 percent explained by the 
value of the fixed fee coefficient obtained from Value_Flow.  Likewise, the variable fee 
coefficient in Flow_Pesos is 77 percent explained by the variable fee coefficient obtained 
from Value_Flow.  Finally, the premium coefficient in Flow_Pesos is 61 percent 
explained by the premium coefficient obtained from Value_Flow.  Quantity_Flow has no 
significant values.  Although the independent variables exhibit appropriate signs and 
lower coefficients than those of Value_Flow, none of them is statistically significant to 
explain changes in the flow of clients. 
The interpretation of this finding is that an important segment of the clients is 
sensitive to neither past performance nor fee reductions since the benefit offered by the 
system is the same across pension funds.  Past performance is similar among funds, so it 
is not a relevant characteristic.  Clients tend to pick randomly and stay steadily in a PFA.  
Another possible explanation for findings is that the net inflow/outflow of clients in each 
fund is zero, but not the inflow/outflow of money.  In effect, because there is no cost to 
transfer from one fund to another, certain clients, usually with large amounts in their 
saving accounts, tend to pay more attention to fees and past performance, and they are the 
ones who generate the net inflow of money.  In terms of benefits, it would be more 
profitable for pension funds to use a reduction in the fixed fee as a competitive element 
since this accounts for 20 percent of fee revenues and has about the same impact on flows 
as a reduction in the variable fee.  However, in reality, funds get involved in price wars 
through variable fees. 
Unlike the previous model, Model (4.14) incorporates the variable Ranking_12m 
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Table 4.8–Panel B still shows that certain consumers are fee chasers and top-
performance chasers.  Ranking_12m is highly significant at 1 percent and negative (1 
being the highest score, 13 the lowest).  Negative and significant coefficients in both 
fixed and variable fees are found.  Clients with larger savings accounts particularly drive 
the variation in flows.  I am unable to give evidence that any change in flows is generated 
by flocking of clients.  Given the definition of flows, Flow_Clients produces the same 
coefficient values as Quantity_Flow and none of these values is statistically significant.  
Model (4.15) considers variables Ranking1st and Ranking6th_lower and its outcomes are 
shown in Table 4.8–Panel C.  Model (4.16), not shown, includes the variables Ranking1st 
and Ranking2nd_5th.  Fund vendors are not relevant to luring fund flows. 
(4.15) 
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Table 4.8–Panels C and D support the idea that fund flows definitely tend to move 
toward winning performers.  In contrast, institutions classified between 2nd place and 5th 
place tend not to receive flows, ceteris paribus.  Poorer funds ranked between 6th and the 
bottom positions see their flows fly away.  These findings prove the flow-performance 
relationship is not linear.  Consumers disregard poorly-performing funds and exclusively 
allocate their resources into winner funds.  Value_Flow is the driver of changes in flows.  
Results obtained using the fixed-effect model are consistent with the Fama-Macbeth 
procedure (not listed).  To evaluate the effect of fund vendors, I run four regressions with 
the dependent variable Flow_Pesos and the independent variables log(assets), 
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performance, marketing expenses, fees, and the number of salespersons.  Results are 
shown in Table 4.8–Panel E.  The salespersons variable is represented by: (i) the share of 
number of vendors of fund (i) over the total vendors in the industry (weight_salesforce); 
(ii) the number of salespersons scaled by asset value of each fund; (iii) the number of 
salespersons normalized by the number of clients of each fund; and (iv) the cumulative 
average of the number of vendors for 3 months.   
Table 4.8–Panel F shows results from running a regression similar to Table 4.8–
Panel E’s regressions but without performance as a regressor.  In both panels under fixed-
effect, the number of vendors is not significant, and past performance measured as 
ranking 1st place, 12-month premium, and 12-month ranking is still highly significant.81  
The most plausible explanation of this result is that, as mentioned earlier, the number of 
salespersons consistently diminished in the period across PFAs; hence, this variable does 
not convey any additional information to the model.  To find out if flows are sensitive to 
a seasonality variable, I test it using dummy and interaction variables per quarter.  The 
results show no significance in any dummy variable DQ(i), which seems consistent with 
the mandatory contribution required by law.  Unlike mutual fund investors, pension fund 
clients must regularly make monthly payments to their saving accounts, regardless of the 
financial performance of PFAs. 
In sum, the dependent variable advertising expenses of PFA (i) scaled by total 
advertising expenses of the industry (weight_marketing) demonstrates that PFAs 
essentially advertise winner funds and lower fees.  When this variable is normalized by 
the asset value, a similar conclusion is displayed.  However, I think the first definition of 
the marketing expenses variable better explains the findings for two reasons.  First, if all 
PFAs increase their advertising by 10 percent, then weight_marketing does not change, 
 
81 The Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure provides the same results in Panels E and F.  I show the fixed-
effect model because it tends to display higher t-values than the Fama-Macbeth method. 
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but if this variable is scaled by assets, it would increase in value.  If PFA (i) increases its 
marketing activities by 10 percent and PFA (j) does so by 5 percent, then 
weight_marketing of fund (i) would go up.  Second, if the number of clients constantly 
rises through periods, then the same amount of marketing expenses spent by the PFAs 
would decrease if scaled by assets or clients.  However, weight_marketing tends to 
capture what others are doing.  As PFAs tend to look at each other in their investment 
style, as previously documented, then the same argument may be applied to marketing 
strategy.  In fact, although all PFAs systematically decreased the number of vendors, the 
correlation between weight_marketing_3months (the share of advertising expense of fund 
(i) over the industry’s advertising expenses) and weight_salespersons_3months (the share 
of the number of salespersons of fund (i) over the industry’s salespersons) is 0.73 for all 
PFAs and 0.65 for the three leaders.  I infer, then, that PFAs have tried to hold their 
relative importance in marketing expenditures and number of vendors, and the winner 
fund advertises more. 
4.7.  WHY DOESN’T VOLATILITY MATTER? 
In this study, volatility does not play an important role.  I evaluate the differences 
in standard deviation of 12-month performance in fund pairs and find that the differences 
are not statistically significant.  Funds exhibit not only similar returns but also similar 
standard deviation.  However, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003) argue that fund managers who perform poorly 
and are behind in the rankings tend to increase the return volatility in the following 
periods as a mechanism to get out from the bottom position.  Implicitly, managers have a 
call option-like compensation.  As evidenced in this document, even though clients chase 
top performers, poorer fund managers do not alter their portfolio risk.  Unlike mutual 
funds in the U.S., Taiwan, and Australia, the Chilean pension fund legislation requires 
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that all funds must return at least the weighted average return minus 2 percent, or 
minimum guaranteed return (MGR); otherwise, PFAs must supplement the difference 
between the current return and the MGR.  As the MGR is based on peer relative 
performance, managers tend to copy each other’s portfolio choices.  In this setting, the 
penalty for behaving differently from others is so onerous that managers rarely deviate 
from others and essentially are encouraged to pursue short-term portfolio strategies that 
realize similar returns and volatility.  Increasing volatility may drag the manager’s 
performance way below the MGR.  In other words, the explicit punishment dramatically 
outweighs the implicit incentive to reach better positions by raising the portfolio risk.  
The contract offered to Chilean pension managers is not call option-like as it is in U.S. 
mutual funds. 
4.8.  WINNER PERSISTENCE 
Do winner fund repeat through time?  The market efficiency hypothesis claims 
that no trader is able to earn abnormal returns based on available information.  Unlike a 
single investor, mutual and pension fund managers constantly conduct research in search 
of investment opportunities that provide higher performance.  Several U.S. studies have 
documented that money managers try to outperform the benchmark or their peers as 
evidence of the managers’ ability.  The classic and pioneering study of Jensen (1968) 
reveals that mutual fund managers do not perceive better returns than the market, after 
subtracting fees.  Likewise, Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986), analyzing 91 U.S. 
pension funds, find that on average, managers underperform the passive benchmark.  
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) argue that not only do pension fund managers 
subtract value because their performance is 1.3 percent below the annual S&P 500’s, but 
they also lack annual performance consistency.  In contrast, Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 
1992) and Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) confirm a persistent level of 
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abnormal performance by mutual funds.  Zheng (1999) postulates that investors may be 
better off if they take of advantage of short-term performers’ persistence.  Goeztmann 
and Ibbotson (1994) suggest that monthly returns are consistent with the repeat winner 
hypothesis and that investors should follow historical fund rankings to obtain superior 
returns.  These authors do not measure whether funds outperform some index but rather 
how funds rank with respect to one another.  They categorize funds as winners or losers if 
they are above or below the median performance for each interval period.  They run 
regressions on each fund’s rank against its prior month’s rank and conclude not only that 
the earlier month’s ranking has the power to predict the next month’s ranking but also 
that R-square is small because the monthly returns are noisy. 
I label a winner fund with a value of 1 when it is exclusively ranked in first place 
on the past performance in periods of 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-months and 0 otherwise.  Table 
10 displays the frequency of each PFA in getting the top position in the ranking for 
different periods.  In the case of 1-month performance with 55 periods, only two funds 
never reached the top position; PFA 6 obtained the highest frequency with almost 24 
percent (13 times).  However, when I calculate the frequency that a PFA is winner in two 
consecutive months, the number of outcomes is only 9, and PFA 6 comes out on top in 3 
opportunities.  During the first year (1997:06–1998:06), with all funds competing, PFA 6 
never got the first place82.  The transition probability of being a winner PFA at T1 is 7.6 
percent.  This is divided into the probability of being top performer at T1 (given that the 
PFA was a winner fund at T0 is 16.6 percent) and the probability of being top performer 
at T1 (given that the PFA was not a winner fund at T0 is 6.9 percent).  If this transition 
probability is computed for the period 1999:01–2001:12, the likelihood of being winner 
at T1 (given that the PFA was a winner fund at T0) is smaller, 14.3 percent.  I run the 
 
82 Keep in mind that the pension funds system functioned with 8 funds from 1999:01. 
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regressions for individual funds of the 1-month ranking on one lag 1-month return 
ranking, and the largest R2 obtained is 0.29.  These results tend to support the notion of 
the absence of monthly winner persistence.  If the differences in monthly performance are 
non-significant, one could expect the top fund position to be random. 
When other periods are analyzed, individual regressions of 12-month return 
ranking on prior 12-month return ranking exhibit the greatest R2, which is equal to 0.5983.  
In terms of frequency, none of funds that ranked 4th place or lower ever reached the 1st 
place.  This result is biased by the fact that from 1999:01, the sample is composed of only 
8 PFAs.  The transition probability of remaining in 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th in two 
consecutives months is 74, 46, 43, 32, 41, 51 and 42 percent, respectively.  The same four 
PFAs usually achieved the top position.  Although PFA 6 (small fund) and PFA 9 (leader 
fund) were most frequently ranked as the rolling 12-month winner fund, PFA 6 plunged 
to the lowest position for several consecutive months after being in 1st place for numerous 
consecutive months.  In fact, the average ranking of 12 months for PFA 6 and PFA 9 is 
3.4 and 3.8, respectively.  The second largest fund (PFA 5) accounts for 3.5 with a 
standard deviation in ranking very similar to the leader’s.  Medium size funds average 
5.0, while small and some defunct PFAs average 4.2 and 5.3, respectively.  These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that winner funds are not persistent and that 
medium, small, and defunct funds tend to follow the leaders.  The leaders have been in 
1st, 2nd, or 3rd places more often than other funds, as evidenced by their average ranking 
value.84
 
83 Coefficients range between 0.00 and 0.77.  The zero value is due to two survivor funds never getting the 
top position.  
84 Olivares (2003) finds that medium, small, and defunct funds tend to mimic the investment strategy 
followed by the three largest funds.  
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4.9.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Variations in flows of Chilean pension funds are studied in this paper.  The flow 
definition is split in two parts; value and quantity, to capture whether changes in flows 
are driven by larger account size or by the number of clients.  I investigate the 
predominant variables that are considered by clients in order to select a pension fund as 
well as the marketing strategy followed by funds in order to compete and gain market 
share.  I find a positive relationship between flows and past performance, measured by 
12-months excess return.  However, this relationship is not linear.  Consumers allocate 
their savings into the funds ranked in the top position, while the funds that are considered 
poorer performers lose flows.  Variable and fixed fees are also important.  The variation 
in flows is almost identical when both types of fees decrease by the same percentage.  
However, although the contribution of variable fees to total revenues is larger than that of 
fixed fees, pension funds compete aggressively based on variable fees.  Although I do not 
appreciate net changes in the number of clients driven by performance and fees due to a 
new amendment restricting transfers, fund flows are moved principally by investors with 
larger accounts who care about top performers and fee reductions.  The component Value 
explains basically the changes in flows.  This provides evidence of the existence of two 
groups of investors.  Investors in the first group, who have large accounts, seem to 
recognize that the small differences in returns are important and therefore move their 
monies into better-performing funds.  In contrast, investors in the other group tend to 
hold their monies in the same pension fund even when it performs poorly.  For them, it is 
not really important to move their monies out of poor funds, because they consider the 
tiny differences in return to be non-relevant and believe that the winner in this 
tournament rotates over time, so they think they will achieve the average return through 
time.  Essentially, for this group of clients, performance does not matter. 
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In relation to marketing strategy, funds focus their plans on past performance.  I 
find evidence that funds in the bottom position tend to reduce their marketing expenses 
relative to other funds.  Winner funds increase their advertising expenses, stressing their 
ranking in ads.  I find that marketing campaigns are designed to last three months, at 
most, because the winner fund in the ranking is random through periods.  Funds do not 
significantly change their market share.  Over time, the only significant element for 
gaining market share has been mergers.  Defunct funds were not able to attain the break-
even point and hence exhibited permanent net operating losses despite their commercial 
efforts to draw more clients.   
I find that volatility is not important.  The emerging question is why poorly-
performing funds don’t alter their portfolio risk.  The answer rests on the penalty imposed 
by the SPFA on funds that do not achieve a minimum return.  Managers’ compensation is 
not call option-like, but financial future-like. 
In sum, based on my results, some consumers react asymmetrically to past returns 
and positively to fee reductions.  The current legislation provides a special setting that 
induces funds not to differentiate from each other.  Not only are their returns similar, but 
their marketing strategies are, too.  Fund management service may be seen as a 
commodity: all funds give the same product (returns) at the same price (fees).  I believe 
the Chilean market does not encourage competition but rather complacency among funds.  
No pension fund is hurt if investment and marketing strategies are replicated.  Fund 
managers are afraid to be seen as different from each other, and the conformity to be over 
the MGR floor is a sign of survivorship.  At first glance, they look like competitors but in 





Table 2.1.  General Description of Chilean Pension Funds 
(As of December of each year) 
 
The number of pension fund managing companies (PFAs) decreased during the 
period 1994–2001 as a result of 11 mergers and 3 license cancellations due to insufficient 
margin accounts.  Fund values are expressed in both US$ millions and as a percentage of 
Chilean GDP.  Annual Real Return corresponds to the PFA system return deflated by the 
annual inflation rate.  The market share is measured by fund assets value represented by 
the Herfindahl index and the market proportion of the three largest PFAs (Larger 3) and 
the market share of the smallest three PFAs (Smaller 3).  Herfindahl index is a measure 
of market concentration and is calculated by squaring the market share of each PFA and 
then summing those squares.  The market share is obtained from asset values of each 
fund divided by total assets value of the industry.85
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∑ where 2iα is squared market-share of fund (i).  
 
Table 2.1.  General Description of Chilean Pension Funds 
(As of December of each year) 
 
 














of 3 Larger 
Funds
Market Share 
of 3 Smaller 
Funds
1981* 12 35,520 296 0.8 12.8 0.217 71.3 1.8
1982 12 127,600 941 3.3 28.5 0.194 67.6 3.0
1983 12 261,101 1,704 5.9 21.3 0.180 65.7 4.6
1984 12 390,275 2,254 7.7 3.6 0.174 65.4 4.9
1985 11 607,319 3,104 10.0 13.4 0.179 65.8 5.0
1986 12 897,634 4,060 12.7 12.3 0.182 66.6 3.3
1987 12 1,243,175 4,976 14.2 5.4 0.178 66.6 3.5
1988 13 1,719,566 6,091 15.0 6.5 0.172 66.3 2.8
1989 13 2,396,109 7,511 17.7 6.9 0.167 65.3 3.2
1990 14 3,332,381 9,948 24.2 15.6 0.158 62.6 2.1
1991 13 5,232,683 14,069 31.4 29.7 0.147 59.0 3.6
1992 19 5,960,709 15,677 30.6 3.0 0.136 56.6 0.2
1993 20 8,578,034 20,149 37.0 16.2 0.130 54.4 0.2
1994 21 9,781,027 24,317 41.0 18.2 0.125 52.7 0.5
1995 16 10,571,724 25,849 38.8 -2.5 0.131 51.8 1.4
1996 13 11,570,655 27,392 39.5 3.5 0.134 53.8 2.3
1997 13 13,359,517 30,481 38.6 4.7 0.139 55.6 1.9
1998 9 14,509,931 30,716 39.8 -1.1 0.169 62.0 5.2
1999 8 18,453,949 34,287 48.6 16.3 0.208 70.4 5.6
2000 8 20,406,835 35,513 50.2 4.4 0.207 70.2 6.0
2001 7 23,389,120 34,954 54.3 6.7 0.209 70.5 16.6
 
Source: Superintendence of Chilean Pension Funds, The Chilean Pension System, 1999. 





Table 2.2.  Returns Distribution of PFA System 
The table provides information on the monthly return achieved by the pension 
funds system. As a way of not overwhelming the reader, I list this monthly information 
every three month. Average return is the simple average of funds group. Standard 
deviation is calculated for each month across funds. Maximum and Minimum returns 
correspond to cross-sectional values for each period. Differences in returns are exhibited 
for (Maximum – Minimum), (Largest fund return – Simple Average) and (Medium Fund 
return – Simple Average). 
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Jun-97 2.52 0.11 2.68 2.34 0.34 0.07 -0.03
Sep-97 -0.05 0.09 0.09 -0.19 0.28 0.06 -0.05
Dec-97 -0.39 0.16 0.04 -0.61 0.65 0.11 0.05
Mar-98 3.07 0.15 3.35 2.84 0.52 0.14 -0.03
Jun-98 -1.87 0.15 -1.60 -2.14 0.53 0.07 0.04
Sep-98 -3.79 0.36 -3.18 -4.25 1.07 0.17 0.25
Dec-98 -0.06 0.09 0.07 -0.21 0.28 0.13 0.08
Mar-99 1.56 0.16 1.90 1.41 0.48 -0.18 0.00
Jun-99 2.26 0.16 2.52 2.05 0.48 0.48 0.25
Sep-99 0.87 0.08 0.97 0.77 0.21 0.14 0.17
Dec-99 1.16 0.15 1.37 1.00 0.37 0.00 -0.20
Mar-00 1.15 0.13 1.29 0.88 0.41 -0.13 -0.03
Jun-00 1.78 0.12 1.94 1.57 0.37 -0.18 -0.03
Sep-00 -0.27 0.13 -0.07 -0.38 0.30 0.13 0.10
Dec-00 0.60 0.03 0.65 0.55 0.11 0.06 -0.02
Mar-01 0.19 0.11 0.35 0.06 0.29 -0.03 0.16
Jun-01 0.96 0.17 1.31 0.80 0.51 -0.06 -0.11
Sep-01 -0.22 0.28 0.32 -0.43 0.75 0.01 -0.01
Dec-01 0.10 0.09 0.22 -0.04 0.26 -0.08 0.11
Avg.* 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
St. Dev.* 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Superintendence of Pension Funds.





Table 2.3.  Limits on Investments of Pension Funds 
With regard to the diversification of pension funds, the Pension Funds Act 
legislation sets the maximum percentages of resource allocation that a PFA may invest in.  
These percentages are defined in relation to (i) issuer, (ii) issuer related to PFA’s 
ownership and management, (iii) individual financial asset, (iv) asset groups, and (v) 
exposure to specific risks.  According to the Pension Funds Act, these limits are 
presented as alternatives between lower and upper boundaries.  The Central Bank of 
Chile is in charge of determining the final value of these limits.  During the period 1981–
2000, the legal framework authorized PFAs to manage just one fund (Type I); however, 
after the 2000 amendment, theses institutions were allowed to address two funds (Type I 
and Type II).  In the latest modification to the legislation (August 2002), the 
Superitendence of Pension Fund Administrators (SPFA) allowed PFAs to handle five 
funds instead of two as a way to augment the diversity of portfolios. 
Table 2.3–Panel A.  Limits by Securities (Period: 1981-2000) 
Security
Lower-Upper Margin Proposed 
in the Act (as % of Pension 
Fund)*
Maximum Limit Defined by 
Central Bank of Chile (as % of 
Pension Fund)
Government bonds 35 - 50 50
Deposits in banks & bank bonds 30 - 50 50
Mortgage-backed securities issued 
by banks 35 - 50 50
Corporate & convertible bonds 30 - 50 45
Convertible bonds (alone) 10 - 15 15
Corporate stocks & REIT shares 30 - 40 37
Mutual funds shares 5 - 10 5
Foreign assets and hedge 6 - 12 12
Foreign currency hedge in 
domestic market 5 - 15 12
Source: Superintendence of Chilean Pension Funds, The Chilean Pension System,  1999.




Table 2.3–Panel B.  Limits by Securities (as of 2001) 
Security Fund Type I Fund Type II
Lower-Upper Margin (%) Lower-Upper Margin (%)
Government bonds 35 - 50 50
Deposits & bank bonds 35 - 50 50
Mortgage-backed securities 
issued by banks 35 - 50 50
Corporate & convertible bonds 35 - 50 45
Convertible bonds (alone) 35 - 50 15
Stocks and REIT notes 30 - 45 37
Mutual funds shares 15 - 35 5
Foreign assets and hedge 10 - 20 12
Foreign currency hedge 10 - 25 12
Source: Superintendence of Chilean Pension Funds, The Chilean Pension System,  1999.
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Table 2.3–Panel C.  Limits by Issuer* (Period: 1981-2000) 
Margin in %
(as % of Pension Fund)
Leasing Company Bonds: The lowest among the three criteria:**
(a) 7% Pension Funds x factor (iv) 
(b) 20% of new issuance or 
(c) Issuer|s Equity x factor (vi) 
Corporate Stocks: The lowest among the three criteria:**
(a) 5% Pension Funds x factor (i) x factor (iii) or
(b) 7% of issued stocks or 
(c) 20% of new issuance
The maximum percentage that Pension 
Funds are allowed to invest in financial 
assets guaranteed by a single issuer
*In this case, there was no change in limits like there was for limits by financial instrument. The
purpose of this provision is to control the concentration of funds by constraining this percentage.
**In the case of Leasing Company Bonds, factor (iv) refers to weighted risk  previously defined. 




Table 2.4.  Holdings of Chilean Pension Funds 
The portfolio has been divided into 9 asset classes.  The summation of weights is 
equal to 1.0.  Securities were introduced into the portfolio of Pension Funds little by little 
by the economic authority concerned with monitoring the good development of a new 
system. In fact, the holdings were initiated with four assets.  Stocks became suitable 
assets in 1985.  Both mutual funds and foreign securities did so in 1992. 
 













1981 28.1 61.9 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
1982 26.0 26.6 46.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
1983 44.5 2.7 50.7 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1984 42.1 12.2 42.9 0.6 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.4
1985 42.4 20.4 35.2 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.5
1986 46.6 22.9 25.5 0.3 3.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1
1987 41.4 27.4 21.3 0.7 6.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.4
1988 35.4 28.5 20.6 1.0 8.1 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
1989 41.6 20.8 17.7 0.7 10.1 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1990 44.1 16.3 16.1 1.1 11.3 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1991 38.3 11.7 13.4 1.5 23.8 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
1992 40.9 9.4 14.2 1.6 24.0 9.6 0.2 0.0 0.1
1993 39.3 6.1 13.1 1.4 31.8 7.3 0.3 0.6 0.1
1994 39.7 4.8 13.7 1.6 32.1 6.3 0.9 0.9 0.0
1995 39.4 5.3 15.8 2.0 29.4 5.3 2.6 0.2 0.0
1996 42.1 4.2 17.9 2.5 25.1 4.7 3.0 0.5 0.0
1997 39.6 10.7 17.0 2.5 22.6 3.3 3.1 1.2 0.0
1998 41.0 13.6 16.6 1.8 14.5 3.8 2.9 5.6 0.1
1999 34.6 16.1 15.1 2.5 11.9 3.8 2.6 13.4 0.0
2000 35.7 18.7 14.4 2.5 11.1 4.0 2.4 10.9 0.2
2001 35.0 17.5 12.9 2.7 10.0 6.2 2.4 13.4 0.0




Table 3.1.  Descriptive statistics of Chilean pension funds 
Table 3.1–Panel A.  Number of Clients and Total Revenues and Expenses  

















Jun-97 5,653,223 44,761 144,845 113,121 347 271
Sep-97 5,714,689 44,284 211,184 173,843 509 419
Dec-97 5,780,400 39,841 282,697 239,306 645 546
Mar-98 5,825,969 28,417 77,383 55,661 171 123
Jun-98 5,843,492 25,066 140,050 113,591 307 249
Sep-98 5,869,622 20,508 189,141 165,146 402 351
Dec-98 5,966,143 17,141 276,821 228,164 586 483
Mar-99 5,984,508 13,502 80,767 54,173 164 110
Jun-99 5,995,985 12,993 162,201 108,469 323 216
Sep-99 6,055,176 12,139 233,425 163,660 445 312
Dec-99 6,105,731 11,065 311,629 221,208 579 411
Mar-00 6,132,650 10,572 78,179 50,438 155 100
Jun-00 6,153,988 10,047 153,625 100,121 290 189
Sep-00 6,240,213 10,082 229,190 152,793 405 270
Dec-00 6,280,126 9,716 357,420 212,038 622 369
Mar-01 6,307,923 8,877 85,230 49,962 145 85
Jun-01 6,331,109 8,776 168,187 101,652 273 165
Sep-01 6,387,603 8,906 244,565 154,641 359 227
Dec-01 6,427,391 8,868 327,209 212,787 489 318
Source: Superintendence of Chilean Pension Funds.
*The Pension Fund Act uses the term affiliates  to refer to pension fund contributors or clients.
Note: The values are represented in Chilean pesos and dollars only to make it easier for readers 
to understand the amounts.  However, the data is worked in Chilean pesos.
 
 108
Table 3.1–Panel B.  Number of Pension Fund Institutions and Average Return 





Jun-97 13 2.52 2.68 2.34
Sep-97 13 -0.05 0.09 -0.19
Dec-97 13 -0.39 0.04 -0.61
Mar-98 13 3.07 3.35 2.84
Jun-98 12 -1.87 -1.60 -2.14
Sep-98 10 -3.79 -3.18 -4.25
Dec-98 9 -0.06 0.07 -0.21
Mar-99 8 1.56 1.90 1.41
Jun-99 8 2.26 2.52 2.05
Sep-99 8 0.87 0.97 0.77
Dec-99 8 1.16 1.37 1.00
Mar-00 8 1.15 1.29 0.88
Jun-00 8 1.78 1.94 1.57
Sep-00 8 -0.27 -0.07 -0.38
Dec-00 8 0.60 0.65 0.55
Mar-01 7 0.19 0.35 0.06
Jun-01 7 0.96 1.31 0.80
Sep-01 7 -0.22 0.32 -0.43
Dec-01 7 0.10 0.22 -0.04
Source: Superintendence of Chilean Pension Funds.
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Table 3.2.  How Much the Variability Return is Explained by the Benchmark 
To test how much the weighted average return explains the PFA performance, I 
divide the samples into 6 groups.  Group 1 consists of the three large funds; Group 2, the 
two medium funds; Group 3, the two small funds; Group 4, the seven funds that survive 
the full period; Group 5, the three funds that have acquired other institutions and have 
survived; and Group 6, the six funds that were acquired and did not survive.  I study 
Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for the whole period (55 months) and Group 6 for the periods 
corresponding to the Asian (1997:06–1998:01) and Russian (1998:05-1998:11) crises and 
the period during which only 7 funds stayed in the market, i.e., from the last acquisition 
of a fund (2001:02–2001:12). 
The model used is , ,Re *Rei t i t i ttPFA tBenchmarkα β ε= + +  where RetPFA i,t  is 
the return of fund groups (i) during time (t).  The independent variable is the weighted 
average return, RetBenchmark,t.  The regression is run not only for each fund group for 
each period defined but also for individual funds to detect difference across funds.  Panel 




Table 3.2–Panel A.  Variability in Individual Funds 
PFA R










Aporta 0.997 1.015 --- ---
Bansander 0.994 1.022 --- ---
Cuprum 0.997 1.006 0.994 1.048
Fomenta 0.987 0.970 --- ---
Habitat 0.999 0.974 0.997 0.983
Magister 0.996 1.043 0.986 1.063
Planvital 0.999 1.012 0.997 1.000
Proteccion 0.999 1.036 --- ---
Provida 0.997 0.963 0.997 0.943
Qualitas 0.965 0.930 --- ---
SantaMaria 1.000 1.011 0.999 0.998
Summa 0.998 1.013 0.997 1.040
Union 0.999 1.111 --- ---
Average 0.994 1.008 0.995 1.011
Standard Deviation 0.009 0.044 0.004 0.042




Table 3.2–Panel B.  R2 of Fund Groups 
Period Period Period
Group¤ Whole period 1997:06 - 1998:08 - 2001:02 -
1998:01 1998:11 2001:12
Group 1 - Large Funds 0.993 0.994 0.993 0.994
Group 2 - Medium Funds 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998
Group 3 - Small Funds 0.989 0.987 0.99 0.985
Group 4 - Survivor Funds 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.983
Group 5 - Funds Acquirers* 0.99 0.987 0.989 0.987
Group 6 - Acquired Funds 0.990(a) 0.990(b) 0.990(c)  --(d)
(a) The first acquisition was in 1998:05.  We count up to this period as a whole period.
(b) Includes the six acquired pension funds for this period.
(c) Counts on the three acquired funds that survived during this period. 
(d) No acquired funds present for this period. 
¤From 2001:02 the system possesses 7 pension funds, the three large funds (Provida, Habitat, 
Cuprum), two medium funds (SantaMaria, Summa) and two small funds (Magister, Planvital).  This 
partition is given by the fund asset values of each fund.





Table 3.3.  Differences among PFAs’ Asset Allocation Weights 
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k
The asset allocation is split into five categories: stocks, bonds, banking deposits, 
MBS (included REIT shares), and foreign securities (as bonds and shares).  The null 
hypothesis I test is “Beta coefficients of asset allocation weights among the pension funds 
are equal,” i.e., ( ) ( )0 ( ) ( ): 0 , 1, 2...13 1,...5
PFA i PFA j
asset a asset aH withi j i jβ β− = ≠ = = .  The three 
regression models used to test it are: 
Model (3.2)  
5
, , 1, 1,
1
,[ ] [i a i t a t a
a
i t t iWeightPFA WeightBenchmarkRetPFA RetBenchmark β ] ε− −
=
−− = ∑ +  
Model (3.3) 
4
, , , 1,
1
[ ]i t i a i t a i
a
Return AssetWeightPFAα β ε−
=
= + +∑  
Model (3.4) 
5
, , , 1,
1
(4) [ ] [ ]i t t i a i t a t a i
a
RetPFA RetAverage WeightPFA WeightAverage 1,β ε− −
=
− = −∑ +  
The econometric procedure used is to run the regressions for one pension fund, 
and after doing so, run it for the rest of the funds.  The Chow Test lets us identify whether 
any structural change has affected a pension fund or a subgroup.  I compute the sum of 
squared errors in each regression to see if there exists evidence of changes in the 
coefficients between two funds and two subgroups.  Each panel contains the results of the 
Chow test value and its F-Test.  I list in panels the findings using these models.   
Panels A and B exhibit the outcomes for each PFA using Models (3.2) and (3.3).  
When a fund is absorbed by another one, the regressions are run until the end of its date 
of existence and counting only the existing funds.  The length of the evaluation period for 
each fund is different since the number of institutions shrinks with acquisitions.  In fact, 
the first acquisition was in 1998:05; the evaluation period is 12 months for thirteen PFAs.  
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The second acquisition was in 1998:08; the evaluation period is 15 months for twelve 
PFAs.  At the end, the seven surviving funds are evaluated from 1997:06 to 2001:12.  
The PFAs are listed according to acquisition occurrence.  The first six were acquired, and 
the rest stayed in the market.  Panel C illustrates the situation for the group of PFA 
acquisitions.  I consider PFAs acquired and PFA buyers as subgroups.  Findings of Model 
(3.2) are displayed.  Panel D presents an analysis by periods of one year and 6 months 
using Model (3.2).  Panel E indicates the results for the category of PFA size using Model 
(3.4).  The subgroup is large, medium, and small. 
 
 
















¤The pension funds are listed in order of first to last in the market.






















¤The pension funds are listed in order of first to last in the market.




Table 3.3–Panel C.  Asset Allocation Weights—Model (3.2), Mergers 
PFA Buyer - PFA Acquired
Provida - Union 1.08 0.4
Summa - Bansander 0.58 0.7
Magister - Qualitas 0.08 1.0
Aporta - Fomenta 1.50 0.2
Provida - Proteccion 0.63 0.6
Magister - Aporta 0.93 0.5
F-Test Significant at:Chow Test Value
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F-Test Significant at:Chow Test Value
 










Table 3.4.  Correlations of Asset Allocation Weights among PFAs 
The correlation among PFAs is measured against the benchmark, which 
corresponds to total summation of fund holdings separated by asset classes. The portfolio 
holdings are divided into 3 assets; fixed income assets, domestic shares and foreign 
assets. Panel A lists the correlation of these 3 assets. Panel B shows the correlations 
among fixed income securities divided in 5 asset groups. 
 
Table 3.4–Panel A.  Correlation of Three Asset Classes, All Funds 
Benchmark* Benchmark* Benchmark*
Fixed Income Assets Domestic Shares Foreign Assets
Aporta 0.95 0.97 0.63
Bansander 0.93 0.97 0.90
Cuprum 0.98 0.99 0.85
Fomenta 0.97 0.97 0.56
Habitat 0.99 1.00 0.94
Magister 0.95 0.97 0.85
Planvital 1.00 1.00 0.92
Proteccion 1.00 1.00 0.88
Provida 0.99 1.00 0.95
Qualitas 0.96 0.97 ---
SantaMaria 1.00 1.00 0.98
Summa 0.97 0.99 0.85
Union 0.99 0.98 0.78





Table 3.4–Panel B.  Correlation in Weights of Fixed Income Securities, All Funds 
Benchmark* Benchmark* Benchmark* Benchmark* Benchmark*








Aporta 0.71 -0.46 0.94 -0.56 0.16
Bansander 0.84 -0.51 0.63 0.62 0.44
Cuprum 0.29 0.99 -0.64 0.94 0.04
Fomenta -0.14 -0.06 0.85 0.36 0.06
Habitat -0.43 0.99 0.91 0.27 -0.24
Magister 0.90 1.00 0.80 0.91 0.43
Planvital 0.52 0.98 0.95 -0.49 0.40
Proteccion 0.89 0.66 0.88 0.75 0.23
Provida 0.76 1.00 0.87 0.65 0.47
Qualitas -0.34 0.71 0.78 0.21 -0.21
SantaMaria 0.90 0.99 0.97 0.60 0.24
Summa 0.87 0.99 0.85 -0.36 0.50
Union 0.52 0.97 0.86 0.95 0.41





Table 3.4–Panel C.  Correlation Matrix of Stock Weights (1997:06–1998:05) 
Aporta Bansander Cuprum Fomenta Habitat Magister Planvital Proteccion Provida Qualitas SantaMaria Summa Union
Aporta 1.00
Bansander 0.99 1.00
Cuprum 0.94 0.93 1.00
Fomenta 0.93 0.92 0.98 1.00
Habitat 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.97 1.00
Magister 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.96 1.00
Planvital 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00
Proteccion 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
Provida 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00
Qualitas 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.00
SantaMaria 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00
Summa 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 1.00




Table 3.4–Panel D.  Correlation Matrix of Changes in Stock Weights (1997:06–1998:05) 
Aporta Bansander Cuprum Fomenta Habitat Magister Planvital Proteccion Provida Qualitas SantaMaria Summa Union
Aporta 1.00
Bansander 0.93 1.00
Cuprum 0.70 0.69 1.00
Fomenta 0.67 0.71 0.74 1.00
Habitat 0.76 0.81 0.93 0.70 1.00
Magister 0.81 0.89 0.55 0.67 0.70 1.00
Planvital 0.75 0.82 0.89 0.68 0.97 0.71 1.00
Proteccion 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.68 0.97 0.72 0.98 1.00
Provida 0.68 0.71 0.94 0.62 0.97 0.66 0.94 0.92 1.00
Qualitas 0.75 0.74 0.53 0.43 0.67 0.89 0.64 0.66 0.70 1.00
SantaMaria 0.79 0.85 0.92 0.72 0.97 0.75 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.68 1.00
Summa 0.79 0.89 0.84 0.65 0.94 0.77 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.66 0.94 1.00




Table 3.4–Panel E.  Correlation Matrix of Bond Weights (1997:06–1998:05) 
Aporta Bansander Cuprum Fomenta Habitat Magister Planvital Proteccion Provida Qualitas SantaMaria Summa Union
Aporta 1.00
Bansander 0.13 1.00
Cuprum 0.28 0.43 1.00
Fomenta 0.40 0.02 0.68 1.00
Habitat -0.05 0.31 -0.29 -0.66 1.00
Magister 0.09 0.51 0.80 0.70 -0.31 1.00
Planvital -0.18 -0.25 -0.69 -0.12 0.02 -0.27 1.00
Proteccion -0.13 0.35 0.77 0.49 -0.10 0.78 -0.36 1.00
Provida -0.20 -0.18 0.02 0.44 -0.58 0.39 0.41 0.19 1.00
Qualitas -0.21 0.01 0.63 0.42 -0.55 0.58 -0.49 0.69 0.44 1.00
SantaMaria 0.60 0.71 0.39 0.19 0.26 0.41 -0.26 0.07 -0.36 -0.26 1.00
Summa -0.50 -0.24 -0.55 -0.13 0.04 -0.08 0.88 -0.01 0.57 -0.14 -0.48 1.00




Table 3.4–Panel F.  Correlation Matrix of Changes in Bond Weights (1997:06–1998:05) 
Aporta Bansander Cuprum Fomenta Habitat Magister Planvital Proteccion Provida Qualitas SantaMaria Summa Union
Aporta 1.00
Bansander -0.04 1.00
Cuprum 0.42 0.49 1.00
Fomenta 0.44 0.02 0.61 1.00
Habitat 0.26 0.12 0.28 -0.25 1.00
Magister 0.09 0.38 0.87 0.56 0.01 1.00
Planvital 0.28 0.28 0.46 0.64 -0.11 0.35 1.00
Proteccion 0.40 0.25 0.66 0.39 0.47 0.60 0.46 1.00
Provida 0.07 -0.06 0.22 0.39 -0.42 0.49 0.21 0.03 1.00
Qualitas -0.07 -0.30 -0.28 -0.13 -0.54 0.03 -0.29 -0.12 0.54 1.00
SantaMaria 0.33 0.54 0.84 0.34 0.31 0.74 0.25 0.57 0.05 -0.27 1.00
Summa 0.10 0.13 0.49 0.46 0.14 0.52 0.80 0.66 0.37 -0.08 0.20 1.00




Table 3.4–Panel G.  Correlation Matrix of Changes in Stock Weights (1997:06–2001:12) 
(7 PFAs and 54 monthly observations)
Cuprum Habitat Magister Planvital Provida SantaMaria Summa
Cuprum 1.00
Habitat 0.94 1.00
Magister 0.70 0.67 1.00
Planvital 0.91 0.97 0.68 1.00
Provida 0.92 0.97 0.64 0.97 1.00
SantaMaria 0.94 0.98 0.73 0.96 0.96 1.00





Table 3.4–Panel H.  Correlation Matrix of Changes in Bond Weights (1997:06–2001:12) 
(7 PFAs and 54 monthly observations)
Change in Cuprum Habitat Magister Planvital Provida SantaMaria Summa
Cuprum 1.00
Habitat 0.07 1.00
Magister 0.08 0.31 1.00
Planvital 0.10 0.45 0.48 1.00
Provida 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.20 1.00
SantaMaria 0.14 0.55 0.42 0.49 0.25 1.00






Table 3.5.  Granger Causality Test on Changes in Stock Weights  
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tThe autoregressive expression ... ...0 1 1 1 1Y Y Y X Xt t p t p t p t pα α α β β ε= + + + + +− − − −  is 
used to appraise whether X Granger-causes Y (Hamilton 1994).  The null hypothesis is 
the βeta coefficients of the regressors X are equal to zero, i.e. 0 1 2: ... 0pH β β β= = = , X 
does not Granger–cause Y.  The rejection decision of the null is based on the F-test at 1 
percent.  In the table, the dependent variable is listed in one column, and in three different 
columns, three possible independent variables are listed, which may be considered as X 
Granger-cause.  The independent variables under consideration are weighted average of 
changes in stock loads, the three leaders, and finally either one main fund or one pair of 
funds.  The selection of the third variable obeys the highest F-observed value between 
each fund, pairs of funds, and group of funds with respect to the dependent variable.  In 
addition, in the last row of each subgroup of funds, the expression Y Granger-cause X is 
added to show the causality effect on the variables.  The sample is divided into two 
sections: the acquired PFAs and the PFAs currently in the market.  For instance, in the 
case of PFA Union, the first two rows are the possible independent variable (X Granger-
cause Y) and third one, with an asterisk, refers to the interchange of variables (Y 
Granger-cause X) to prove one-way causality.  Panel A arranges the pension funds in 
chronological order according to date of acquisition, with the earliest being first.  The 
date in front of the dependent variable corresponds to the most significant relationship or 
the highest observed F-test to explain Granger causality.  Panel B organizes the current 
pension funds according to size, with the largest funds first.  The first three funds 
comprise the leader variable.  Weighted is the weighted average of changes in stock 
weight in the PFA system.  Other is the variable indicative of Granger causality among 
individual or pairs of funds. 
Table 3.5–Panel A.  Causality—Acquired Pension Funds 










1. Union 1998:05 Weighted --- --- 1 68.75 0.0%
Union --- Leaders --- 1 58.00 0.0%
Weighted* --- --- Union 1 1.06 30.7%
2. Bansander 1998:07 Weighted --- --- 1 42.28 0.0%
Bansander --- Leaders --- 1 43.36 0.0%
Bansander --- --- Cuprum (c) 1 67.13 0.0%
Weighted* --- --- Bansander 1 1.41 24.0%
Cuprum* --- --- Bansander 1 0.30 58.4%
3. Qualitas  1998:08 Weighted --- --- 1 37.79 0.0%
Qualitas --- Leaders --- 1 37.50 0.0%
Weighted* --- --- Qualitas 1 0.99 32.4%
Leaders* --- --- Qualitas 1 0.85 36.1%
4. Fomenta Weighted --- --- 1 33.21 0.0%
Fomenta --- Leaders --- 1 28.54 0.0%
Fomenta 1998:09 --- --- Magister 1 80.83 0.0%
Magister* --- --- Fomenta 1 0.42 52.1%
5. Proteccion Weighted --- --- 1 26.65 0.0%
Proteccion 1998:12 --- Leaders --- 1 22.98 0.0%
Leaders* --- --- Proteccion 1 1.65 20.4%
6. Aporta Weighted --- --- 2 4.68 1.4%
Aporta --- Leaders --- 2 3.93 2.6%
Aporta 2001:01 --- --- Cuprum (c) 2 5.30 0.8%
Cuprum* --- --- Aporta 2 1.24 29.8%
(b) Independent variables.
(c) One of the three leaders.
* Here the independent and dependent variables are rotated to demonstrate causality in one direction.





Lags Statistical Significance F-Observed
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Table 3.5–Panel B.  Causality—Survivor Funds 
(Arranged by asset values from the largest fund to the smallest)
Granger-cause* Granger-cause* Granger-cause*
Weighted Three Leaders Other
1. Provida Present Weighted --- --- 6 4.12 0.20%
Provida --- --- Cuprum 7 2.14 6.20%
Provida --- --- Habitat 7 1.13 36.70%
Provida --- --- Cuprum 8 4.57 0.10%
2. Habitat Weighted --- --- 7 2.87 1.60%
Habitat Present --- --- Cuprum 7 3.36 0.70%
Habitat --- --- Cuprum+Provida 7 2.59 2.60%
Habitat --- --- Provida 7 1.08 39.70%
Habitat --- --- Cuprum 6 2.04 8.20%
Habitat --- --- Cuprum+Provida¤ 6 1 44.10%
3. Cuprum Weighted --- --- 6 2.18 6.40%
Cuprum --- --- Habitat+Provida¤ 6 3.22 1.10%
Cuprum --- --- Provida 6 3.07 1.40%
Cuprum --- --- Habitat 6 2.58 3.20%
Cuprum Present --- --- Habitat+Provida¤ 7 4.22 0.10%
Cuprum --- --- Habitat 7 4.9 0.00%
Cuprum --- --- Provida 7 3.01 1.20%
4. SantaMaria Weighted --- --- 5 2.03 9.30%
SantaMaria --- --- Cuprum 5 2.58 3.90%
SantaMaria Present --- --- Habitat 5 3.45 1.00%
SantaMaria --- --- Provida 5 1.46 22.10%
SantaMaria --- --- Cuprum+Habitat¤ 5 3.47 1.00%
Cuprum+Habitat --- --- SantaMaria 5 2.48 4.60%
Dependent Variable Condition Lags Statistical Significance F-Observed
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Weighted Three Leaders Other
5. Summa Weighted --- --- 2.03 9.30%
Summa Present --- --- Cuprum 5 3.67 0.70%
Summa --- --- Habitat 5 1.53 20.10%
Summa --- --- Provida 5 1.49 21.30%
Summa --- --- Cuprum+Habitat¤ 5 3.29 1.30%
Cuprum --- --- Summa 5 1.47 21.80%
6. Magister Weighted --- --- 7 1.99 8.00%
Magister --- Leaders --- 7 1.79 11.60%
Magister Present --- --- Cuprum 7 2.6 2.60%
Magister --- --- Habitat 7 1.56 17.60%
Magister --- --- Provida 7 1.81 11.20%
7. Planvital Weighted --- --- 6 3.24 1.00%
Planvital --- Leaders --- 6 2.44 4.10%
Planvital Present --- --- Habitat+Provida¤ 6 4.06 0.30%
Habitat+Provida --- --- Planvital 6 3.15 4.10%
*Independent variables.
¤Formed with a simple average between two larger funds.
Statistical 




Table 3.6.  Herding Level in the Chilean Pension Funds System 
I report the herding values for pension funds using the methodology defined by 
Lakonishok et al. (1992).  The number of pension funds diminished from thirteen to 
seven.  By January 2001, there existed only seven pension funds as a consequence of 
assorted acquisitions.  The herding measurement, applied to a given stock month (i,t) for 
the period 1997:06–2001:12, is equal to ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )H i t p i t p t AF i t= − − wherein p(i,t) is 
the proportion of traders who buy a given stock (i) at month (t).  ( )p t refers to the 
proportion of traders in month (t) who are buyers of all stocks (i).  The adjustment factor, 
AF(i,t) is computed from the binomial distribution to allow the random variation of p(i,t) 
under the null hypothesis of no herding.  The herding value is calculated each month (t) 
for all stocks (i) and averaged as a group according to number of traders (N).  Panel A 
documents the herding value for both overall and each number of funds trading in the 
market.  To show the effect of how the herding value changes as the number of traders 
increases, Panel B clusters the sample for trading funds from more than two to more than 
twelve.  Finally, with a different categorization of the results, Panel C exhibits the mean 
values grouped by ranges of number of traders, and once more. 
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Table 3.6–Panel A.  Herding Under Different Number of Traders 
Number of Traders T-test
Overall (N³2) 1.8 5.40 ***
N=3 1.3 1.71 **
N=4 1.2 1.55 *
N=5 2.8 3.11 ***
N=6 5.4 4.76 ***
N=7 4.8 4.10 ***
N=8 7.0 3.86 ***
N=9 5.9 1.50 *
N=10 2.7 0.61
N=11 14.4 2.07 **
N=12 14.0 Ń ¤
N=13 34.5 9.86 ***
*Significant at 10 percent.
**Significant at 5 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.




Table 3.6–Panel B.  Herding as Number of Traders Increases 
Number of Traders Herding Mean*** T-test
N>2 2.7 6.84 1,417
N>3 3.5 7.44 923
N>4 4.7 8.20 600
N>5 5.9 7.93 376
N>6 6.2 6.35 218
N>7 7.4 4.91 116
N>8 8.2 3.00 39
N>9 10.2 2.66 21
N>10 18.4 3.35 10
N>11 27.7 3.88 3
N>12 34.5 9.86 2
***All mean values are significant at 1 percent.
Observations
 
Table 3.6–Panel C.  Herding in Certain Ranges of Number of Funds Trading 
Number of Traders Herding Mean*** T-test
2<N<7 2.1 4.84 1,199
3<N<8 2.9 6.00 807
4<N<9 4.5 7.66 561
5<N<10 5.6 7.49 355
6<N<11 5.6 5.77 208
7<N<12 6.8 4.55 113




Table 3.7.  Herding Level Using the Sias (2004) Approach 
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,
I report the result of herding measure using Sias (2004) approach. I consider the 
cases that PFA (i) trades at least in 2 periods consecutively. In some cases, this condition 
limits the analysis since sometimes PFA trades in consecutive period the stock (k). The 
regressions run are models (3.6) and (3.7) where model (3.6) is defined as: 

























Additionally, model (3.6) is decomposed into model (3.7): 
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Beta Coefficient Average R2 Own Trades Others Trades
N>0 0.344 0.160 0.031 0.313
(11.82) (12.44) (9.62)
N>1 0.262 0.149 0.045 0.218
(6.28) (7.88) (5.73)
N>2 0.571 0.020 0.068 0.502
(4.92) (4.62) (3.67)
N>3 0.786 0.110 0.181 0.605
(4.59) (3.58) (4.37)
Quintile 1 0.338 0.180 0.041 0.298
(6.92) (6.27) (7.45)
Quintile 5 0.185 0.082 0.030 0.156
(1.80) (3.95) (1.51)
 
Table 3.8.  Herding Values of Chilean Pension Funds for Different Periods 
I report the herding values for pension funds using the methodology defined by 
Lakonishok et al. (1992).  The number of pension funds diminished from thirteen to 
seven.  By January 2001, there existed only seven pension funds as a consequence of 
assorted acquisitions.  The herding measurement, applied to a given stock month (i,t) for 
the period 1997:06–2001:12, is equal to ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )H i t p i t p t AF i t= − −  wherein p(i,t) is 
the proportion of traders who buy a given stock (i) at month (t).  ( )p t  refers to proportion 
of traders in month (t) who are buyers of all stocks (i).  The adjustment factor, AF(i,t) is 
computed from the binomial distribution to allow the random variation of p(i,t) under the 
null hypothesis of no herding.  The herding value is calculated each month (t) for all 
stocks (i) and averaged as a group according to number of traders (N).  Panel A shows 
evidence of the effect of the two financial crises on the herding mean applied to two 
different groups of traders (N>1 and N>5).  In the case of the Asian crisis, two categories 
of dates are evaluated, the whole crisis duration and the date of the greatest fall of 
Chilean Stock Exchange (1998:01) during this crisis.  The Russian crisis effect on the 
stock market is appraised for its duration (one month).  Panel B reports the effect of the 
change in legislation of an extension in the length of the measure period of the MGR.  
The former procedure applied was to consider the past-12-months average return, while 
the new methodology uses the past-36-months average return.  The base period is 
1998:09–1999:10 and the following ones correspond to how the pension funds reacted to 
this amendment.  The period 1997:06–1998:07 is presented to illustrate the whole 
sample. 
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Table 3.8–Panel A.  Effect of Financial Crises on Herding Activity 
Event Date Traders Herding Mean (%)
Asian Crisis 1997:06-1998:01 N>1 0.38 3.71 4.80 ***
1998:01:00 N>1 0.23 3.46 1.97 **
1997:06-1998:01 N>5 0.38 7.43 4.85 ***
1998:01:00 N>5 0.23 4.93 1.73 **
Russian Crisis 1998:08:00 N>1 0.33 -0.01 -0.43
1998:08:00 N>5 0.33 0.00 0.21
***Statistically significant at 1%. 





Table 3.8–Panel B.  Effect of the Appraisal Period Enlargement of Minimum Return 
(From the past 12 months to the past 36 months, as of October 1999)
Period Traders Observations Herding Value (%)
1997:06-1998:07 N>1 697 3.25 5.61 ***
1998:09-1999:10 N>1 375 0.37 0.46
1999:11-2000:11 N>1 475 1.47 2.21 **
2000:12-2001:12 N>1 426 1.58 1.79 **
1997:06-1998:07 N>2 491 4.16 6.06 ***
1998:09-1999:10 N>2 243 1.81 1.90 **
1999:11-2000:11 N>2 344 0.92 1.27 *
2000:12-2001:12 N>2 276 3.37 3.31 ***
1997:06-1998:07 N>3 343 4.86 6.15 ***
1998:09-1999:10 N>3 146 2.54 2.04 **
1999:11-2000:11 N>3 233 1.96 2.40 **
2000:12-2001:12 N>3 152 4.02 3.09 ***
***Statistically significant at 1%. 
**Statistically significant at 5%. 




Table 3.9.  Herding in Market Capitalization Stocks 
I report the herding values for pension funds using the methodology defined by 
Lakonishok et al. (1992).  The number of pension funds diminished from thirteen to 
seven.  By January 2001, there existed only seven pension funds as a consequence of 
assorted acquisitions.  The herding measurement, applied to a given stock month (i,t) for 
the period 1997:06–2001:12, is equal to ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )H i t p i t p t AF i t= − −  wherein p(i,t) is 
the proportion of traders who buy a given stock (i) at month (t).  ( )p t  refers to proportion 
of traders in month (t) who are buyers of all stocks (i).  The adjustment factor, AF(i,t) is 
computed from the binomial distribution to allow the random variation of p(i,t) under the 
null hypothesis of no herding.  The herding value is calculated each month (t) for all 
stocks (i) and averaged as a group according to number of traders (N). Panel A exhibits 
herding values for each quintile under different number of traders in the market. Panel B 




Table 3.9–Panel A.  Herding by Quintiles—Market Size 
Quintile Number of Traders Observations
Q1 N>1 2.89 *** 770
Q2 N>1 1.14 ** 663
Q3 N>1 0.13 386
Q4 N>1 1.80 * 142
Q5 N>1 5.88 *** 97
Q1 N>3 4.14 *** 486
Q2 N>3 2.34 ** 293
Q3 N>3 2.57 ** 103
Q4 N>3 4.05 * 21
Q5 N>3 9.20 ** 20
***Statistically significant at 1%. 
**Statistically significant at 5%. 
*Statistically significant at 10%. 
Herding
Table 3.9–Panel B.  Herding by Economic Sector 
Industry
A.  Power Plants 3.03 *** 4.31 ***
B.  Energy Distribution 1.88 * 4.65 **
C.  Telecommunication 4.47 *** 5.22 ***
D.  Forestry 0.82 3.26 ***
E.  Banks 1.43 2.94 **
F.  Foods 3.44 *** 4.22 ***
G.  Retailers -0.17 0.89
H.  Manufacturing 0.84 2.60 **
***Statistically significant at 1%. 
**Statistically significant at 5%. 
*Statistically significant at 10%. 
Herding Value (%) if N>1 Herding Value (%) if N>3
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Table 3.9–Panel C.  Herding by Larger Stock Within Each Economic Sector 
Individual Stock¤
A.  Endesa 2.98 ** 2.68 *
A.  Chilgener 6.38 *** 6.33 ***
B.  Enersis 6.42 *** 6.36 **
B.  Chilectra 2.64 0
C.  CTC 6.87 *** 6.96 ***
C.  Entel 2.92 ** 3.22 **
D.  Copec 4.41 ** 4.6 **
D.  CMPC 1.88 2.1 *
E.  Banco Chile 6 0
E.  Banco Crˇdito 0.07 1.48
F.  Cervezas 6.63 *** 9.18 ***
F.  Andina 0.82 1.57
G.  Falabella 2.16 1.04
G.  DS 1.2 2.91
H.  Cap 0.02 0.88
H.  LabChile 3.55 ** 6.27 ***
¤ The capital letters A., B., . . . H. refer to the economic sectors indicated in Panel B.
***Statistically significant at 1%. 
**Statistically significant at 5%. 
*Statistically significant at 10%. 
Herding Value (%) if N>1 Herding Value (%) if N>3
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Table 3.10–Panel A.  Censored Dependent Variable and Quintiles 




Q1 0.0204 0.175 0.115 0.124
(3.81)**
Q3 -0.0026 0.159 0.112 0.088
-0.46
Q4 0.0111 0.17 0.127 0.108
-1.59
Q5 0.0081 0.168 0.124 0.104
-1.01
Regressors (1) Coefficients (2)
(1)  Variable Dummy Base: Q2 . Statistical Output: L.Ratio Chi-Squared(4) =  21.43. Significance 
Prob > chi2  = 0.0003. Standard Errors of Coefficients = 0.1041 (53.27) **. Absolute values of z-
statistics in parenthesis. 
(2)  Below the regressor coefficient lies the T-test.  In parentheses with **, significant at 1 percent.
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Table 3.10–Panel C.  Censored Dependent Variable and Group of Stocks Size 




StockSize1_5 0.0369 0.550 0.160 0.167
(3.88)**
StockSize6_10 0.0055 0.430 0.129 0.111
-0.59
StockSize11_20 0.0043 0.426 0.127 0.109
-0.53
StockSize21_30 -0.006 0.387 0.116 0.094
-0.75
StockSize31_40 -0.0064 0.386 0.116 0.093
-0.79
StockSize41_80 -0.007 0.384 0.115 0.092
-1.01
Regressors (1) Coefficients (2)
(1)  Variable Dummy Base: StockSize81_greater. Statistical Output: L.Ratio Chi-Squared(6) =  
32.65. Significance Prob > chi2  = 0.000. Standard Errors of Coefficients = 0.1039 (53.28) **. 
Absolute values of z-statistics in parenthesis.




Table 3.10–Panel D.  Censored Dependent Variable and Large Stocks of Quintiles 




Q1_CTC 0.0538 0.152 0.171 0.194
(3.29)**
Q1_Endesa 0.0451 0.151 0.164 0.176
(2.77)**
Q1_Enersis 0.0332 0.148 0.153 0.153
(2.04)*
Q1_Entel 0.0481 0.152 0.167 0.182
(2.93)**
Q1_Cervezas 0.037 0.150 0.157 0.160
(2.27)*
Q5_Maderas 0.0288 0.147 0.149 0.145
-0.74
Q5_Pilmaiquen -0.0375 0.102 0.079 0.051
-1.47
Q5_Quemchi 0.0793 0.149 0.186 0.246
-0.94
Q5_Quilicura -0.0057 0.128 0.113 0.089
-0.14
Q5_Somela 0.0463 0.151 0.165 0.178
-1.46
Regressors (1) Coefficients (2)
(1)  Variable Dummy Base: Remaining_Stocks. Statistical Output: L.Ratio Chi-Squared(10) =  
40.63. Significance Prob > chi2  = 0.000. Standard Errors of Coefficients = 0.1039 (53.29) **. 
Absolute values of z-statistics in parenthesis.
(2)  Below the  regressor coefficient lies the T-test.  In parentheses with  **, significant at 1 percent. 
In parentheses with *, significant at 5 percent.
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Table 3.10–Panel D.  Censored Dependent Variable and Large Stocks of Quintiles 




Q1_CTC 0.0538 0.152 0.171 0.194
(3.29)**
Q1_Endesa 0.0451 0.151 0.164 0.176
(2.77)**
Q1_Enersis 0.0332 0.148 0.153 0.153
(2.04)*
Q1_Entel 0.0481 0.152 0.167 0.182
(2.93)**
Q1_Cervezas 0.037 0.150 0.157 0.160
(2.27)*
Q5_Maderas 0.0288 0.147 0.149 0.145
-0.74
Q5_Pilmaiquen -0.0375 0.102 0.079 0.051
-1.47
Q5_Quemchi 0.0793 0.149 0.186 0.246
-0.94
Q5_Quilicura -0.0057 0.128 0.113 0.089
-0.14
Q5_Somela 0.0463 0.151 0.165 0.178
-1.46
Regressors (1) Coefficients (2)
(1)  Variable Dummy Base: Remaining_Stocks. Statistical Output: L.Ratio Chi-Squared(10) =  
40.63. Significance Prob > chi2  = 0.000. Standard Errors of Coefficients = 0.1039 (53.29) **. 
Absolute values of z-statistics in parenthesis.
(2)  Below the  regressor coefficient lies the T-test.  In parentheses with  **, significant at 1 percent. 




Table 4.1.  Changes in Market Share after Mergers 
Panels A and B exhibit information about the market share of each pension fund 
measured as a function of the total number of clients and total assets value.  In the initial 
period, 1997:06–1998:05, there were thirteen pension funds.  Between 1998:06 and 
1998:07, the first two mergers occurred.  The next two mergers occurred in 1998:08 and 
1998:09, and the last two occurred in 1999:12 and 2001:01.  In the last four columns of 
the Panels, I list the final market share of each fund after mergers.  Due to rounding of 
numbers, the total summation of each column is not exactly equal to 1.0. 
 
 
Table 4.1–Panel A.  Market Share Based on Clients (in percentage) 
(Sorted by size based on the period 1997:06-1998:05)











PFA 9 19.4 23.3 23.5 31.8 31.8
PFA 5 18.6 20.9 21.5 22.5 22.8
PFA 3 17.5 16.8 16.8 16.1 16
PFA 11 12.4 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.9
PFA 8 9.5 9.1 8.9 --- ---
PFA 12 7.5 11.8 11.4 11.2 11
PFA 2 5.1 --- --- --- ---
PFA 13 4.2 --- --- --- ---
PFA 7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.8
PFA 6 1.3 1.2 1.6 3.1 2.8
PFA 1 0.8 0.6 1.3 --- ---
PFA 10 0.6 0.5 --- --- ---







Table 4.1–Panel B.  Market Share Based on Asset Values (in percentage) 
(Sorted by size based on the period 1997:06-1998:05)











PFA 9 19.4 23.3 23.5 31.8 31.8
PFA 5 18.6 20.9 21.5 22.5 22.8
PFA 3 17.5 16.8 16.8 16.1 16
PFA 11 12.4 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.9
PFA 8 9.5 9.1 8.9 --- ---
PFA 12 7.5 11.8 11.4 11.2 11
PFA 2 5.1 --- --- --- ---
PFA 13 4.2 --- --- --- ---
PFA 7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.8
PFA 6 1.3 1.2 1.6 3.1 2.8
PFA 1 0.8 0.6 1.3 --- ---
PFA 10 0.6 0.5 --- --- ---
PFA 4 0.5 0.6 --- --- ---
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Table 4.2.  Descriptive Statistics of Chilean Pension Funds 
All the numbers are obtained from monthly Interim Financial Income Statements.  
As financial report values are accumulatively recorded, I determine the monthly variation 
between two months.  The same procedure is applied when I study the information from 
December of year X1 to January of year X2.  The monthly mean values are computed for 
each year on the basis of monthly variations within that year. For instance, Total 
Expenses/Total Revenues for 1997:06–1997:12 is calculated as a monthly mean variation 
of seven periods.  ($) refers to pesos, the Chilean currency.  Using the exact translation 
from the Pension Fund Act, I use “clients” to refer to pension fund clients. 
 











Variable Fee (% on taxable salary) 3.00% 2.80% 2.70% 2.60% 2.50%
Fixed Fee ($) 216 334 455 547 581
Total Income per Client ($) 4,029 3,932 4,313 4,819 4,296
















Total Expenses / Total Revenues 0.824 0.811 0.694 0.641 0.61
Advertising Expenses / Total Expenses 0.043 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.018
Salesforce Expenses / Total Expenses 0.357 0.302 0.262 0.154 0.139
Advertising Expenses per Client ($) 145 72 61 40 55
Salesforce Expenses per Client ($) 1,305 1,016 739 426 365
Total Expenses per Clients ($) 3,674 3,242 3,063 2,855 2,788
*Total Expenses are composed of salespersonsÕ wages, disability insurance, administration, 
advertising, employeesÕ wages, board, and depreciation.
 











Total Assets of Funds 
(Million Pesos) 13,500,000 13,900,000 16,900,000 19,600,000 22,100,000
Total Assets of Funds 
(Million Dollars) 32,300 30,200 33,200 36,400 35,000
Total Number of Clients 5,715,432 5,862,088 6,022,070 6,183,198 6,348,499
Total Number of Salespeople 19,366 9,914 4,265 3,270 2,673






Table 4.3: Clusters of Pension Funds and Financial Ratios 
(As of December of each year) 
 
The information presented this table illustrates some financial ratios relative to 
expenses, revenues, and assets, calculated using the financial reports ending as of 
December of each year.  The sample is divided into four categories: (i) Acquired funds 
(those absorbed by others), (ii) Survivors, (iii) the Three Leaders (based on asset values, 
not number of clients), and (iv) the Industry Value (which is computed using the total 
values of the market and not on either the simple or the weighted average of funds). 
 
 
Table 4.3.  Clusters of Pension Funds and Financial Ratios 
 









Revenues / Fund Assets 2.09 2.12 2.09 2.14
Fee Income / Fund Assets 1.95 2 1.94 2.02
Expenses / Fund Assets 1.77 2.77 1.85 1.61
Marketing Expenses / Fund Assets 0.7 1.06 0.7 0.64
Net Operating Income / Fund Assets 0.32 -0.65 0.24 0.53
Revenues / Fund Assets 1.88 1.62 1.88 1.91
Fee Income / Fund Assets 1.78 1.56 1.76 1.84
Expenses / Fund Assets 1.55 1.57 1.62 1.44
Marketing Expenses / Fund Assets 0.52 0.56 0.51 0.49
Net Operating Income / Fund Assets 0.33 0.06 0.26 0.47
Revenues / Fund Assets 1.7 1.58 1.7 1.68
Fee Income / Fund Assets 1.44 1.42 1.45 1.45
Expenses / Fund Assets 1.21 1.57 1.28 1.14
Marketing Expenses / Fund Assets 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.3
Net Operating Income / Fund Assets 0.49 0.01 0.42 0.54
Revenues / Fund Assets 1.74 1.54 1.8 1.46
Fee Income / Fund Assets 1.32 1.45 1.37 1.31
Expenses / Fund Assets 1.03 1.43 1.12 0.94
Marketing Expenses / Fund Assets 0.17 0.33 0.21 0.14
Net Operating Income / Fund Assets 0.71 0.11 0.68 0.53
Revenues / Fund Assets 1.41 --- 1.41 1.41
Fee Income / Fund Assets 1.22 --- 1.25 1.22
Expenses / Fund Assets 0.92 --- 1 0.85
Marketing Expenses / Fund Assets 0.14 --- 0.17 0.12
Net Operating Income / Fund Assets 0.5 --- 0.41 0.56








Table 4.4: Monthly Fund Flow Variations 
(Measured by the assets value and the number of clients) 
 
The net flows of each pension fund are measured by Flows_Pesos and 
Flow_Clients. Flows_Pesos corresponds to the percentage variation of asset values, 
computed on local currency, between two periods, and is given by Model (4.1) 86. To 
better understand the major source the variation in flows, Model (1) is widened into 
Model (4.2), and later divided into: Quantity_Flow (4.2a) and Value_Flow (4.2b) which 
tend to account for changes in flows due to variation in both the number of clients and the 
saving accounts size. In Model (4.3), Flow_Clients is defined as the percentage variation 
in the number of clients adjusted by the number of clients added to fund (i) from fund (j) 
due to mergers. Panel A illustrates the monthly average value of Models (4.2), (4.2a), 
(4.2b), and (4.3) for the period 1997:06–1998:05.  In that period, there were thirteen 
pension funds.  Panel B presents the same as the prior models, but for the period 
1998:10–2001:01, after four mergers took place.  Panel C does the same as Panel B, but 
for the period after 2001:01. 
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86 Fund flows have been extensively used in the U.S. mutual fund literature, as in Zheng (1999), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Carhart (1997), and Gruber (1996).  I use the definition of Huang, Wei, and Yan (2003).  
Unlike these papers, my study decomposes Flow_pesos into two components, Value and Quantity. 
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Table 4.4–Panel A.  Fund Flow Variations—Period 1997:06–1998:05 
 
(Before any mergers - monthly average percentage change)
Flow_Pesos  (%)* Quantity_Flow  (%) Value_Flow  (%) Flow_Clients  (%)
PFA 1a -0.86 -0.72 -0.14 -0.73
PFA 2a -0.64 0.71 -1.35 0.72
PFA 3 0.06 0.77 -0.71 0.78
PFA 4a 0.67 1.44 -0.77 1.47
PFA 5 1.45 0.67 0.78 0.67
PFA 6 -0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.13
PFA 7 0.34 -0.44 0.77 -0.44
PFA 8a 0.55 1.02 -0.47 1.03
PFA 9 0.19 0.26 -0.07 0.26
PFA 10a -1.49 -1.30 -0.19 -1.32
PFA 11 0.52 0.10 0.42 0.10
PFA 12 0.08 0.22 -0.14 0.22
PFA 13a -0.71 -0.62 -0.09 -0.63
System 0.37 0.30 0.07 0.30
aPFAs that merged and disappeared through time.
*Flow_Pesos = Quantity Flow + Value Flow.  Summation not exact due to rounding numbers for 
presentation.
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Table 4.4–Panel B.  Fund Flow Variations—Period 1998:10–2001:01 
 
(After four mergers - monthly average percentage change)
Flow_Pesos  (%)* Quantity_Flow  (%) Value_Flow  (%) Flow_Clients  (%)
PFA1a 0.14 0.17 -0.03 0.17
PFA2ab --- --- --- ---
PFA3 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.10
PFA4ab --- --- --- ---
PFA5 0.44 0.39 0.05 0.38
PFA6 1.09 0.35 0.74 0.34
PFA7 0.57 -0.09 0.66 -0.08
PFA8a 0.30 0.01 0.29 0.30
PFA9 0.26 0.30 -0.04 0.68
PFA10ab --- --- --- ---
PFA11 0.34 0.15 0.20 0.15
PFA12 0.22 0.17 0.05 0.17
PFA13ab --- --- --- ---
System 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.24
aPFAs that merged and disappeared through time.
*Flow_Pesos = Quantity Flow + Value Flow.  Summation not exact due to rounding numbers for 
presentation.
bPFA 2 and PFA 13 merged with PFA 11 and PFA 9, respectively.  PFA 4 and PFA 10 merged 
with PFA 1 and PFA 16, respectively.
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Table 4.4–Panel C.  Fund Flow Variations—Period 2001:02–2001:12 
(After all mergers - monthly average percentage change)
Flow_Pesos  (%)* Quantity_Flow  (%) Value_Flow  (%) Flow_Clients  (%)
PFA1ac --- --- --- ---
PFA2ab --- --- --- ---
PFA3 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.10
PFA4ab --- --- --- ---
PFA5 0.38 0.34 0.04 0.34
PFA6 -1.11 -0.76 -0.36 -0.76
PFA7 0.41 0.03 0.38 0.03
PFA8ac --- --- --- ---
PFA9 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.28
PFA10ab --- --- --- ---
PFA11 0.35 0.06 0.30 0.06
PFA12 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05
PFA13ab --- --- --- ---
System 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.20
aPFAs that merged and disappeared through time.
*Flow_Pesos = Quantity Flow + Value Flow.  Summation not exact due to rounding numbers for 
presentation.
bBefore 1998:09, PFA 2 and PFA 13 merged with PFA 11 and PFA 9, respectively, and PFA 4 
and PFA 10 merged with PFA 1 and PFA 6, respectively.





Table 4.5.  Relationship between Flow and Past Performance 
This table reports the coefficient values of regression models applied to flow 
definitions, Flow_Pesosi,t and Flow_Clientsi,t. The dependent variable Flow_Pesosi,t is 
divided into (i) Quantity_Flow and (ii) Value_Flow. 
I use models (4.4) and (4.5) to investigate whether fund flows react to past 
performance measured within different periods of time.  As control variables, the model 
uses a one-lag logarithm of Assets Value (LOG(Asset)i,t-1) and standard deviation of 3-
month returns (Standard.Deviationi,t). Variable fees and Fixed fees are included with one-
lag period (VarFeei,t-1, FixFeei,t-1).  Performance (Premium) is measured as excess return 
on the benchmark (weighted average return) defined specifically in the Pension Funds 
Act.  This is computed for three different revolving periods (T): 1-month, 6-months, and 
12-months, and it is lagged 3-months.  Premium_12monthi,t-3 denotes the rolling past-12-
months excess return lagged 3 months. Additionally, as robustness, raw returni,t-3 is used 
as alternative independent variable to performance. These models are regressed under 
three additional specifications. Models A, B and C are estimated using the methodology 
of Fama-Macbeth (1973) with cross-sectional regressions on monthly fund flows for the 
periods T=1, T=6 and T=12 months, respectively. The results are exhibited in Panels A 
and C. Panels B and D present results of the above models under fixed-effect model as an 
alternative procedure to test the robustness of findings. 
The absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets under each coefficient.  
Asterisks (*, **, and ***) indicate the significance level of coefficients at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively.  Listed at the bottom of each panel are the number of observations, 
number of units (i), R-squared values, F-test, and Hausman specification test (H0: 
Correlation Coeff.(ui  , X)=0) for each fixed-effect model. 
(4.4)  , 1 , -1 2 , 3 , -1
4 , -1 5 , -3 , 1 , 6 ,12
_ ( ) .
_
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t T
Flow Pesos LOG Asset Standard Deviation FixFees
VarFees Premium Tmonth
α β β β
β β ε =
= + + + +
+ +
(4.5)  , 1 , -1 2 , 3 , -1
4 , -1 5 , -3 , 1 , 6 ,12
_ ( ) .
_
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t T
Flow Clients LOG Asset Standard Deviation FixFees
VarFees Premium Tmonth
α β β β
β β ε =
= + + + +
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Table 4.5–Panel A1.  Dependent variable is Flow_Pesos under Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) 





Intercept 0.208 0.117 0.26
[1.16] [1.32] [2.35]**
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.008 -0.004 -0.009
[1.09] [1.20] [2.17]**
Standard.Deviation 0.01 -0.003 -0.014
[0.73] [0.38] [1.41]
LagVarFee -4.01 -1.87 -4.01
[1.22] [1.28] [2.21]**
LagFixFee -0.005 -0.002 -0.016
[0.42] [0.29] [1.83]*
Lag3 Prem_1m -0.854 --- ---
[0.57]
Lag3 Prem_6m --- -0.067 ---
[0.18]
Lag3 Prem_12m --- --- 0.38
[2.31]**
Cross Section Regressions 54 49 43
Number of Funds 13 13 11
 
 157
Table 4.5–Panel A2.  Dependent Variable is Flow_Clients under Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) 





Intercept -0.01 0.051 0.079
[0.20] [0.39] [1.42]
Lag LOG(Asset) 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
[0.43] [0.50] [0.29]
Standard.Deviation 0.013 0.004 -0.005
[0.06] [0.49] [0.35]
LagVarFee -0.468 -1.22 -1.538
[0.63] [0.25] [0.12]
LagFixFee 0.002 -0.003 -0.005
[0.63] [0.44] [0.18]
Lag3 Prem_1m -0.475 --- ---
[0.51]
Lag3 Prem_6m --- -0.399 ---
[0.26]
Lag3 Prem_12m --- --- 0.029
[0.77]
Cross Section Regressions 54 49 43
Number of Funds 13 13 11
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Table 4.5–Panel B1.  Dependent Variable is Flow_Pesos under Fixed Effect 
Regressors Model 4.4A Prem_1m Model 4.4B Prem_6m Model 4.4C Prem_12m
Intercept --- --- ---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.002 -0.003 -0.013
[0.30] [1.30] [3.46]***
Standard.Deviation -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0011
[0.22] [1.47] [1.55]
LagVarFee -0.919 -0.19 -3.83
[0.15] [0.23] [2.78]**
LagFixFee (000s) -0.008 -0.002 -0.035
[0.10] [0.30] [2.61]**
Lag3 Prem_1m -0.13 --- ---
[0.69]
Lag3 Prem_6m --- 0.35 ---
[2.60]**
Lag3 Prem_12m --- --- 0.48
[4.83]***
Observations 466 401 325
Number of Funds 13 13 11
F test: All coeff = 0 0.87 2.19 10.05
Prob. > F-test 0.50 0.05 0.00
Hausman Test Chi(2) 8.65 15.80 20.18
Prob.>Chi-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4.5–Panel B2.  Dependent Variable is Flow_Clients under Fixed Effect 
Regressors Model 4.5A Prem_1m Model 4.5B Prem_6m Model 4.5C Prem_12m
Intercept --- --- ---
Lag LOG(Asset) 0.001 -0.0006 -0.005
[0.64] [0.39] [3.10]***
Standard.Deviation -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005
[0.36] [0.08] [1.50]
LagVarFee -0.188 -0.074 -1.97
[0.48] [0.15] [2.76]***
LagFixFee 0.0009 -0.003 -0.017
[0.30] [0.004] [2.51]**
Lag3 Prem_1m -0.241 --- ---
[1.21]
Lag3 Prem_6m --- 0.004 ---
[0.06]
Lag3 Prem_12m --- --- 0.103
[2.01]**
Observations 466 401 325
Number of Funds 13 13 11
F test: All coeff = 0 0.43 0.53 4.52
Prob. > F-test 0.83 0.75 0.00
Hausman Test Chi(2) 11.41 9.45 3.86
Prob.>Chi-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.57
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Table 4.5–Panel C.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, and 
Quantity_Flow under Fama Macbeth (1973) 
No significant values in Model 4.4A (T=1) (not shown).
Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow
Intercept 0.117 0.066 0.051 0.26 0.18 0.08
[1.32] [1.30] [0.84] [2.35]** [2.28]** [1.42]
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.002
[1.20] [0.89] [0.66] [2.17]** [2.18]** [1.09]
Standard.Deviation -0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.014 -0.009 -0.005
[0.38] [0.95] [0.63] [1.41] [1.70] [0.96]
LagVarFee -1.87 -0.68 -1.18 -4.01 -2.48 -1.53
[1.28] [0.65] [1.13] [2.21]** [1.96]* [1.56]
LagFixFee (000s) -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.016 -0.01 -0.005
[0.29] [0.31] [1.34] [1.83]* [1.78]* [1.34]
3Lags Prem_6m 0.067 0.466 -0.399 --- --- ---
[0.18] [2.05]** [1.16]
3Lags Prem_12m --- --- --- 0.38 0.35 0.03
[2.31]** [3.01]*** [0.28]
Cross-Section Reg. 49 49 49 43 43 43
Number of Funds 13 13 13 11 11 11
Regressors
Model 4.4B Model 4.4C
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Table 4.5–Panel D.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, and 
Quantity_Flow under Fixed Effect 
Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006
[1.30] [0.19] [0.59] [3.46]*** [2.17]** [3.33]***
Standard.Deviation -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.005 -0.005
[1.47] [0.06] [0.91] [1.55] [0.34] [0.12]
LagVarFee -0.19 -0.09 -0.1 -3.83 -1.83 -1.99
[0.23] [0.88] [0.83] [2.78]** [1.67]* [2.78]**
LagFixFee (000s) -0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.035 -0.017 -0.017
[0.30] [0.32] [0.78] [2.61]** [1.66]* [2.48]**
3Lags Prem_6m 0.35 0.33 0.011 --- --- ---
[2.60]** [3.31]** [0.87]
3Lags Prem_12m --- --- --- 0.48 0.37 0.1
[4.83]*** [4.74]*** [2.02]**
Observations 401 401 401 325 325 325
Number of Funds 13 13 13 11 11 11
F test: All coeff = 0 2.19 4.21 0.49 10.05 7.14 4.74
Prob. > F-test 0.05 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman Test Chi(2) 15.80 16.83 13.30 20.18 17.62 3.44
Prob.>Chi-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63
Regressors
Model 4.4B Model 4.4C
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Table 4.5–Panel E.  Raw Performance in Models (4.4) and (4.5) in Flow_Pesos and 
Flow_Clients 
Fama-Macbeth Fixed-effect Fama-Macbeth Fixed-effect
Intercept 0.219 --- 0.081 ---
[1.98]* [1.47]
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.009 -0.015 -0.002 -0.0065
[2.17]** [4.12]*** [1.08] [3.44]***
Standard.Deviation -0.014 -0.001 -0.005 -0.0003
[1.41] [0.6] [0.94] [0.90]
Lag Fix Fee -0.016 -0.038 -1.538 -0.017
[1.83]* [2.79]*** [1.57] [2.49]**
Lag Variable Fee -4.011 -4.178 -0.005 -1.99
[2.21]** [2.99]*** [1.36] [2.79]**
Lg3 Return_12 month 0.38 0.36 0.029 0.01
[2.31]** [3.60]*** [0.29] [1.95]*
Cross section Reg. 43 --- 43 ---
Number of Funds 13 13 13 13
Observations --- 325 --- 325
F test: All coeff = 0 --- 7.87 --- 4.47
Prob.>F-test --- 0.00 --- 0.00
Hausman Test Chi(2) --- 28.87 --- 27.57





Table 4.6.  Relationship between Flow and Ranking on Performance 
This table reports the coefficient values of regression models applied to flow 
definitions.  The dependent variables are Flow_Pesosi,t and Flow_Clientsi,t. Flow_Pesosi,t 
is divided into (i) Quantity_Flow and (ii) Value_Flow. 
I investigate whether fund flows react to ranking position of funds, based on past 
performance.  As control variables, the models use a one-lag logarithm of Assets Value 
(LOG(Asset)i,t-1) and standard deviation of 3-month returns (Standard.Deviationi,t).  
Variable fees and Fixed fees are included with a one-lag period (VarFeei,t-1, FixFeei,t-1).  
To characterize the position in the 12-month ranking, I assign 1 to the fund that achieved 
first place and 13. I define dummy variables Ranking_1st (1 if 1st place, 0 otherwise), 
Ranking_2nd_3rd, Ranking_4th5th6th, and Ranking 6th_lower (1 if 6th place or lower, 0 
otherwise). 
I refer to Flowi,t in next models as the dependent variables Flow_Pesosi,t  and 
Flow_Clientsi,t. These variables, in Panel A, are estimated using the methodology of 
Fama-Macbeth (1973).  Cross-sectional regressions on monthly flows are run and 
averaged for each coefficient.  Panel B uses the same prior specification models but 
under fixed-effect regressions. Panel C shows the results using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
methodology for the dependent variables Flow_Pesosi,t, Value_Flow and Quantity_Flow.  
Panel D uses the same flow definitions from Panel C under fixed-effect regressions. 
Panel E lists quarterly information on the percentage change of average value per client 
adjusted by returns and mergers, equivalent to [(Asseti,t)/Clientsi,t], in the 12-month past 
performance of winner fund, measured as (i) one-month before (t-1) the period that 
winner fund achieves top place (t0) represented by Before–Current: (Asseti,t-
1*(1+returni,t0))/ Clientsi,t-1] and [(Asseti,t0 – Mergersi,t0)/Clientsi,t0] and (ii) one-month 
prior (t-1) and one-month after (t1) the fund classifies as winner, called Before–After: 
[Asseti,t-1*(1+returni,t0))/ Clientsi,t-1] - [(Asseti,t1 – Mergersi,t1) /(1+returni,t1)*Clientsi,t1]. 
Also, percentage change in the number of clients is exhibited to realize a comparison. 
The absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets under each coefficient.  
Asterisks (*, **, and ***) indicate the significance level of coefficients at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively.  Listed at the bottom of the each panel are the number of observations, 
number of units (i), R-squared values, F-test, and Hausman specification test (H0: 
Correlation Coeff.(ui  , X)=0) for each fixed-effect model. 
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Table 4.6–Panel A1.  Dependent variable  is Flow_Pesosi,t under  Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) 
Regressors Model 4.7 Model 4.8 Model 4.9 Model 4.10
Intercept 0.297 0.094 0.08 0.069
[2.46]** [3.24]*** [2.24]** [1.77]*
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.01 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
[2.36]** [1.87]* [1.16]* [1.47]
Standard.Deviation -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 ---
[0.57] [1.19] [1.47]
LagVarFee -4.79 -1.336 -1.2 -1.35
[2.39]** [1.94]* [1.87]* [1.59]
LagFixFee -0.016 --- --- ---
[1.95]*
DLag3 Ranking 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004
1st_12month [1.87]* [2.08]** [2.20]** [1.63]*
DLag3 Ranking --- 0.001 --- 0.001
2nd_3rd_12month [0.489] [0.28]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- -0.002
4th,5th,6th_12month [0.59]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- -0.0004 ---
6th_lower_12month [0.23]
Cross Section Regressions 43 43 43 43
Number of Funds 11 11 11 11
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Table 4.6–Panel A2.  Dependent variable  is Flow_Clientsi,t under  Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) 
Regressors Model 4.7 Model 4.8 Model 4.9 Model 4.10
Intercept 0.075 -0.01 -0.011 -0.026
[1.27] [0.37] [0.46] [1.08]
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
[1.04] [1.36] [1.75]* [1.24]
Standard.Deviation 0.0001 -0.006 -0.009 ---
[0.98] [0.49] [1.67]
LagVarFee -1.35 0.107 0.088 0.461
[1.30] [0.17] [0.18] [0.86]
LagFixFee -0.007 --- --- ---
[1.54]
DLag3 Ranking -0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.002
1st_12month [0.72] [0.18] [0.74] [1.13]
DLag3 Ranking --- 0.0001 --- 0.002
2nd_3rd_12month [0.13] [1.13]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- 0.002
4th,5th,6th_12month [0.38]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- 0.0001 ---
6th_lower_12month [0.12]
Cross Section Regressions 43 43 43 43
Number of Funds 11 11 11 11
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Table 4.6–Panel B1.  Dependent variable  is Flow_Pesosi,t under Fixed Effect 
Regressors Model 4.7 Model 4.8 Model 4.9 Model 4.10
Intercept --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.005 -0.004 -0.013 -0.005
[1.75]** [1.46]* [3.37]*** [1.84]*
Standard.Deviation -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 ---
[1.55] [1.57] [2.43]**
LagVarFee -1.04 -0.252 -1.165 -0.211
[1.65]* [0.57] [1.43] [0.43]
LagFixFee -0.009 --- --- ---
[1.65]*
DLag3 Ranking 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.009
1st_12month [3.90]*** [3.90]*** [3.20]** [3.84]***
DLag3 Ranking 0.001 0.001 --- 0.003
2nd_3rd_12month [0.67] [0.67] [1.34]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- 0.002
4th,5th,6th_12month [1.14]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- -0.002 ---
6th_lower_12month [1.14]
Observations 325 325 325 325
Number of Funds 11 11 11 11
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06
F test: All coeff = 0 3.84 3.37 5.41 9.25
Prob. > F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman Test Chi(2) 11.67 9.44 11.51 7.64
Prob.>Chi-Squared¤ 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17
¤Breusch-Pagan test (H 0 :Variance (u)=0 ) realized on Model 10 gives a test value = 0.64. 
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Table 4.6–Panel B2.  Dependent variable  is Flow_Clientsi,t under Fixed Effect 
Regressors Model 4.7 Model 4.8 Model 4.9 Model 4.10
Intercept --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
[3.33]*** [2.91]*** [2.89]*** [2.20]**
Standard.Deviation -0.001 -0.001 -0.0007 ---
[1.73]* [2.09]** [2.06]**
LagVarFee -2.299 -0.603 -0.591 -0.77
[3.27]*** [1.46] [1.42] [1.88]
LagFixFee -0.02 --- --- ---
[2.98]***
DLag3 Ranking 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
1st_12month [1.76]* [1.61] [1.68]* [1.28]
DLag3 Ranking --- -0.0005 --- -0.0007
2nd_3rd_12month [0.69] [0.66]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- -0.0002
4th,5th,6th_12month [0.29]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- -0.0001 ---
6th_lower_12month [0.13]
Observations 325 325 325 325
Number of Funds 11 11 11 11
R-squared 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06
F test: All coeff = 0 15.58 14.94 2.48 14.88
Prob. > F-test 0 0 0 0
Hausman Test Chi(2) 5.9 2.19 2.41 1.87
Prob.>Chi-Squared¤ 0.31¤ 0.82¤ 0.79¤ 0.86(a)
¤Breusch-Pagan test (H 0 :Variance (u)=0 ) realized on:
Model 4.7 gives a test value = 4.04; which is significant at 4.43%.
Model 4.8 gives a test value = 3.42; which is significant at 6.42%. 
Model 4.9 gives a test value = 4.26; which is significant at 3.89%.
Model 4.10 gives a test value = 3.22; which is significant at 7.25%.
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Table 4.6–Panel C.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, and 
Quantity_Flow under Fama Macbeth (1973) 
Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow
Intercept 0.094 0.104 -0.01 0.08 0.091 -0.01
[3.24]*** [4.17]*** [0.36] [2.24]** [2.99]*** [0.41]
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001
[1.87]* [3.22]*** [2.29]** [1.16]* [2.24]** [1.71]**
Standard.Deviation -0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.015 -0.007 -0.009
[1.19] [0.58] [0.52] [1.47] [0.77] [1.69]*
LagVarFee -1.336 -1.47 0.143 -1.2 -1.29 0.095
[1.94]* [2.72]** [0.23] [1.87]* [2.34]** [0.18]
LagFixFee --- --- --- --- --- ---
DLag3 Ranking 0.005 0.005 0.0004 0.006 0.005 0.001
1st_12month [2.08]** [2.36]** [0.25] [2.20]** [2.20]** [0.77]
DLag3 Ranking 0.001 0.001 0.0001 --- --- ---
2nd_3rd_12month [0.489] [0.529] [0.07]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- --- --- ---
4th,5th,6th_12month
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0002
6th_lower_12month [0.23] [0.54] [0.1]
Cross-Section Reg. 49 49 49 43 43 43
Number of Funds 13 13 13 11 11 11
Regressors
Model 4.8 Model 4.9
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Table 4.6–Panel D.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, and 
Quantity_Flow under Fixed Effect 
Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow
Intercept --- --- --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.004 -0.004 0.0001 -0.013 -0.007 -0.006
[1.46]* [1.98]** [0.1] [3.37]*** [2.25]** [3.13]***
Standard.Deviation -0.001 -0.001 0.0002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[1.57] [1.66]* [0.5] [2.43]** [1.72]* [2.09]**
LagVarFee -0.252 -0.316 0.06 -1.165 -0.543 -0.622
[0.57] [0.94] [0.24] [1.43] [0.84] [1.49]
LagFixFee --- --- --- --- --- ---
DLag3 Ranking 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.002
1st_12month [3.90]*** [3.85]*** [1.57] [3.20]*** [2.95]*** [1.71]*
DLag3 Ranking 0.001 0.0008 0.0002 --- --- ---
2nd_3rd_12month [0.67] [0.74] [0.16]
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- --- --- ---
4th,5th,6th_12month
DLag3 Ranking --- --- --- -0.002 -0.002 -0.0001
6th_lower_12month [1.14] [1.38] [0.1]
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325
Number of Funds 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.04
F test: All coeff = 0 3.37 3.47 0.58 5.41 3.95 2.72
Prob. > F-test 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.02
Hausman Test Chi(2) 9.44 18.85 77.43 11.51 11.29 3.60
Prob.>Chi-Squared 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.60
Regressors
Model 4.8 Model 4.9
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Table 4.6–Panel E.  Monthly Percentage Change in Average Value per Client for 
Winner Fund 







Change (%) in 
Number of 
Clients 
Change (%) in 
Number of 
Clients 
(T-1- T0) (T-1- T1) (T-1- T0) (T-1- T1)
Jun-98 PFA 5 3.77 7.73 0.78 1.45
Sep-98 PFA 9 5.43 9.75 0.22 0.44
Dec-98 PFA 9 2.84 3.24 0.14 0.18
Mar-99 PFA 6 4.70 3.46 0.60 0.99
Jun-99 PFA 6 3.13 1.95 1.19 2.31
Sep-99 PFA 6 0.31 0.37 0.19 1.28
Dec-99 PFA 6 3.66 3.85 0.27 0.86
Mar-00 PFA 5 -0.22 -1.56 0.14 0.22
Jun-00 PFA 1 1.33 -0.56 0.88 0.50
Sep-00 PFA 1 -0.37 -0.15 -0.98 -1.54
Dec-00 PFA 1 2.41 1.45 -1.24 -2.73
Mar-01 PFA 9 2.10 0.93 0.26 0.53
Jun-01 PFA 6 -0.18 -1.68 -1.13 -2.03
Sep-01 PFA 6 2.00 0.85 -0.48 -0.56





                                                
Table 4.7.  Marketing Strategy Implemented by Pension Funds 
I examine the variables that pension funds incorporate in their strategies to 
compete and gain market share.  The dependent variable, Weight_Marketingi,t, is the 
share of advertising expenses disbursed by the fund (i) over the total advertising expenses 
spent by the industry.  In four models, I present this share calculated over 1-, 3-, 6-, and 
12-month periods to capture the effect of how long the advertising strategy is.87  As 
control variables, the models use a one-lag logarithm of Assets Value (LOG(Asset)i,t-1), 
the standard deviation of 3-month returns (Standard.Deviationi,t), and changes in total 
expenses of fund (i) at time (t).  Also, variable and fixed fees are included with a one-lag 
period (VarFeei,t-1, FixFeei,t-1). I define the dummy variables Ranking_1st (1 if fund in 1st 
place, 0 otherwise), Ranking_2nd_3rd, and Ranking_6th_lower (1 if 6th place or lower, 0 
otherwise).  The ranking is determined on the basis of excess return on the benchmark. 
Panels A and C exhibit the results using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method.  Panels B and 
D use a fixed-effect model. Unlike prior panels, Panels E and F use the model with the 
dependent variable Weight_Marketing_3monthi,t, which corresponds to the share of 3-
months advertising expenses of fund (i) scaled by the total advertising expenses of the 
industry. The independent variables are single and pairwise dummy variables of 
performance rankings as Ranking1st and Ranking 6th_lower; Ranking1st and Ranking 
2nd_3rd and so on. 
The absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets under each coefficient.  
Asterisks (*, **, and ***) indicate the significance level of coefficients at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively.  Listed at the bottom of each panel are the number of observations, 
 
87 Sirri and Tufano (1998) consider a measure period of 12 months for the share of media exposure per 
fund. 
number of units (i), R-squared values, F-test, and Hausman specification test (H0: 
Correlation Coeff.(ui  , X)=0) for each fixed-effect model. 
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Table 4.7–Panel A.  Dependent Variable is Weight_ Marketing_Tmonth i,t under 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
Model 4.11A Model 4.11B Model 4.11C Model 4.11D
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month
Intercept -1.043 -1.11 -0.997 -1.024
[4.51]*** [5.32]*** [3.90]*** [5.83]***
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.093 0.092 0.084 0.094
[6.97]*** [6.88]*** [5.26]*** [7.99]***
Standard.Deviation -0.059 -0.015 -0.018 -0.068
[0.73] [0.20] [0.24] [1.03]
Change Total Expenses (M$) -0.018 -0.017 -0.011 -0.017
[1.81]* [1.78]* [1.08] [2.23]**
D.2Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.066 0.06 0.038 0.037




Table 4.7–Panel B.  Dependent Variable is Weight_ Marketing_Tmonth i,t under 
Fixed Effect 
Model 4.11A Model 4.11B Model 4.11C Model 4.11D
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month
Intercept --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.049 0.057 0.064 0.056
[6.48]*** [6.48]*** [7.66] [6.99]***
Standard.Deviation 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001
[1.38] [1.44] [1.14] [0.43]
Change Total Expenses (M$) 0.029 0.024 0.015 0.011
[4.80]*** [4.29]*** [2.98] [2.42]**
D.2Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.037 0.022 -0.002 -0.003




Table 4.7–Panel C.  Dependent Variable is Weight_ Marketing_Tmonth i,t under 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
Model 4.11A Model 4.11B Model 4.11C Model 4.11D
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month
Intercept -0.394 -0.468 -0.461 -0.524
[1.80]* [2.19]** [2.15]** [3.69]***
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.043 0.046 0.048 0.058
[3.07]*** [3.11]*** [3.48]*** [6.05]
Standard.Deviation -0.143 -0.118 -0.139 -0.15
[1.87]* [1.67] [1.89]* [2.50]**
Change Total Expenses (M$) 0.022 0.02 0.018 0.009
[2.02]** [1.88]* [1.81]* [1.40]
D.2Lag Ranking 6th_lower_12m -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 0.005




Table 4.7–Panel D.  Dependent Variable is Weight_ Marketing_Tmonth i,t under 
Fixed Effect 
Model 4.11A Model 4.11B Model 4.11C Model 4.11D
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month
Intercept --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.035 0.045 0.049 0.048
[2.30]*** [3.32]*** [4.17]*** [5.30]***
Standard.Deviation 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.0004
[1.38] [1.61] [1.09] [0.16]
Change Total Expenses (M$) 0.032 0.026 0.014 0.013
[4.17]*** [3.77]*** [2.29]** [2.78]***
D.2Lag Ranking 6th_lower_12m -0.028 -0.027 -0.021 -0.012




Table 4.7–Panel E.  Dependent Variable is Weight_ Marketing_3month i,t under 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
Regressors Model 4.12A Model 4.12B Model 4.12C
Intercept -0.747 -1.038 -1.79
[2.43]** [3.74]*** [4.47]***
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.081 0.084 0.07
[4.72]*** [4.11]*** [3.16]***
Standard.Deviation -0.254 --- 0.158
[1.97]* [1.64]
LagVarFee --- --- 20.52
[2.73]***
LagFixFee --- -0.05 ---
[2.50]**
Change Total Expenses (M$) -0.005 -0.014 0.026
[0.36] [1.03] [2.05]**
D.2Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.086 0.08 --
[2.65]** [2.35]**
D.2Lag Ranking 2nd3rd_12m --- 0.008 0.017
[0.42] [0.706]




Table 4.7–Panel F.  Dependent Variable is Weight_ Marketing_3month i,t under 
Fixed Effect 
Regressors Model 4.12E Model 4.12F Model 4.12G
Intercept --- --- ---
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.048 0.061 0.047
[3.82]*** [6.61]*** [3.88]***
Standard.Deviation 0.005 --- ---
[1.60]
LagVarFee --- --- -2.68
[1.38]
LagFixFee --- -0.043 ---
[2.83]***
Change Total Expenses (M$) 0.021 --- 0.025
[3.11]** [4.46]***
D.2Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.017 0.025 ---
[1.67]* [2.71]***
D.2Lag Ranking 2nd3rd_12m --- 0.016 0.01
[2.46]** [1.44]




Table 4.7–Panel G.  Dependent Variable is CHmarketing_3Month_over_Asseti,t, 
under Fama-Macbeth (1973) Procedure and Fixed Effect 







Intercept 0.126 --- -1.942 ---
[0.80] [3.30]***
Lag LOG (Asset) 0.01 -0.021 0.061 0.007
[1.52] [1.24] [3.05]*** [0.42]
Standard.Deviation -0.062 0.01 0.058 0.008
[0.85] [2.86]*** [0.67] [2.35]
LagVarFee --- --- 35.139 22.71
[3.37]*** [5.47]***
LagFixFee -0.034 -0.175 --- ---
[1.28] [4.27]***
D.2Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.045 0.014 --- ---
[1.80]* [1.68]*
D.2Lag Ranking 2nd5th_12m --- --- 0.011 -0.005
[0.34] [0.82]
D.2Lag Ranking 6th_lower_12m 0.012 0.014 -0.025 0.006




Table 4.8: What Are Relevant Variables to Clients? 
 
I examine what variables are important to pension fund clients using the 
methodology of Fama-Macbeth (1973).  To test robustness of my results, I employ a 
fixed-effect model in unbalanced panel data.  Table 9 reports the coefficient values of 
regression models applied to flow definitions.  The dependent variable are Flow_Pesosi,t 
and Flow_ Clientsi,t. As control variables, the models use a one-lag logarithm of Assets 
Value (LOG(Asset)i,t-1) and both the share of 3-month advertising expenses over  total 
advertising expenses of the industry (weigh_marketing_3monthi,t) and the share of 3-
month accumulated number of salespersons over the industry’s 
(weigh_salesperson_3monthi,t). I use scaled variables by asset values of each fund for 3-
month advertising expenses and the number of 3-month salespersons. Variable fees and 
Fixed fees are included with a one-lag period (VarFeei,t-1, FixFeei,t-1). Performance 
(Premium_12m) is measured as excess return on the benchmark. This is computed over 
revolving 12-month periods and is lagged 3 months.  To rank funds, I define the variable 
(Ranking_12m) and assign 1 to the fund that achieved first place and 13 to the fund in last 
place in the ranking during the last 12 months.  I also define a dummy set of variables as 
Ranking_ 1st (1 if fund in 1st place, 0 otherwise), Ranking_2nd_5th, and Ranking 6th_lower.  
I run four models according to flow definitions.  The models of Panels A, B, and C are 
estimated using the methodology of Fama-Macbeth (1973).  Cross-sectional regressions 
on monthly fund flows are run and averaged for each coefficient. I test seasonality effect 
on flows expressed by dummy variables per quarter and interaction variables with 
ranking and performance under fixed effect model. 
The absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets under each coefficient.  
Superscripts (*), (**), and (***) indicate the significance level of coefficients at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.  Listed at the bottom of the each panel are the number of 
observations, number of units (i), R-squared values, F-test, and Hausman specification 
test (H0: Correlation Coeff.(ui  , X)=0) for each fixed-effect model. 
 
 
Table 4.8–Panel A.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, 
Quantity_Flow, and Flow_Clients under Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
 
Regressors Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Clients
Intercept 0.215 0.19 0.026 0.025
[2.33]** [2.87]*** [0.52] [0.52]
Lag LOG (Asset) -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001
[2.21]** [2.64]** [0.49] [0.50]
Lag VarFee -3.818 -3.35 -0.461 -0.451
[2.40]** [3.01]*** [0.51] [0.51]
Lag FixFee -0.013 -0.01 -0.003 -0.003
[0.07] [2.03]** [0.81] [0.83]
Lag Weight_Salespersons_3m -0.004 -0.009 0.005 0.005
[0.30] [0.83] [0.98] [0.97]
3Lag Premium_12m 0.339 0.202 0.136 0.138
[2.03]** [2.01]* [1.40] [1.42]
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Table 4.8–Panel B.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, 
Quantity_Flow, and Flow_Clients with Ranking_12m under Fama-
Macbeth (1973) 
 
Regressors Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Clients
Intercept 0.234 0.213 0.021 0.02
[2.39]** [2.88]*** [0.36] [0.36]
Lag LOG (Asset) -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001
[2.21]** [2.70]** [0.29] [0.30]
Lag VarFee -4.039 -3.708 -0.331 -0.309
[2.38]** [2.93]*** [0.32] [0.30]
Lag FixFee -0.014 -0.011 -0.002 -0.002
[1.83]* [1.98]* [0.59] [0.58]
Lag Weight_Salespersons_3m -0.004 -0.009 0.005 0.005
[0.26] [0.74] [0.78] [0.72]
3Lag Ranking_12m -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003
[3.15]*** [2.64]** [1.48] [1.63]
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Table 4.8–Panel C.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, 
Quantity_Flow, and Flow_Clients with Ranking_6th _lower under Fama-
Macbeth (1973) 
 
Regressors Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Clients
Intercept 0.249 0.306 -0.057 -0.059
[2.56]** [3.34]*** [0.74] [0.76]
Lag LOG (Asset) -0.009 -0.011 0.002 0.002
[2.47]** [3.23]*** [0.80] [0.84]
Lag VarFee -4.147 -5.099 0.952 0.973
[2.57]** [1.49]*** [0.70] [0.72]
Lag FixFee -0.016 -0.018 0.001 0.001
[2.05]** [2.56]** [0.23] [0.24]
D.3Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001
[1.79]* [1.69]* [0.61] [0.59]
D.3Lag Ranking 6th_lower_12m -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[2.52]** [1.25]** [1.33] [1.31]
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Table 4.8–Panel D.  Dependent Variables are Flow_Pesos, Value_Flow, 
Quantity_Flow, and Flow_Clients with Ranking 2nd_5th under Fama-
Macbeth (1973) 
 
Regressors Flow_Pesos Value_Flow Quantity_Flow Flow_Clients
Intercept 0.234 0.2 0.034 0.034
[2.65]** [2.63]** [0.55] [0.56]
Lag LOG (Asset) -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001
[2.61]** [2.52]** [0.51] [0.51]
Lag VarFee -4.137 -3.499 -0.638 -0.657
[2.70]** [2.77]*** [0.52] [0.58]
Lag FixFee -0.01 -0.011 0 0.001
[1.37] [2.01]* [0.11] [0.12]
D.3Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.006 0.006 0.0001 0.0001
[2.37]** [3.05]*** [0.06] [0.12]
D.3Lag Ranking 2nd_5th_12m 0.0002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.10] [0.77] [0.75] [0.77]
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Table 4.8–Panel E.  Dependent Variable is Flow_Pesos with Performance, Fees, and 
Salespersons 
 
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG (Asset) --- -0.001 -0.004 -0.008
[0.10] [1.16] [2.31]**
D.3Lag Ranking 1st_12m 0.008 0.008 --- ---
[3.71]*** [3.97]***
3 Lag Ranking_12m --- --- -0.001 ---
[3.98]***
3 Lag Premium_12m --- --- --- 0.56
[5.76]***
Lag VarFee -0.028 -0.399 --- -1.32
[0.48] [0.89] [1.39]
Lag FixFee -0.006 --- -0.004 ---
[1.13] [0.57]
Lag Weight_Marketing_3m -0.019 -0.008 -0.009 -0.003
[1.63] [0.79] [0.74] [0.32]
Lag Weight_Salesforce_3m 0.038 --- --- ---
[1.24]
Lag Salesforce / Assets --- 0.002 --- ---
[1.58]
3Lag Salespersons_3m / Clients --- --- 0.198 ---
[0.48]




Table 4.8–Panel F.  Dependent Variable is Flow_Pesos with Performance, Fees, 
Marketing Expenses 
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept --- --- --- ---
Lag LOG (Asset) -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[1.21] [0.38] [0.12] [0.5]
Lag VarFee -1.068 -0.923 -1.47 -1.384
[1.64] [1.42] [2.23]** [2.11]**
Lag FixFee -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011
[1.72]* [1.76]* [2.34]** [2.24]**
Weight_Marketing_3m -0.019 --- -0.015 -0.014
[1.60] [1.39] [1.35]
Weight_Salesforce_3m 0.041 --- --- ---
[1.16]
Salespersons_3m / Clients --- 0.146 --- ---
[1.07]
Change Marketing_3m --- -0.008 --- ---
[1.50]
Lag Salesforce / Assets --- --- 0.001 ---
[1.38]





Table 4.8–Panel G.  Seasonality Effect under Fixed Effect with Flow_Pesos and 
Interaction Dummies 
Regressors Model Q1 Model Q2 Model Q3 Model Q4
Intercept --- --- ---
---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[3.11]*** [3.11]*** [3.12]*** [3.11]***
Lag FeeVar -4.195 -4.211 -4.188 -4.194
[3.08]*** [3.09]*** [3.08]*** [3.09]***
Lag Feefix -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036
[2.75]*** [2.75]*** [2.74]*** [2.71]***
Lag3 Prem_12m 0.52 0.505 0.442 0.573
[4.61]*** [4.77]*** [3.22]*** [4.77]***
DQ1*Lag3 Prem_12 -0.084 --- --- ---
[0.44]
DQ2*Lag3 Prem_12 --- -0.052 --- ---
[0.23]
DQ3*Lag3 Prem_12 --- --- 0.098 ---
[0.57]





Table 4.8–Panel H.  Seasonality Effect under Fixed Effect with Flow_Pesos and DQi 
 
Regressors Model Q1 Model Q2 Model Q3 Model Q4
Intercept --- --- ---
---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.01
[3.10]*** [3.37]*** [3.12]*** [3.20]***
Lag FeeVar -4.21 -4.456 -4.153 -4.395
[3.09]*** [3.30]*** [3.05]*** [3.22]***
Lag Feefix -0.036 -0.039 -0.036 -0.038
[2.74]*** [2.95]*** [2.74]*** [2.85]***
Lag3 Prem_12m 0.496 0.497 0.495 0.498
[5.01]*** [5.06]*** [5.02]*** [5.04]***
DQ1 0.0001 --- --- ---
[0.10]
DQ2 --- 0.036 --- ---
[0.34]
DQ3 --- --- -0.001 ---
[0.90]




Table 4.8–Panel I.  Seasonality Effect under Fixed Effect with Flow_Pesos and 
Ranking 
Regressors Model Q1 Model Q2 Model Q3 Model Q4
Intercept --- --- ---
---
Lag LOG(Asset) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
[3.11]*** [3.37]*** [3.37]*** [3.39]***
Lag FeeVar -5.984 -5.864 -5.887 -5.916
[4.43]*** [4.34]*** [4.36]*** [4.38]***
Lag Feefix -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051
[3.89]*** [3.89]*** [3.89]*** [3.88]***
DLag3 Ranking_1st 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
[3.04]*** [3.07]*** [3.57]*** [3.59]***
DQ1* DLag3 Ranking_1st -0.005 --- --- ---
[1.11]
DQ2* DLag3 Ranking_1st --- 0.002 --- ---
[0.59]
DQ3* DLag3 Ranking_1st --- --- -0.002 ---
[0.69]





Table 4.9.  Frequencies of Fund Winners 
This table presents the frequencies, expressed in percentage, of the number of 
times a PFA (i) has been ranked in top positions (winner fund) based on the ranking of 
past performance measured by 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month returns computed on rolling 
basis. 
 
PFA 1 5.5 5.5 10.9 14.5 10.9
PFA 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PFA 3 9.1 9.1 5.5 1.8 0.0
PFA 4 10.9 9.1 3.6 0.0 0.0
PFA 5 12.7 16.4 21.8 16.4 12.7
PFA 6 23.6 29.1 34.5 34.5 36.4
PFA 7 9.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
PFA 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PFA 9 12.7 12.7 10.9 12.7 18.2
PFA 10 3.6 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
PFA 11 7.3 5.5 1.8 3.6 0.0
PFA 12 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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